

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The Rise (and Fall?) of Reconciliation in Northern Ireland

Duncan Morrow

Northern Ireland emerged in the 1920s as a society whose democratic veneer was consistently undermined by an antagonistic political core. Following collapse in the 1970s, the Northern Ireland peace process deployed huge political effort to bring violence to an end and to promote reconciliation over antagonism. Although the 1998 Good Friday Agreement promoted reconciliation as a central dimension of peace-building, failure to establish stable political relationships led the sponsoring governments to set aside the goal of reconciliation in pursuit of a more prosaic accord whose priorities were containment and the establishment of consociational political cooperation between suspicious antagonists. The consequence has been to cement social division and a latent antagonism which remains at risk of future instability.

Violence in inter-state disputes about territory and nationality has an almost unlimited potential to escalate. The outbreak of both World Wars in Europe and the implosion of Yugoslavia into massacre and expulsion in the 1990s were both triggered by the powerful vortex of "ethnic" claims in the frontier and the competition of external sponsors. Resolving nationality crises is thus of far greater importance than the limited size of these interfaces initially suggests.[1]

Because events in Northern Ireland did not entirely conform to this pattern, the achievements of the peace process have continued to draw international attention. The bond of nationality, which characteristically

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strengthens when the *Volk* is believed to be under threat by violence, loosened in Britain and Ireland, and was replaced by shared horror and widespread alienation from the violence of Northern Ireland. It became clear that territorial control over the north of Ireland was of only relative importance to Britain and Ireland when set against interests in internal stability, economic prosperity, and globalisation. The partisan impulse was overwhelmed by a rejection of the tide of violence. Instead of escalating inter-state conflict, violent antagonism in Northern Ireland generated a gradual process of inter-state rapprochement as residual post-colonial resentment was steadily transformed into active partnership, and as competing claims to sovereignty and territory were subordinated and reframed within a dynamic narrative of "reconciliation." To those beyond its borders, it was clear that the future in Northern Ireland was to be "shared" and the enmity of the past replaced with friendship and partnership in the future. For better or worse, Northern Ireland was to be a test-bed of a renegotiation of nationalism and democracy.[2]

The emergent British-Irish partnership was undoubtedly a historic achievement. Reconciliation provided a language of "peace" within which traditional national and antagonistic claims that justice and liberty depended on the exercise of exclusive sovereignty were transcended by an ethic which established the sovereign's duty, in partnership with its former enemy, to ensure internal inclusivity and inter-national equality, and to exclude all nationalist justifications for killing and exclusion. The internal conflict narrative of British versus Irish, Protestant versus Catholic, and Unionist versus Nationalist was to be transcended by, not opposed to, a contrasting narrative of sharing over separation and reconciliation over conflict. Within this paradigm, the challenge was fundamentally ethical rather than national, a challenge to engage the moral imagination as John Paul Lederach describes it.[3] This ethical journey from enmity to humanity provided the basis for the engagement of external actors including the United States and the European Union in a common endeavour to find a pluralist solution.

The doctrine of reconciliation gave new coherence to British and Irish policy; however, it brought with it profoundly awkward consequences. The ethical nature of the concept tended to obscure its political content. First, the doctrine of reconciliation allowed the British and Irish elites to "moralise" their actions, obscuring the fact that the prospect of containing and limiting the unenforceable claims of exclusive nationalisms to sovereignty in the ethnic frontier was a matter of interest as much as morality. Like some

magic disappearance trick, reconciliation neatly allowed sovereign government action to repudiate "normal" claims by their nationals for security support at the margin of the state. The stated ethical preference for "peace" was indistinguishable from the *realpolitik* decision that Britain and Ireland would not or could not enforce national claims by violence in the frontier. Without formal acknowledgement, the abandoned nationals in Northern Ireland found it hard to distinguish the doctrine of reconciliation from betrayal.

Second, while managing political problems where they present as violence (Northern Ireland) rather than where they originate (British-Irish relations) is far from unusual, its problematic consequence is that where reconciliation is most necessary it is also most difficult. Not only does it qualify the doctrine of self-determination within liberalism, but it imposes unusual risks of trust on people who have suffered directly at the hands of violence and exclusion. By limiting national solidarity, the British state and broader Irish nationalism were transformed into "innocent peacemakers" while the "Protestants and Catholics" of Northern Ireland were defined as "the problem" for their obtuse refusal to see ethical or political sense.

Finally, an ethic that repudiates national violence inevitably casts an unwelcome light on collusion with violence by all parties in the past. An anti-violence ethic places the claims of victims at the centre of moral concern, exposing killing and exclusion as, at best, futile and misguided. Not only individual killers but whole political traditions are potentially revealed as closer to criminal than heroic. In practice, when this searing exposure of violence threatened to undermine the legitimacy of every political party, governments and nationalists alike found it convenient to "move on."

The Northern Ireland peace process is presented as a remarkable triumph for reconciliation over the persistence of nationalist antagonism. In reality, the visionary and ethical narrative of reconciliation also exposed profound political dilemmas: the persistence of hostile separation and the prioritisation of nationalism, the passing of responsibility for embedding peace from sovereign governments to local ethnic antagonists, and the impossibility of acknowledging wrongdoing in the past while depending on trust in the present. The post-visionary period of peace-building in Northern Ireland has therefore been characterised by the struggle to limit and manage these consequences and by an inherent and persistent fragility.

A PLACE APART

The coming-into-being of Northern Ireland in 1920 owed more to the management of crisis and contingency than to planning. While there was no "Northern Ireland movement" or mass political advocacy calling for its creation before 1920, the outcome confirms Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan's insight that the political cleavages established in Western Europe after World War I would resonate for decades.[4]

Although subject to much of the nationalist turmoil of post-World War I Europe, British territory was not determined by international conference. Facing widespread public support for militant republican insurgency, British authority in most of Ireland could only be secured, if at all, through the exercise of massive force. At the same time, Unionist domination of the Northeast could not be prevented *unless* the British were prepared to prevent it by force. Concluding that nothing would be gained through the further use of British force either to occupy Ireland or to push post-war Empire loyalists into a settlement they were organised to reject, the British Government resorted to constitutional creativity to generate political stability, promoting "articulated Home Rule" as a mechanism to secure Unionism in the North and Irish Nationalism in the South and resolve the pre-War Home Rule dilemma.

The overwhelming British interest was not to maximise the British presence in Ireland but to minimise the impact of Irish divisions on Britain.[5] Although it was immediately rejected by Nationalists as the basis for an accommodation in Ireland, its acceptance by Ulster Unionists paradoxically established Home Rule in the one part of Ireland where the majority had never campaigned for it. Simultaneously partitioned by international frontier from the rest of Ireland and placed at arm's length from London, the consequence was an accidental "place apart," without parallel in the United Kingdom.

The primary effect of Northern Ireland was to secure Ulster Protestants "against" Ireland more than to tie them "into" Britain. Yet the border drawn to minimise the need for the use of British force did not equate to a clean division in popular allegiance. Northern Ireland institutionalised "anti-Irishness" or "anti-Catholicism" much more than it integrated Britishness. Northern Ireland emerged as a new variant on British-Irish territorial and cultural rivalry in which British-Irish conflict metamorphosed into a standoff over the legitimacy of Northern Ireland itself.[6] Northern Ireland's

defining characteristic was neither "Britishness" nor "Irishness" as defined in the rest of Britain and Ireland, but the embedded dynamic of insecurity and antagonism that it purported to resolve.

Politics reflected this integral division between the Unionist *Staatsvolk* and their Nationalist challengers, expressed variously as a conflict between British and Irish or Catholic and Protestant with more in common with developments in the later Habsburg Empire and its tendency to autonomous ethnic self-organisation known as "organic work" than with most of western Europe.[7] The boundaries of community life in its educational, cultural, social, and ecclesiastical forms corresponded to and reproduced the model of "otherness" and, often, "hostility." "Community" gained "hard" shape in the north of Ireland by the correspondence of institution, ritual, and narrative, not only "imagined"[8] but repeatedly reinforced through experiences of belonging and exclusion at local level and through distinct interactions with the organs of state.

THE DYNAMICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTAGONISM

Antagonism is a relationship rooted in actual or threatened violence. Behind antagonism is a generalised fear that "others" intend to destroy me and my vital interests, as evidenced by the activity of those threatening violence, however small in number. The result is a pervasive but fundamental distinction between friend and foe, a distinction which is treated as "fact" and "common sense." People caught up in an antagonistic relationship cannot dismiss the possibility that the other is part of a hostile conspiracy. If the other is perceived to belong to a hostile group, anxiety is lessened but not eliminated by the calming rhetoric of moderates and personal relationships.

Frank Wright, the most astute analyst of the centrality of antagonism in the "ethnic frontier," puts it thus: "Antagonism can be said to be endemic when ethnic communities come to experience each other through the most threatening and aggravated acts of the 'other.' Ideologies of ethnic supremacy are perceptions of the other as a conspiracy against which eternal vigilance is required."[9]

The need to maintain vigilance establishes a reservoir of tolerance for "all means necessary," including the capacity to resort to violence—"just in case." By treating the conspiracy as real, we ourselves are driven to conspire. Antagonism creates a self-replicating engine of vigilance in which each act of violence promises to end violence, but actually generates more violence,

in a pattern of reciprocity and escalation. What persists is the structure of "them and us," where responsibility lies with "the other," and can only be solved by "them" or by victory over them. Antagonism hides the mechanism through which we are also contributory within the reciprocal cycle by naming resistance to the enemy as heroism and by declaring compromise to be appeasement. The heart of antagonistic conflict is this self-perpetuating dynamic of conspiracy, discrimination, and terror in which *everyone* participates and *no one* feels responsible.

In a conspiratorial world, it is simply irrational to promote equality. Antagonism turns everything into a conflict to get and hold the maximum number of resources before rivals can claim them. If inequality creates conflict, it is equally true that conflict rationalises inequality. Once systematic inequality is rationalised as necessary for self-defence, the antagonistic pattern of citizenship becomes embedded in discrimination and resentment, institutionalising a *de facto* experience of first and second class citizenship based on group divisions. Inevitably, Unionists explained the root of this crisis by the malevolent intentions of Nationalism, while Nationalists condemned the system of larger and smaller exclusions institutionalised in the fabric of the state.

Formally equal citizenship is destroyed in practice once the friend and foe dynamic is embedded in the routine practice of the state. Commitment to equal citizenship in Northern Ireland was profoundly compromised by the "self-evident" requirement claimed by the governing Unionists for protection against hostile and violent enemies. Suspicion and vigilance demand control of public institutions, securing the state's privilege to make laws and to use force (Weber's "monopoly of violence"). The appearance of democratic procedures obscures the fact that this is a battle for supremacy between peoples rather than decision-making by a people. Elections are reduced to head-counting between closed groups rather than competitions in a common pool and produce politicians who "represent" antagonistic fears but without clear mandate to transcend them.

By equating victory with justice, violence is raised to the highest ethic. If peace is equated with treachery, cooperation is anathema. Internal participants present a narrative of provocation (by others) and reaction (by us) in which differences in moral responsibility are absolute. Outside observers without stake in the antagonistic relationship see a pattern of reciprocity and similarity where heroes and villains perform essentially the same acts

observed from different sides of an antagonistic relationship. Unsurprisingly, this insight into the equivalence of heroism and crime and the ambivalence of our categories of victim and perpetrator provokes the greatest resistance of all.[10]

Identity is defined *against* the other and it becomes almost impossible to distinguish the extent to which identity is in the solidarity of being "anti-them" or in being "pro-us." Peace will thus not only demand a change in relationship with the other, it will radically alter our understanding of self. Politicians discover that any compromise or refusal to represent the fear underlying antagonism will lead to their replacement by more radical elements. Unless some mechanism is found to break this, politics is reduced to a Clausewitzian extension of war, with the inherent potential to "escalate to the extremes."

Reconciliation in the frontier can be defined as the definitive end of conspiracy and its transcendence by mutual recognition and reciprocity. Reconciliation implies an end to all threat of violence, a political system which commands legitimacy across ancient hostilities and the development of a culture of interdependent action and cooperation in which the claims of citizens to goods and rights from the whole community are treated as personal and individual. Seeking a fundamental reorientation in the pattern of "friend or foe" is the essential difference between conflict transformation and conflict management.[11]

While the "friend or foe" pattern of antagonism persists, the requirement for vigilance and hostile self-organisation remains. Peace agreements which establish a new distribution of power and goods but leave hostility intact remain fragile and vulnerable to attempts to derail them by extremists, often feeling more like short-term pauses in a permanent antagonism, during which anxiety may actually rise. In a context of reciprocal violence, reconciliation is therefore both necessary *and* inherently unlikely.

THE CRISIS OF ANTAGONISM, 1969-1985

Northern Ireland "contained" violence in two senses. It constrained the legacy of wider British-Irish relations within a limited geographical area. If the goal of the settlement of 1920 was to drive the British-Irish crisis off the political agenda in London and Dublin, then Northern Ireland until the mid-1960s "worked." But underlying the superficial tranquillity, political relationships continued to rest on an unsubtle, unspoken, but active antagonism. If the

goal was to eliminate the grievances of Northern Catholics or to reassure Unionists about the intentions of Nationalism, then the events of the 1960s illustrated that the stagnant sectarianism nurtured by the settlement of 1920 had merely incubated the virus.

The collapse of contained antagonism in Northern Ireland was swift and spectacular. In 1968 many observers hoped that peaceful civil rights demands represented an opportunity for reform. But where hostility has been contained rather than resolved, the absence of visible violence cannot be assumed to evidence the presence of democratic relationships. Campaigns about socio-economic questions which can be treated as security threats can trigger an "ethnic" rather than "socio-economic" chain of response at a remarkable speed. By 1969 issues of socio-economic injustice, political hostility, and sectarian bitterness coalesced in confrontation along increasingly sectarian lines and transformed into fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the state.

In the absence of victory for one side, a collapse of contained antagonism can be resolved in two ways: by the elimination of antagonism or by re-establishing stronger containment. Early British efforts tentatively tried to achieve both. Labour Ministers presented themselves as temporary neutral arbiters re-establishing security in an autonomous Northern Irish Catholic-Protestant quarrel, reiterating Northern Ireland's status within the UK[12] while leaning heavily on the Northern Ireland government to concede all remaining civil rights demands. They also pressed the Northern Ireland government to develop a strategy for "community relations" based on practice developing in England in response to tension following immigration from the former Empire.[13] In November 1969, the Community Relations Act set up "a Community Relations Board to promote good relations between all sections of the community" and established a new Ministry and a Commission "to encourage . . . harmonious community relations."[14]

In the event, British attempts at neutrality fell apart under pressure from the drive for security. When the Provisional IRA reignited "armed struggle" against the British presence in Ireland, the army was deployed to enforce ever-tougher security measures for the Unionist Government including internment without trial. For those demanding civil rights, a British agenda of "harmony" in the face of endemic discrimination and exclusion could only be an exercise in protecting interests and placing responsibility on the victims to resolve the problem.[15] Meanwhile, many

Unionists believed "community relations" was a Trojan horse illustrating British naiveté and the tendency to appease those undermining the Union. Many elected politicians and administrators objected to the establishment of the more radical independent Community Relations Commission, and its promotion of community development as a means to give voice to those outside the mainstream of party politics, as a dangerously anti-democratic vehicle[16] which promoted the unelected and "could only lead to anarchy or tyranny in the long run."[17] Although at loggerheads, politicians and administrators concurred that "community relations" was a self-interested British device promoting naive harmony and avoiding substantive issues of legitimacy, discrimination, and violence.

Between August 1969 and February 1973, around 10 percent of the population of the Belfast urban area were forced to evacuate their homes under conditions of intimidation and panic.[18] After paratroopers killed thirteen civil rights campaigners in Derry in January 1972, an outraged crowd set fire to the British embassy in Dublin. Meanwhile, Protestant suspicion of ultimate British abandonment grew. Once the former Northern Ireland Minister for Home Affairs William Craig mobilised his Protestant Vanguard militia and warned of a potential duty to "liquidate the enemy," nobody was left in doubt about the crisis.

The elimination of antagonism seemed impossibly remote. But although the 1920 settlement had imploded, violence reinforced the view of both Governments that their primary interest in Northern Ireland was to protect against further escalation. Wider British and Irish interests were converging over entry to the Common Market.[19] Following the British Government's decision to end Unionist monopoly power in March 1972, political efforts concentrated on partnership between Unionism and Nationalism and increasing inter-governmental cooperation. Direct rule was to be "temporary." In a Green Paper, the UK Government confined its interests in Northern Ireland to establishing internal peace, securing prosperity, and ensuring that Northern Ireland was not a base for any external threat to the security of the United Kingdom; it recognised that relations with Ireland were crucial.[20] Meanwhile, tough security measures to clamp down on Provisional IRA activities were introduced south of the border, reflecting deep anxieties about the impact of violence in the North.

In spite of, or perhaps because of, the slaughter on the streets, a power-sharing Executive based on a cross-party coalition was agreed upon

at Sunningdale, Berkshire. The Unionist leader, Brian Faulkner, also agreed, under pressure, to reactivate the concept of a North-South "Council of Ireland" as part of the deal. Although the Irish Government made clear that "there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired a change,"[21] the dynamic of conspiracy led to a coordinated working class Unionist revolt. Five months after its establishment, the Executive fell when Faulkner was forced to resign. Yet in one of the Executive's few decisive acts, the Community Relations Commission was abolished. Not only was the Minister convinced that the Commission was contributing to deteriorating relationships between communities and elected representatives but he argued that any case for a body independent of government in 1969 was now superseded by political power-sharing. When the returning direct rule administration confirmed the Executive's decision to close the Commission, Rev. Ian Paisley remarked, "No local administration . . . would have dared to do such a thing, and had it done so, this House would have exploded. . . . However, it now seems that this House is learning . . . the wisdom of those who, when these institutions were brought into existence, voiced their objections to them."[22]

Constitutional innovation came to a halt for a decade as the British resorted to "governing the ungovernable," declaring their intention to re-establish the primacy of the police as part of a policy of "normalising" security and introducing draconian anti-terrorist laws to contain the spread of Northern Ireland affairs to Great Britain.[23]

Horror at violence combined with political hopelessness was reflected in huge public demonstrations of support for Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan's call to be allowed "to live and love and build a just and peaceful society" and their view that violence made that work more difficult. But the essential vulnerability of calls for an "end to violence" to polarisation was illustrated after the policy of security "normalisation" led to the withdrawal of special category status to IRA prisoners by the Secretary of State. Nationalists and Unionists divided rapidly along traditional lines as the dispute crystallised deeply-held convictions about legitimacy and ultimate responsibility for violence, reaching its conclusion when ten republican prisoners died on hunger strike in 1981.

There were then no Nationalist takers for British attempts to restart internal devolution in 1982. Alarmed by the meteoric rise of Sinn Féin around the hunger strikes, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)

led by John Hume persuaded the Irish government under Garret Fitzgerald to establish a "New Ireland Forum" to consider the future of the north in an Irish context. The Forum's Report in 1984 broke with previous Irish thinking by airing a series of options short of a unitary Republic to achieve Nationalist aims.

RECONCILIATION AS IDEOLOGY OF STATES

Both Unionists and the British Government rejected what they saw as unchanged Irish expansionism. But the Forum did lead to intensive negotiations between London and Dublin. The emergent Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was the most radical reformulation of British and Irish Government approaches to Northern Ireland since 1920, establishing a new British-Irish commitment to "peace, stability and prosperity throughout the island of Ireland by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights, co-operation against terrorism and the development of economic, social and cultural co-operation."[24] The principle that the border would not be altered without the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland was reiterated, while the British Government agreed to the Irish Government putting forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland.[25] The creation of a standing Intergovernmental Conference and a joint civil service working group outside Belfast underlined their resolve.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement established a new orthodoxy that both containment and an end to antagonism in Northern Ireland required active inter-State cooperation within a broad, if still vague, British and Irish framework. Unionists regarded the concession of a formal role for the Irish Republic as treason.[26] Likewise, Republicans rejected the new arrangements as a "Nationalist nightmare." But an Agreement where the Governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland asserted sovereign responsibility for developing frameworks was not dependent on local participation.

The corollary of mutual containment was the moderation of any lingering rivalry for territorial sovereignty. The logical internal analogue of the end of wider British-Irish antagonism over Northern Ireland was the promotion of intercommunity partnership. "Reconciliation" was the antithesis of historic antagonism and a direct rejection of national and religious fundamentalism. Treating Northern Ireland as a specific "place between," in which unique arrangements for "reconciliation" were required, pitted Unionists against Britain and Republicans against Ireland. The Governments' political

project was to be ethical not territorial, prioritising the justice claims of peace and equality over violence and discrimination more than mediating between the justice claims of nationalities.

Rejected by political Unionism and Republicanism, the governments embarked on direct community engagement. With American, European, and Commonwealth finance, the International Fund for Ireland was established in 1986 to "promote economic and social advance and to encourage contact dialogue and reconciliation between Unionists and Nationalists throughout Ireland"[27] and set about distributing grants and loans for economic development and community enterprise. The British Government embarked on its own program to tackle the alienation of some of the poorest parts of Northern Ireland and initially focused on supporting groups without paramilitary links. But by 1988, Hume was being encouraged to engage in direct dialogue with Sinn Féin and it was clear that "political vetting" was locally unpopular and counter-productive. As political vetting decayed, a new breed of pragmatic activist emerged, many connected to Republican and Loyalist organisations with strong community roots.

Reforms intended to promote inter-community engagement followed. A report on equality of employment by the Government's independent Standing Advisory Committee on Human Rights (SACHR) led to renewed Fair Employment legislation. Legislation in 1989 made provision for Northern Ireland's existing schools to "transform" to integrated status and introduced "Education for Mutual Understanding" into the curriculum.

In 1986, SACHR commissioned a review of community relations policy. The review acknowledged that no intercommunity settlement could succeed without "political accommodation, if not reconciliation"[28] and supported a single Equality and Human Rights institution and the introduction of a Bill of Rights. Contrasting the £436.3 million budget for security against the £1 million invested in civic inter-community action community relations, however, the report argued for investment in community relations, defined as "engaging community energy and activity in the task of finding a negotiated peace within a framework of human rights and equality," and concentrated on improving understanding between communities in Northern Ireland, promoting tolerance and diversity, and encouraging structures to safeguard the rights of all.[29]

SACHR recommended the establishment of a coordinating unit in government and a Community Relations Agency sufficiently independent

to repudiate the charge that it was a puppet of British interests. It would encourage engagement "between groups who under normal circumstances would find it difficult to come together, including all political and paramilitary organisations" and give advice to government on community relations issues or on "improving legislation and its enforcement to promote human rights and equality."

The new Community Relations Council set out to "aggregate peace"[30] by creating an infrastructure of inter-community dialogue and co-operation and improving the quality of engagement around contentious issues. The immediate priority was to identify areas for action where autonomous inter-community engagement could be supported in the absence of political consensus; to emphasise dialogue, conflict resolution, and pluralism; and to develop community-based programmes to tackle sectarianism, discrimination, and violence.[31]

But if "reconciliation" entered the language of diplomacy, it remained fragile in politics. When Hume's direct negotiations with Sinn Féin's Gerry Adams in 1988 indicated a changing calculus among Republicans, the British Secretary of State Peter Brooke reopened secret channels to the Provisional IRA in 1990 and pronounced that the British Government had "no selfish strategic or economic interests in Northern Ireland."[32] Meanwhile, Brooke made overtures to Unionists which seemed to hint that the Anglo-Irish Agreement could be set aside or renegotiated. The result was a tortuous series of "talks about talks."[33] Although talks eventually began, both Nationalists and Unionists resisted the logic of containing the British-Irish problem within Northern Ireland and equating progress with unchanging national imperatives. Hume and Adams believed that an Irish Nationalist consensus could pressure the British to become "persuaders for Unity." Unionists proposed that the North-South elements of the Anglo-Irish Agreement should be subsumed into a British-Irish Agreement with Northern Ireland part of the United Kingdom and any Irish dimension applied equally to all UK regions.[34] Talks collapsed in November 1992.

Ultimately, the argument for reconciliation was made by the argument against violence. When an IRA bomb killed ten and injured fifty-seven on Belfast's Shankill Road in October 1993, it led to a killing spree and a higher death toll than in any month since 1976. It also led the Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring to propose six principles for a peace agreement which sought to replace the Hume-Adams position with proposals more acceptable

to Unionists.[35]

Frantic intergovernmental negotiations led to the Joint Declaration of 15 December 1993. The text conveys Governments at pains to address the issues of greatest sensitivity to Sinn Féin and the Unionists while maintaining the framework established in 1985.[36] The British Government agreed to accept any inclusively negotiated agreement, while the Irish declared that a united Ireland required the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. In a direct attempt to encourage Sinn Féin they announced that all democratically mandated parties which established a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods could participate.

Although the Declaration won international support, Sinn Féin was not persuaded. The document represented a retreat from Hume-Adams, ruling out any prospect of the British acting as "persuaders for unity." Anxious not to reject the process out of hand, Sinn Féin requested clarification of specific points. The British Government underlined that it would begin direct dialogue within three months of "a public and permanent renunciation of violence . . . and commitment to peaceful and democratic means alone" by the IRA.[37]

Ultimately the IRA rejected the text of the Declaration, agreeing to a "complete" rather than permanent end to military operations on 31 August 1994.[38] While this was an offer to end violence immediately, the offer of a "complete not permanent" ceasefire left the suspicion of conspiracy untouched, making it impossible to determine whether it represented a tactical ruse or a historic olive branch. But when Unionists reacted with suspicion, they looked truculent and ungenerous. Faced with the alternative of rejecting the gesture, the Governments determined to move on.

PROCESSING PEACE

The Anglo-Irish Agreement eliminated any prospect that the British or Irish government would countenance anything remotely resembling an international war over Northern Ireland. By prioritising the internal stability of Great Britain and the twenty-six counties over territorial commitments in Northern Ireland, they implicitly qualified and limited their solidarity with Northern nationalists and unionists. That this could not be made explicit, and that both made periodic denials of any such intent, indicates the underlying fragility of the strategy. The British army continued to be deployed and the financial cost of Northern Ireland for both states remained considerable.

Ultimately, the resolution of the problem required some form of shared internal governance which depended in turn on change in the underlying antagonism. Having ruled out "national" solutions, horrified by the limitless nature of violence, and unable to complete abandonment and containment, the governments turned to reconciliation. The Framework Document of 1995 declared the purpose of talks as "a new beginning for relationships within Northern Ireland, within the island of Ireland and between the peoples of these islands."[39]

The distance between the desirability of reconciliation and its achievement remained enormous. The Northern Ireland parties remained resolutely outside the gathering consensus, locked in an antagonism that had hardened over twenty-five years. But having failed to remove the Anglo-Irish Agreement, they found themselves forced into negotiation. In practice, progress required a combination of powerful international support, especially from the European Union and the United States, the expansion of inter-community peacebuilding activity in civil society, and the deployment of enormous diplomatic effort to find forms of words that could enable parties and governments to shift position without explicit acknowledgement. Thus the governments both provided explicit reassurance that peace would not require any fundamental change in national aspiration, while also making clear that "an accommodation will involve an agreed new approach to the traditional constitutional doctrines on both sides."[40]

Peace in Ireland was not "agreed" or even "made," but "processed." Superficially, this meant the "continuous action, operation, or series of changes taking place in a definite manner." The systemic infrastructure produced "three strands of relationships," agreement on the primacy of the rule of law, and actions to address the social and economic issues that fuelled hostility. "Process" also implied "use of an official and established procedure" which kept peace going when there was violence or tension on the streets. But process also means to "perform a series of mechanical or chemical operations on (something) in order to change or preserve it."[41] Unseen and perhaps unnoticed, the original and apparently immutable object—reconciliation—was continuously redefined and renegotiated.

Antagonistic mistrust almost overwhelmed engagement. When the Governments published their "Framework Documents" in February 1995, Unionists rejected them as essentially Nationalist. When the British Government sought to address Unionist alienation a month later by announcing

that Republicans should decommission some of their arms in advance of entering into negotiations (the so-called Washington 3 conditions), relationships with Republicans broke down. Despite attempts to formulate a mechanism to resolve the impasse (the so-called Mitchell Principles including "parallel decommissioning"), the IRA returned to an active campaign of violence, placing a bomb in Canary Wharf in London that killed two and caused an estimated £100 million in damage in February 1996. Nationalists boycotted a new Forum elected in 1996 to begin inter-party negotiations. In July, commercial life in Northern Ireland was brought to a standstill in a dispute over traditional parades. During the General Election of May 1997, the English motorway network was crippled and the Grand National delayed by IRA bombs. As late as June 1997, the IRA shot two police officers dead.

International momentum proved crucial in sustaining the process. President Clinton's visit to Belfast at Christmas in 1995 signified the level of international interest. To "show the European Union's solidarity with the people of Northern Ireland in their search for peace and reconciliation,"[42] the EU committed €667 million over five years to a new PEACE Programme, loosely modelled on the post-war Marshall plan. Targeted at a huge variety of locations and themes including employment, regeneration, and social inclusion, PEACE also established new mechanisms for local cooperation through "EU Strategy Partnerships." Reconciliation was now a participative process, with a vehicle for maintaining momentum at community level when the political process stalled.[43]

The IRA called a second ceasefire in July 1997. One month later, an Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) was established to oversee parallel decommissioning and Sinn Féin signed up to the Mitchell Principles, although without specific action. While David Trimble led the Ulster Unionists into negotiations, other Unionist parties remained outside. Inside, Unionist negotiators refused to speak directly with Sinn Féin. "Heads of Agreement" introduced by the Governments in January 1998 were rejected by Sinn Féin, while proposals on North-South structures were rejected by Unionists. Breaches in ceasefires forced the suspension of first Loyalists and then Sinn Féin. In the final hours of negotiation, serious concerns among Ulster Unionists about the terms of early release of paramilitary prisoners and the decommissioning of weapons almost prevented final accord.

THE AGREEMENT (1998)

While the political arrangements of the Belfast Agreement sought to accommodate and allay the fears of Unionism and Nationalism, the rest of the text of the Agreement was profoundly marked by the language of reconciliation. In theory, at least, the signatories agreed to end violence, share government, promote reconciliation, and accept equality and human rights in a spirit of "partnership, equality and mutual respect."[44] Acknowledging that they did not share constitutional aspirations, the signatories dedicated themselves to "strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements"[45] and recognised that "the tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of suffering."[46]

Arguably the most radical element of the Agreement was its commitment to "the birth-right of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose" and the confirmation that this would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland.[47] Ireland and Irish Nationalists thereby officially conceded the permanent legitimacy of a British people and culture in Ireland, while Unionists and Britain acknowledged that being Irish and seeking a united Ireland in Northern Ireland was a declaration of loyal citizenship in a shared society. Furthermore, it established the right of hybridity and change.

All parties gave a "total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means."[48] The British abandoned the sovereignty of Parliament and accepted that the Irish border was a decision for "the people of the island of Ireland alone."[49] Ministers in the new structures were obliged to "operate in a way conducive to promoting good community relations and equality of treatment."[50] Among over twenty references to Human Rights, the Agreement established a new Commission.[51] The various bodies promoting equality of opportunity were replaced with a new Equality Commission,[52] the role of community organisations in promoting reconciliation was explicitly acknowledged, and the signatories promised to promote both integrated housing and education as policy priorities.[53]

The Agreement was ratified by the UK and Ireland, signed by all major parties in Northern Ireland except the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and approved and passed by massive majorities in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Yet almost immediately, it was clear that the failure

to ensure Republican disarmament left traditional Unionist fears of Republican intentions intact. As Unionists backpedalled on agreed deadlines for the establishment of devolved institutions, Nationalist suspicions that Unionism remained unreformed grew, especially as loyalist declarations of non-cooperation with decommissioning went unchallenged. When the Unionist leader David Trimble called for Sinn Féin to be "house-trained in democracy,"[54] it was clear that the rhetoric of reconciliation in the Agreement had convinced neither Unionist nor Nationalist that the antagonistic conspiracy was over.

The institutions of government collapsed twice before 2003. In 2001, serious disorder broke out in north Belfast, exposing deep sectarian divisions. As one observer remarked, "Looked at from day to day, or from the perspective of those most directly affected by recent violence, it often appears that . . . society has, if anything, become more polarised and segregated."[55]

A SHARED FUTURE?

Despite huge international goodwill, power-sharing was inoperable in the face of parties consumed by suspicion and hostility. Unwilling to let the achievements of the Agreement simply collapse, the Governments and their supporters adopted a form of "parallel processing" in which the framework was "kept alive" by a combination of Government action to establish institutions agreed in 1998, international diplomacy, and community activity. This informal coalition propped up the reconciliation narrative for years after the Agreement on a substantive and significant scale. Commissions for Human Rights and Equality were established and an international Commission on Policing was established under Chris Patten. Community relations were transformed from "contact" at community level to a comprehensive intervention strategy supporting action at every level of society to promote a peaceful and interdependent society under the rubric of "Equity, Diversity and Interdependence" (EDI: "It is no longer possible to limit community relations to the informal and community groups without reference to the broader structure of public and private life"[56]).

The first "Programme for Government" of the short-lived Northern Ireland Executive agreed to "review and put in place a cross-departmental strategy for the promotion of community relations."[57] The review was unequivocal that "acceptance and/or support for 'separate development' or 'co-existence' is inherently unstable, undesirable, inefficient and not

an outcome implied or desired in the Programme for Government." The review team concluded that policy should commit to an over-arching goal of a cohesive but pluralist society underpinned by the principles of Equity, Diversity, and Interdependence.[58] Creating integrated communities, improving communication in interface areas, and building a pluralist culture were to be priorities.[59]

Tellingly, the review was still the subject of open dispute within the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) when police officers invaded Sinn Féin offices at Stormont investigating allegations of a "spy ring" in October 2002, upon which power-sharing collapsed. Despite the collapse of devolution, the governments continued to implement what they could of the Agreement. The unlikely bright spot was policing, where the Patten Commission succeeded in producing a report that attracted the enthusiastic support of moderate Nationalism, the Irish and British Governments and, decisively, the US administration.[60] After 11 September 2001, Sinn Féin came under increasing pressure to cooperate with the new policing arrangements and to decommission weapons.

In January 2003 the new Direct Rule Minister, Des Browne, launched a surprisingly popular consultation on community relations under the title "A Shared Future" that overwhelmingly endorsed the direction established by the previous review.[61] Adopted in 2005, "A Shared Future" declared that "Separate but equal is not an option" and that "Parallel living and the provision of parallel services are unsustainable both morally and economically."[62] Through a "Triennial Action Plan" all Departments would commit to systematic action to tackle sectarianism and the increasingly complex issues of race equality. International resources followed policy. The International Fund for Ireland explicitly endorsed a Shared Future.[63] In 2002, the EU endorsed an even larger PEACE II programme (€995 million of which €609 million came from the EU) designed to "reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation" through the vehicles of economic renewal and social integration and inclusion.[64] Reconciliation was explicitly defined as "a common vision of an interdependent, just, equitable, open and diverse society and the development of a vision of a shared future requiring the involvement of the whole society" and identified with five interdependent issues: (1) the development of a shared vision of an interdependent society; (2) acknowledging and dealing with the past; (3) building positive relationships; (4) significant cultural and attitudinal change; and

(5) managing social, economic, and political change to ensure equality and equity.[65] Despite concern that this would lead to an instrumental approach to a subtle conceptual formulation, the definition was integrated into the development of a further extension to PEACE II in 2006 and the PEACE III programme adopted in 2007.

Paradoxically, the participative element of promoting peace continued, but without broader political engagement. The PEACE programme designed to support working political institutions following the Agreement was being implemented during a period of profound political instability. As a result, a contributory element to a wider political transformation became almost independent of the negotiations to engage the political parties.[66] And while the commitment to reconciliation was deepening within policy and funding, the definition unwittingly summarised precisely the problems which were proving impossible to negotiate with the political leadership of Sinn Féin and the DUP, where Government efforts were increasingly focused on minimising the requirements to abandon antagonism in order to entice participation.

PUTTING HUMPTY-DUMPTY TOGETHER AGAIN?

Recriminations for the failure to resolve the question of disarmament uniformly placed the blame on others, leaving underlying antagonism fatally unresolved.[67] By 2003, these deep antagonistic anxieties had destroyed the leadership of the Ulster Unionists and the SDLP.

The continuing international language of reconciliation and peace obscured the reality that the priority of political accommodation was increasingly moving Governments away from global "reconciliation" towards bilateral discussions with the DUP and Sinn Féin about the conditions under which they could share government. "Reconciliation" was being politically recast as a minimal deal which secured the abandonment of political violence, support for the rule of law, and cooperation in a shared administration. Provided that all parties were committed to renouncing the use of violence and institutional participation was secured, the nature of partnership was treated as negotiable. Critically, there was now no requirement to address the outstanding issues of reconciliation identified in the EU programme such as the vision of an interdependent society, dealing with the past, or inter-community relations. With Government support, reconciliation was increasingly equivalent to voluntary containment by antagonists.

Republican willingness to embrace policing and decommissioning was accelerated, at least in part, by the hostility of the United States to anything associated with extra-state terrorism. When the IRA was accused of coordinating a bank robbery and covering up a murder in 2005, US patience with IRA prevarication snapped. By September 2005, the IRA had completed decommissioning to the satisfaction of the International Decommissioning Body. The task of engaging Unionists who had been hostile to the 1998 Agreement was now centre stage, leading to a new inter-governmental St. Andrews "Agreement." The Governments announced an intention to restore devolution on the basis of unilateral changes to the Belfast Agreement, including abolishing the requirement for the DUP to vote for a Sinn Féin nominee as First or Deputy First Minister, and the full acceptance of the Police Service by Sinn Féin.

Reflecting the precarious balances in his party, the DUP leader, Ian Paisley, neither accepted nor rejected the deal and the process continued. When Sinn Féin indicated that they would sign up to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) providing that responsibility would be devolved from London within "a reasonable period," the ambiguity of this formula allowed DUP negotiators to deny that the devolution of policing had been agreed. After elections in March 2007, both Sinn Féin and DUP concluded that no better deal was likely to emerge and "agreed" to devolution.

Because stability was held to be dependent on the participation of antagonists in government, it was implicitly now conditional on not putting any obstacles in the way. Above all, while behaviour in the present was to change, there was no requirement to address the consequences of violence in the past, and no requirement to resolve the contradictions of antagonistic visions of the future. In effect, the political process engaged the political leaders of the communities in complex power-sharing or consociational arrangements while taking care to avoid any implication that the fundamental hostility or division had been transcended.

The symbolic significance of ancient enemies like Paisley and McGuiness sitting side by side was compelling, but it tended to distract attention from the fact that the visionary elements of the Agreement—dealing with the past, promoting shared housing, integrated education, community relation or human rights bills—had been set aside. Reconciliation was no longer a shared vision, if it ever had been, but was now restricted to the governmental-international "threat" to enforce a Plan B based on "external"

administration of Northern Ireland; it was part of containment.

SHARING OUT THE FUTURE?

Both DUP and Sinn Féin were at pains to avoid any implication that a willingness to agree to devolved government meant a change in nationalist ideology. Rather than endorse "A Shared Future," the Assembly agreed to "note the strategic direction and underpinning principles."[68] In September 2007, a report into the costs of division in Northern Ireland commissioned under direct rule and buried by the new Executive emerged under Freedom of Information regulations. The authors estimated that division in Northern Ireland cost up to £1.5 billion per annum in duplication, misallocated expenditure, and opportunity costs.[69] Sinn Féin in particular reacted ferociously, accusing the authors of "a calculated campaign to dilute the equality agenda . . . designed to elevate community relations over the primary obligation on government to fulfil its equality duty."[70] Equality and good relations, previously understood as complementary, were now set as incompatible alternatives.

Gradually it became clear that all initiatives which sought to explicitly address the elements of reconciliation identified by the EU in 2003 had been set aside. Suggestions from the Mayor of New York or Secretaries of State that these should be policy priorities were ignored. The draft Programme for Government in 2008 made no reference to a shared future or community relations. Only lobbying from churches secured the inclusion of commitment to "a shared and better future" as a cross-cutting theme, and a commitment to implement a program of "cohesion and integration."[71]

An impasse over selection led to a stand-off over education policy which was to last for years, while the priority accorded to inter-community activity in schools and youth work was actively downgraded. The report of the Eames-Bradley group on the Past was dismissed by Unionists and shelved by the British government and it was clear that there would be no agreement on a Bill of Rights. The Ashdown Commission on Parading was mothballed without completing its work and there was no consensus on minority languages policy. Differences over approaches to homosexual equality led to the shelving of a Single Equality Bill while the Review of Public Administration was delayed.

For as long as violence was contained, no British or Irish Government would upset the arrangements. Sinn Féin's historic support for the police

enormously reduced the fear of violence among Protestants and limited support for paramilitary activity, while the DUP's commitment to power-sharing removed the threat of a Unionist monopoly. In the depths of a global economic crisis, a problem contained was a problem resolved.

When a crisis did develop over the failure to agree on a timetable for the devolution of policing and justice, the British and Irish governments dedicated weeks of Ministerial time to resolve it. The episode undoubtedly demonstrated the commitment of the governments to stability. It was also indicative of the continuing fragility of trust. To enable the devolution of policing and justice, the strictly proportional d'Hondt formula used to divide out Ministries in Northern Ireland was set aside and the Ministry was reserved for the small, non-aligned Alliance Party. The DUP's approval for policing was conditional on a new arrangement for parades. Despite direct Sinn Féin-DUP negotiations, the bill was ultimately withdrawn when it was rejected by the Orange Order.

The Alliance Party made its participation in government conditional on the publication of a policy for "cohesion, sharing and integration" (CSI) by the OFMDFM. When it finally emerged in summer 2010, the consultation document drawn up by the OFMDFM was dramatically less ambitious than "A Shared Future."[72] Housing and education hardly featured; there was no reference to previous policy and no plan for any inter-Departmental action framework. Criticism was widespread and comprehensive. An independent report concluded that CSI was jettisoning reconciliation for "mutual accommodation."[73] The CRC bluntly commented that the proposals did nothing to promote cohesion, sharing, or integration,[74] while the independent analyst of consultation responses concluded that "the majority of respondents do not feel that CSI in its current form is acceptable."[75] But while OFMDFM effectively withdrew their proposals and promised all-party talks, the practical consequence was that policy to promote inter-community engagement was abandoned.

A PROBLEM POSTPONED?

The Northern Ireland peace process developed as the interaction of the necessity of reconciliation and its impossibility. However vaguely articulated, "reconciliation" created a framework within which the unwillingness of either Britain or Ireland to support violence by militants in Northern Ireland to force single-identity solutions was given practical and moral effect.

Problematically, however, it implies the development of a relationship in which cooperation becomes normative and threats are isolated, sporadic, and treated as unusual. While diplomacy could seek to negotiate an end to violence, it could not generate trust without decisive risk-taking leadership and plausible, persistent, and comprehensive action.

In 1987, Frank Wright diagnosed that ending ethnic antagonism entailed putting an end to "perceptions of the other as a conspiracy against which eternal vigilance is required."[76] The Good Friday or Belfast Agreement of 1998 placed consociational power-sharing arrangements within an idealistic framework based on interchangeable *jus soli* British and Irish citizenship, mechanisms for change in sovereignty (the principle of consent), human rights and equality frameworks, and commitments to "purely peaceful and democratic means." Governments in Europe and North America contributed diplomatic capital and over £2.5 billion to the efforts. But although it seems rather obvious with hindsight, the absence of mechanisms to assure the permanent demobilisation of paramilitary organisations and the resultant reluctance on the part of Ulster Unionism to fully engage with power-sharing spectacularly failed Frank Wright's test. In spite of evident changes to both Loyalism[77] and Republicanism, conspiracy survived the peace process, leaving Northern Ireland in a kind of Gramscian "no man's land," surrounded by morbid symptoms of a past which had demonstrably failed to deliver either liberation or security, yet resistant to the scale of the political task required by reconciliation.

When power-sharing collapsed in 2002, the Governments continued to promote the wider project of reconciliation as the central dimension of the peace process. Faced with the need to engage those most suspicious of the reconciliation narrative, the political priority was to engage antagonists in institutions which might contain violence rather than to prioritise a shared vision of the future. The opportunity to manage conflict was preferable to the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to transformation. In public, reconciliation was not so much abandoned as redefined, but demands to address the underlying dynamic of national antagonism and generate trust were increasingly treated as superfluous and possibly dangerous. Institutional co-operation was to be combined with cultural hostility, producing an uneasy relationship that could survive the consequences of mutual veto and "sharing out" and did not require any shared vision of the future.

The working out of these paradoxes has come to define the

post-Agreement landscape of a still-unresolved conundrum. While shared Government and commitment to law and order limited the risk of violence, the importance of addressing longer term questions like living together or shared schools were shelved or dismissed. Furthermore, it was increasingly clear that without a new paradigm, it would be impossible to address the long-term decline of industrial Belfast, with a disproportionate effect on the Loyalist working class.[78] For the core parties in the Executive, "sharing" appeared to be, at best, a "necessary, and hopefully temporary, evil" within formally unaltered national projects rather than a positive opportunity to turn away from antagonism within a new, albeit experimental, framework.

Containment was again the name of the game, with the advantage for the governments that, this time, its modalities were agreed upon by both Unionist and Nationalist in Northern Ireland. By 2011, when Elizabeth II became the first British monarch to visit Dublin since partition and independence, nobody could doubt that the British and Irish states were allies in the face of Northern Ireland's divisions.[79] Devolution in 2007 re-established Northern Ireland's status as "a place apart" from the rest of Britain and Ireland.

Ironically, the unchanging interest of the British and Irish governments in limiting responsibility for Northern Ireland ensured that the achievements of reconciliation were lionised in public and its potential shortcomings denied or minimised. Yet the emergence of serious contention around the flying of national flags and the limits to be imposed on sectional parades during 2012 suggested that these issues still had powerful potential to polarise the parties, to significantly damage the credibility of the Executive as a functioning government, and to reignite the residual sense that behind the apparent absence of violence lay an ongoing conspiracy. The critical and as yet unanswered test of the Executive remained clear:

> To date Irish history has been punctuated by periods of violence and periods of relative calm. Peace has never been a reliable destination, but a stopping point in a continuing conflict, a truce dictated by political calculation rather than a transformation to a . . . different relationship . . . . Is this another truce or a step towards transformation? Is this merely a pause, in which essentially enemy communities face each other in mutual loathing awaiting the next substantial shift in the balance of power to renew hostilities or is this a journey towards a destination which is only

> vaguely visible, but is shaped by principles like fairness, equal value and equity, acknowledgement and embrace of diversity and the building of trust and creative interdependence.[80]

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

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Sustainability of Peacebuilding Interventions: The Experience of Peace and Reconciliation Community Projects Supported by the EU Peace III Fund and the International Fund for Ireland

Olga Skarlato, Sean Byrne, Peter Karari, and Kawser Ahmed

This article examines the perceptions of 120 respondents regarding the sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties. Their nongovernmental organizations are supported by economic assistance from the European Union Peace III Fund, the International Fund for Ireland, or both. We explore the perceptions of community group leaders and program development officers from Derry and the Border area regarding the sustainability of funded peacebuilding projects in which they are involved. Their narratives focus on the efforts of volunteers versus paid workers, descriptions of sustainability in community peacebuilding initiatives, and the meaning of sustainability in peacebuilding. The findings emphasize the importance of various dimensions of sustainability in peacebuilding and the implications for external agencies providing economic assistance to peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in countries emerging from political violence.

INTRODUCTION

Peacebuilding is a multilevel and continuous process involving multiple actors and requiring numerous resources.[1] The signing of a peace accord is only one step within the process of peacebuilding; sustained post-agreement political will and support is required to implement the peace accord.[2] "A

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peace process may reach a settlement, but fail to address the root causes of conflict and underrate the human costs of violence."[3] It is critical, therefore, to analyze the deep roots of ethno-political conflicts as well as the degree of political commitment to peacebuilding in order to tackle post-accord reconstruction, reconciliation, and development of a sustainable process of building a more peaceful future.[4] According to Virginia Gamba, peace cannot be consolidated unless the following key objectives are realized: securing peace, ensuring demobilization, ensuring disarmament, and assisting in post-conflict reconstruction and development.[5]

Since the 1920s and the partition of the island, the conflict in Northern Ireland has been characterized by sectarianism, political violence, social exclusion, economic challenges, civil disobedience, and instability.[6] The long war between the Provisional IRA and the British army and Loyalist paramilitaries ended in 1996. In 1998 the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement was signed by the British and Irish governments in a significant political step toward a peaceful resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict by establishing a power-sharing Assembly at Stormont comprising Unionist and Nationalist elected politicians.[7] However, despite the introduction of a political power-sharing mechanism and a significant reduction in political violence, the Protestant Unionist-Loyalist and Catholic Republican-Nationalist communities remain fatally embraced in a deeply divided society with strong ethno-national differences.[8] The process of building peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties is aimed at economic and social recovery, encouraging reconciliation between both communities, and promoting cross-community interaction and relationship building. In this process it is important to consider the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts, including non-governmental organizations' (NGO) single identity and cross-community initiatives supported by international donors.

We start by reviewing the role and the meaning of sustainability in peacebuilding and in peace funding. We then examine the perceptions of the 120 study participants regarding the sustainability of the funded peacebuilding NGO projects. We explore the themes raised by the respondents related to volunteer versus paid workers' efforts, achieving sustainability in community peacebuilding initiatives, and the meaning of sustainability in peacebuilding. Finally, we examine the findings by reflecting on various dimensions of sustainability in peacebuilding as well as discussing the implications for external funders to grassroots peace and reconciliation initiatives.

SUSTAINABILITY IN PEACEBUILDING AND PEACE FUNDING

A key feature of and significant challenge to any peacebuilding process is that it is a long-term orientation toward building a sustainable and peaceful future. According to Roger Mac Ginty, sustainability is one of the meta-ideas that has "underpinned thinking about peace."[9] An important consideration within this critical transformational approach is that peacebuilding and development are processes that need to be sustainable in the long-term.[10] Moreover, John Paul Lederach conceptualized the sustainability of conflict transformation and peacebuilding as a long-term proactive process that involves "a spiral of peace and development instead of a spiral of violence and destruction."[11] John Darby and Mac Ginty also note that an essential criterion for any peace process is the commitment of negotiating parties to a sustained process.[12] Luc Reychler identifies several distinct characteristics of sustainable peace: "the absence of violence; the elimination of unacceptable political, economic and cultural forms of discrimination; a high level of internal and external legitimacy or support; self-sustainability; and a propensity to enhance the constructive transformation of conflict."[13]

The sustainability of post-accord development programs including those supported by international economic aid is also critical.[14] Mac Ginty notes the difficult conditions generally associated with post-accord societies, including "high public debt, underinvestment, unemployment, low revenue collection rates, a weak currency, and a dependency on imports."[15] Post-accord economic aid is "decisive in achieving monetary reconstruction" and "helps facilitate a gradual recovery."[16] Further, Christopher Adam, Paul Collier, and Victor Davies conclude that "postwar aid has a direct effect, perhaps through strengthening confidence in the maintenance of peace."[17] However, Ho-Won Jeong concludes that "local development programs may not sufficiently overcome old animosities for a short time even though support for peace can be nurtured by beneficiaries of economic transactions."[18]

In particular, it is important to prevent creating a dependency culture in communities that benefit from long-term economic assistance from the international donors.[19] Dale Thomas and Neal Jesse emphasize "the dependency on exports to Britain" as one of the causes of the "continued industrial crisis in Northern Ireland."[20] Nicholas Acheson and Carl Milofsky note that the "resource mobilizing strategies" that the voluntary and community organizations in Northern Ireland adopted as early as the 1990s left them "relatively dependent on UK government and European Commission

funds."[21] A long-term vision of sustainability is needed for both the external funding agencies that support community development peacebuilding and reconciliation projects, and for the community members who design, develop, implement, and own these projects.[22]

Grassroots participation is also a critical ingredient in ensuring the sustainability of the peacebuilding process. It may take the form of preliminary consultations, cooperation in designing and carrying out peacebuilding projects, and providing ongoing feedback throughout the projects and after their completion. Grassroots projects include but are not limited to citizen action initiatives in the areas of human rights and social justice, citizen exchange programs, local community empowerment, health, and environmental initiatives.[23] Grassroots communities and external funders must incorporate a social inclusion agenda into the sustainable peace process: "the use of decentralized and local delivery mechanisms is crucial to a grassroots-led approach to transformation so that it gives local ownership of the process and ensures progress and success."[24]

Trust building both before and after the resulting peace accord may also contribute to the effectiveness and sustainability of a peacebuilding process.[25] According to Hizkias Assefa, "building trust and honest relationships are more important in the long run than skills and methodology."[26] In addition, external economic aid as an integral component of post-accord peacebuilding initiatives in Northern Ireland helped build trust by providing the space and resources for members of the Protestant Unionist and Catholic Nationalist communities to interact, cooperate, and build relationships.[27] At the same time, for a peacebuilding process to be sustainable and effective, there is a need to combine internal factors and processes that accompany international economic assistance, including political involvement and a commitment to building a lasting peace with an institutional foundation capable of supporting the process of carrying out this commitment.[28] Moreover, the dimensions of the sustainable impact of peacebuilding projects may include community infrastructure; equity investments in companies; organizations with skills and capabilities that can generate income and gradually have NGOs stop relying on grant funding; and long lasting relationships, including establishing cross-community, cross-sector, and cross-border connections.[29]

This article examines the perceptions of 120 respondents regarding the sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in Northern

Ireland and the Border Counties supported by economic assistance from the European Union (EU) Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (Peace III) and the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), or both. Both external funding agencies were set up to assist the facilitation of economic and social development in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties. The NGO projects supported by the EU Peace III Fund and the IFI attempt to address the legacy of sectarianism and violent conflict by promoting cross-community interaction, encouraging reconciliation, and building peace between the Catholic Nationalist and the Protestant Unionist communities. The respondents represent a wide variety of peacebuilding initiatives supported by both funding agencies, including, but not limited to, activities that aim to build peace through dialogue; cross-community communication and cooperation; art, cultural, and music projects; welfare services; and specific initiatives for youth, women, and the elderly. Some projects have also offered peacebuilding skills training in mediation and facilitation. Many projects supported by the IFI and Peace III Funds have emphasized sustainability as their goal.[30]

Overall, the work of the Peace III Fund (2007-13) is aimed at "reinforcing progress towards a peaceful and stable society and promoting reconciliation" by building social and economic stability and contributing to a shared society in Northern Ireland and the Border region.[31] Peace III is partly funded by the EU through its Structural Funds programme (225 million euros from the EU and further national contributions of 108 million euros).[32] One of the key lessons learned from the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (Peace II) was that peacebuilding is "a long term and multi-dimensional challenge."[33] For the IFI, one concept of peacebuilding is working with communities and organizations "to move beyond a state of conflict to a more stable and civic society."[34]

The IFI was established in 1986 by the British and Irish governments after the signing of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) as an independent international organization to focus on peacebuilding and reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties with support and contributions from the United States, EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.[35] The sustainability of peacebuilding NGOs is a major priority of the IFI, which identifies and supports projects and initiatives in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties that "have the potential to make a long-term contribution

to peace building and integration."[36] In particular, IFI's five-year strategy, "Sharing this Space" (2006-10), was aimed at building and realizing the vision of a shared future. It focused on the most economically and socially deprived communities, facilitated integration between communities, and ensured the long-term sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties.[37] As of 2011, the IFI had approved a total of 869 million euros for peacebuilding projects and administration costs.[38] An external review of the IFI conducted in 2010 found that the IFI "has a strong track record on encouraging sustainable change."[39] In particular, reviewers expected a high proportion of projects to continue under a self-sustainable income without further financial support from the IFI.[40]

METHODOLOGY

The second author conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews in the summer of 2010 to explore the perceptions of 120 respondents from Derry/Londonderry and the Border Counties regarding the role, impact, and significance of external economic aid from the IFI and the EU Peace III Fund in nurturing peacebuilding and reconciliation NGO projects in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties. Using semi-structured questions, the in-depth interviews addressed a number of issues pertaining to the economic assistance process, including the procedures for applying for economic aid to assist peacebuilding NGO initiatives; the evaluation of how the projects worked out; the sustainability of funded NGO projects; the capacity of the funding to assist in building cross-community contact, trust, and understanding; the role and impact of the funding in promoting reconciliation, peacebuilding, and development; the contribution of the funding in consolidating equity and justice; the role of the Belfast Agreement in the Northern Ireland peace process; and the hopes and fears of the study participants regarding the overall peace process. The semi-structured interviews were derived by reading the academic literature on the role of external economic aid in Northern Ireland and other societies emerging out of protracted political violence or civil wars as part of a longitudinal grant-supported research on economic aid and the peace process conducted by the lead author in Northern Ireland in 1997, 2006, and 2010.[41] The focus of this article is on the respondents' perceptions and views of the sustainability of the NGO projects funded by the IFI and/or EU Peace III Fund. The

120 respondents in this study included NGO community group leaders and program development officers from Derry/Londonderry and the Border region including Counties Armagh, Cavan, Derry, Donegal, Fermanagh, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan, and Tyrone. Most of the 120 study participants were involved in peacebuilding and reconciliation NGO projects that have received economic assistance from the IFI, the EU Peace III Fund, or both, while others were IFI or Peace III program development officers. Each interview lasted between 80 and 120 minutes, and all interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. Fictitious names are used in this study. The responses of the 120 study participants were analyzed inductively in a grounded theory approach, as the themes emerged from the data transcripts.[42] Grounded theory has a focus on the inquiry and aims of a study to broaden the understanding of human nature and behaviour in specific social contexts.[43] Using this approach, the interviews were analyzed by carefully and systematically studying the data shared by the respondents and creating a system of codes that would assist to identify the themes and topics discussed in this study.

EXTERNAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF PEACEBUILDING PROJECTS

The respondents reflected on the question of whether their funded peacebuilding projects were sustainable beyond the five year term of funded support. Regarding sustainability options after the external economic assistance ends in 2013, their perceptions varied. For example, one group of study participants noted that when the external funding ends, peacebuilding work will discontinue. A community group leader from Derry expressed this perception:

> *Fiona:* If there is no IFI funding and no official EU funding any community structures within the ground are not going to be there, it's simple, they are not sustainable. . . . If somebody said to me you have the choice of a house or a hospital bed or a community project that's building peace. . . . I mean the size of the cake is only so big and it's only going to go around so far. I would have to say no, they are not going to be there.

On the other hand, another group of study participants noted that the end of economic assistance would not terminate peacebuilding projects and provided a number of reasons for their belief. For example, a community

group leader from Derry shared that peacebuilding initiatives will continue after the funding runs out:

> *Arnold:* I have never worked in community development in a paid post, it has always been voluntary. I have been very lucky I have my own work, I have never wanted to work in it for payment. I have consistently said to funders, I would like you to fund this but if you don't we'll do it anyway and I think that should be the basis. I don't believe that it all should depend on someone's salary being paid. . . . If the Peace money was all taken away tomorrow the peace will hold because people value it too much now. It is not just going to go because the Peace money goes.

Other study participants agreed that while the funding has created a strong foundation for peacebuilding, the extent to which it will be sustainable beyond the external funding depends on a number of important factors. Some of these factors include the ability of peacebuilding organizations to generate alternative funding and to maintain the structure and the leadership of their NGO projects. This perspective was reflected by a community group leader from County Monaghan:

> *Matilda:* All that I have talked about has been possible because of funding because with the best will in the world you need people, their work, because people are doing their everyday jobs. They don't have necessarily the time to invest in building these relationships. Like no matter how you look at it and no matter how idealistic you want to be about it, it does take a certain amount of facilitation and mediation work and you need someone there leading that process. . . . So if you withdraw the funding the will is going to be there and of course you have to have a dividend from what has gone before, and you have people there who have been in a process who will want to continue it. But to what extent they can continue it without the funding, it's certainly going to be more difficult. And you would hope . . . that the legacy of what has gone before will continue . . . but I think the bottom line is you need the structures, you need the money.

A concern that worried many study participants was how to approach the end of funding projects in 2013, especially during the current global economic crisis. Another community group leader from County Monaghan shared her

story about mechanisms to deal with the overall decline in funding support:

> *Mairead:* You have two options: one is not to run the programme at all . . . the other is to charge people for those who are getting it free. I never believed in giving something totally free, ever, so we would have taken a little bit as well as having the grant, which we would have regarded as support taken a little bit from people even if it was only to cover the tea and biscuits or the light or the heating in the room. But now in a time of a recession it's difficult to ask people for very much so where we might have been charging eighty euro for an eight weeks programme two hours a week, we would only be charging now forty because of the recession. So it will impact big time, but we started with nothing and it demands greater creativity and challenge in it. So we're not going to let ourselves be put down by it, but we will still look for every penny we can get wherever we can get it.

Both funding agencies have different criteria and expectations regarding the sustainability of peacebuilding initiatives they support. For example, a community group leader from County Louth reflected on the difference between the EU Peace III Fund and the IFI in terms of measuring the sustainability of peacebuilding projects:

> *William:* So as regards sustainability, yes, I think the International Fund . . . was very much focused on sustainability. It wouldn't be the same with the Peace III programme, the Peace III programme is about bringing people together, and . . . it's very hard to measure . . . the benefits other than you getting both communities working together.

Designing and implementing a sustainable peacebuilding intervention often requires a long-term commitment, multiple resources, and a clear vision of how to maintain the sustainability of projects despite the change in overall circumstances. For example, the introduction of economic assistance and grant opportunities from both funds over twenty-five years ago changed the dynamics of the voluntary sector's involvement in peacebuilding. Consequently, the current decline in the funders' support of external aid to peacebuilding initiatives can have a significant overall impact on the peace process in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties in general and on its volunteer component in particular. The next section focuses more closely on the impact of volunteers versus paid workers on the sustainability of

peacebuilding projects.

BUILDING PEACE: VOLUNTEERS VERSUS PAID WORKERS

The involvement of volunteers in NGOs enriches, sustains, and often drives the local peacebuilding process. However, most peacebuilding projects also require various forms of resources and funding in order to operate long-term and to maximize their capacity. While external funding may be necessary for peacebuilding projects to function, the fluctuation in funding support may affect the dynamics of project delivery and may influence its long-term sustainability. For example, according to a community group leader from Derry, when the funding eventually ends, most peace work will be put aside because the people who are currently involved in these projects will need to find other means to support themselves and their families:

> *Chris:* Most of those groups aren't self-sustainable. Most of those groups only are capable and able of people to do this work provided they have funding for to do it. So my fear is that there would be a major breakdown and people would just give up the cross-community work because obviously they have to put bread on their own table so therefore they would have to find alternative forms of work. And certainly cross-community work and building peace work would be something that would be put aside.

A number of respondents noted that external funding created dependency in the peacebuilding communities in Northern Ireland. Another community group leader from Derry explained this phenomenon:

> *Tom:* There has been quite a strong voluntary sector here that you have created, turned that into a bit of a professional class and when the money starts to end you now see people go back to do it in a voluntary way. And that will happen in some areas but in other areas I think that's going to be quite hard. . . . I don't like to use the word but it does create a dependency. When I'm working with NGOs I feel the same, logically if you can get the money from the Peace programme and you can get a big chunk of it you are feeling, well, that will really keep us going. But in that process you lose your anthropoid spirit and that sort of stuff, and that's compounded also by the rigours of the programme, you know, of the bureaucracy.

However, other respondents noted that when money runs out they will just continue working as volunteers within the NGOs. For example, another community group leader from Derry noted the benefits of having received training that will contribute to the long-term sustainability of their peacebuilding work in the future, including working on a voluntary basis:

> *Gerry:* Yeah, well I think after the money runs out . . . we will continue to run projects, they may not be as grand or as big as what they are. . . . I think in particular the fund from IFI has enabled everybody, IFI provided very good training for their supervisors, it provided good training for administrators, it set us in such a situation where we can run a project on our own with minimum supervising. We have the knowledge, infrastructure, we have the contacts, the communication, we have the training programmes and we have the ability to run programmes now and that will continue.

Moreover, a community group leader from County Fermanagh noted that while there are always volunteers available to participate in peacebuilding initiatives, recognition and encouragement of these volunteers may empower them and help sustain their efforts:

> *Larry:* Before all these projects, there were people doing work in the community and I think there is always going to be a resource of people there . . . to do something for the community, whether they are going to target the hard peace building or do the easier work. . . . I think maybe that encouragement of volunteers and recognitions of volunteers is something that would be important for the next couple of years so that they are seen to be useful, that it's not all paid workers.

While the external assistance from both funds changed the dynamics of the involvement of the voluntary sector in peacebuilding efforts, the present gradual decline of economic assistance brings yet more changes at the grassroots level. For some activists it may be possible to continue their peace and reconciliation work without additional funding. Others may need to reduce or discontinue their voluntary efforts to be able to seek employment to support themselves and their families. There may be significant implications for the Northern Ireland peace process if a large number of community members and activists become less involved in peacebuilding. However, there are also numerous examples of attempts to achieve the sustainability

of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives among community groups in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties that are discussed in the next section.

EXAMPLES OF ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABILITY OF PEACEBUILDING AND RECONCILIATION PROJECTS

Study participants discussed the challenge of developing and carrying out initiatives that are aimed at building sustainable peace and reconciliation among the members of both communities. For example, a community group leader from Derry shared her perceptions about addressing the challenge of achieving sustainability by developing income-generating projects and seeking other means of alternative funding:

> *Myra:* Sustainability is a huge challenge. So for us as an organisation what we have done is we have acquired a semi derelict building . . . that's the one twenty-five million restoration project which we have all the funding for . . . and for us that's just an income generator. We will have tenants, we have seven and a half thousand square feet, we will have tenants in that, they will be paying us the rent, that just goes into our, if you like, coffers to enable us. Because for every pound we raise we can then match it with philanthropic giving, grant giving, because although the peace funding is going, there are other sources of funding.

However, another community group leader from Derry contends that the commercialization of peacebuilding projects is very problematic:

> *Rodger:* One area where there is very little commercial viability is in peacebuilding and in community relations. Unless . . . a group is funded and comes to us and buys our services or we apply for the funding directly to work with groups or individuals and there is no commercial work to be undertaken, that's the bottom line. And if the funding dries up then some work will be diluted, there is no two ways about it.

An important dilemma was raised by a community group leader from Derry who noted the difficulty of commercializing peacebuilding and reconciliation projects:

> *Sinead:* Sustaining what we are currently doing I think is going

> to be difficult because we can't sell it, and the community can't buy it. So . . . how do you sell facilitation skills if you work in a community and conflict whenever you have a situation whereby that community can't buy your skills?

In sum, while peacebuilding activities are not easily commercialized, and generating funds from mediation and facilitation skills may be problematic, commercialization may also be one of the few available sources of income with potential to help sustain some of the peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in the long term.

An important effort to achieve the sustainability of several peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives was described by a community group leader from Derry. He emphasized the significance of collaboration and partnerships in peacebuilding:

> *Brett:* Well I know that one of the things that Peace III tried to achieve was that people become more focused on partnerships so they share resources, share costing and so on, so I suppose that is one of the things about [this] Partnership is there is eleven groups that are going to come together, hopefully share resources, share costs, but if either one of the partnership members get into difficulties there would be support from other projects that would see them through their difficulty.

Another possible approach that could nurture the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts was shared by a community group leader from Derry who noted the need to create jobs and focus on the local economy in the framework of funding peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives:

> *Seamus:* I was one of the people who said that when the European Peace money came on stream what we should do is create as many jobs as possible using it, get people into employment and thus fund community work, community development and strengthening. . . . Northern Ireland has a huge dependency culture . . . we should be creating our own companies and our own jobs. . . . My personal view is that what we have to do is focus on growing the local economy.

Brian, a community group leader from Derry, emphasized the significance of government support of the peacebuilding process to ensure that it is sustainable and noted that "sustainability requires that government be held to

account." The narrative of another Derry community group leader focused on the need for government support to maintain and develop peacebuilding and reconciliation projects further:

> *Simon:* I suppose if people aren't funded and there is no work getting done a lot of people will do things voluntarily, but the only way I can see it is for governments, local governments and the Assembly to treat what people are doing and organisations the same as they treat private health care practitioners and say at least how could you get core funding so that you can stay open and pay the rent. . . . So unless they do that a lot of projects will fizzle out and then in a couple of years' time they will wonder what went wrong, you know it will be short-sighted if they just cut them off.

A community group leader from County Cavan noted that investing in short-term peacebuilding and reconciliation interventions is problematic because it is unlikely that they can be sustainable:

> *Aoife:* Usually if you have a big developmental issue a three or four year intervention is not enough to make it sustain[able], you're probably talking about ten to make something really impacting and long-term sustainable. So short-term interventions are problematic.

A Derry community group leader argued that to achieve sustainability it is important to focus on longer-term projects, reduce the number of funded initiatives if needed, and invite more engagement by academics in advising the grassroots:

> *Niall:* I think the problem with all funders of this kind of work is that it is always short-term, a maximum of three years. . . . And we all know from our own work that, that sort of real change at the grassroots whether you call it peacebuilding or transformation, you know, takes much longer than that. So maybe to fund a project for longer, fund fewer projects but for longer . . . maybe before they start allocating money sometimes [they need] a greater engagement with the academics in terms of advice maybe about what to do.

A Peace III program officer from County Donegal emphasized that developing capacity is important in contributing to the sustainability of funded

peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives:

> *Lydia:* What we're hoping to do is we're hoping to develop capacity within our own organisation so that we have levels of skills within our own organisation that we can continue this work. I mean whether we'll have funding to give out to groups and that type of thing I don't know, but certainly that we would have a perspective and that we would have the understanding.

The respondents shared various examples of their efforts to achieve the long-term sustainability of their peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts. Some study participants focused on developing income-generating components in the framework of their projects, others attempted to seek alternative funding and applied for numerous grants, while still others emphasized the significance of building partnerships and enhancing collaboration within the peacebuilding and reconciliation community. Focusing on the local economy, creating employment opportunities, and needing government support were among other considerations regarding enhancing the sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts. Finally, some study participants noted the importance of long-term interventions and the focus on capacity-building to help ensure the sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation projects in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties.

THE MEANING OF SUSTAINABILITY IN PEACEBUILDING AND RECONCILIATION

A number of respondents went into significant detail regarding what it means for a peacebuilding or a reconciliation project to become sustainable. For example, a community group leader from Derry emphasized an important distinction between the economic dimension of sustainability and the sustainability of networks and relationships:

> *Tom:* I think there is often a mistake in the sustainability debate where it is like, is it about generating income, is it about self-reliance . . . like that business way of thinking about sustainability, not thinking about sustainability as your networks and your relationships. And the Peace programme has helped that, so on the positive side I would say, well, of course having the money and so many people in the sector there is a stronger network of relationships.

A community group leader from County Monaghan noted another important dimension of sustainability, namely, the long-term change in people's attitudes:

> *Liam:* Thinking about sustainability, I suppose I was thinking about it first, tending to think about it in terms of concrete things, buildings, all sorts of stuff like that. I think maybe the more fundamental sustainability is the change of attitudes, which really is short-term; long-term is by far the most important.

For a community group leader from Derry, sustainability means introducing important changes in communities' lifestyles when people become more self-sufficient and more empowered to improve the quality of their lives:

> *George:* It's not about sustainability of organisations essentially, it's about sustaining and addressing the need that exists and improving the quality of life and enabling people to improve their standing in life and to become much more self-reliant and to become less dependent on either state funding or any other funding. But these are very, very difficult issues for communities such as this.

According to a Peace III program officer from County Fermanagh, the sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives is about encouraging community members to build relationships in their day-to-day activities and jobs:

> *Geraldine:* You know, the delivery of Peace III now is that it's not about sustaining community groups for the sake of sustaining them, it's about encouraging them to reach out and do something that they would not normally do, which will help with better relationships within their community or with . . . a neighbouring community, or a community across the Border. So it's an add-on to whatever their core business is . . . should that be environmental, physical, infrastructural.

For a community group leader from Derry, the meaning of sustainability is reflected in the long-term and continuous support that communities show by participating in peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives:

> *Alfred:* Our sustainability is the support of the people and that's what makes things different with us. Because we and even to this day, even going back thirty years or more so in the past sixteen

> years being close to the street and operating with the murals and everything, we have the support of the people in telling their story and that's what will sustain us to whenever regardless of funding.

Sustainability can also be conceptualized in terms of capacity-building among members of both communities. According to a community group leader from County Monaghan, this includes learning important conflict management and conflict resolution skills to help community members deal with conflict on a day-to-day basis and become local leaders building peace in their local communities:

> *Niamh:* In the terms of sustainability the key thing is that you constantly look through your funded period at the sustainability, that this is not about organisations getting money just to run a project, it's about organisations getting money to build the capacity of the communities to have those success stories . . . where they become young community leaders and then adult community leaders and then older community leaders and the sustainability is built into the community. . . . It's about those participants taking their learning outside, giving them mediation skills, conflict management skills, and presentation skills and advocacy skills so that within their own lives they are able to (a) advocate themselves, (b) advocate others, (c) deal with conflict and mediate when stuff arises.

A community group leader from County Armagh shared the example of a strong link between organizational sustainability and the sustainability of community networks:

> *Pauline:* I think funding is going to take a completely new aspect in the next few years and what we would like is to establish [our organization as] a service provider for counselling because ideally what we are trying to do is get some sort of a level service agreement with the health trust so that we will be able to provide counselling because we own our own premises here. . . . So this is our sustainability, we will be able to stay here but what we would like is to give other groups who don't have premises the opportunity to come and use them . . . so we want this to be a meeting point for community groups in the future. So sustainability because some of the units are going to be rented

> and we will pay for the privilege of staying here and continuing our services, but sustainability of community network because we will have the space that is ours for other groups to come and enjoy that as well.

Overall, there are a number of different dimensions to the sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives discussed by the study participants. Some respondents conceptualized sustainability in terms of building relationships and networks or in terms of capacity building or long-term changes in attitudes. Other study participants perceived sustainability as empowering communities to become local leaders in peacebuilding and reconciliation, and in encouraging the self-reliance of community members. Yet other respondents noted that the sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives is reflected by the long-term support and continuous participation of local community members in these initiatives.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the vast majority of our 120 respondents noted that the sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives is a key issue, especially in today's challenging economic times. While some respondents were very positive about continuing peacebuilding and reconciliation work even after the economic aid evaporates, others were very doubtful that this type of work could continue without certain levels of external funding. Yet another group of respondents noted that while the scope of volunteer activity in peacebuilding and reconciliation will decrease, this work will continue due to a variety of income generating approaches that are now used. For example, several respondents articulated a number of income generating funding initiatives such as renting out their available office or meeting space and offering various skills training workshops for a fee (such as training in conflict resolution, mediation, and facilitation). However, other study participants emphasized that it is often complicated to generate funding from peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives because many of these projects focus on cross-community interaction, community-building and relationship-building, and not on generating economic profit.

Consequently, it is important to reflect on the meaning of the sustainability of local community initiatives aimed at building peace and encouraging reconciliation between members of both communities. A key point that emerges from this study is that while the sustainability of business projects

and other economic initiatives set up with the assistance of both funds is important, it is also critical to nurture the sustainability of relationships, connections, and cross-community peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives. In particular, a number of NGOs and initiatives supported by both funding agencies have developed connections and partnerships with sibling organizations which operate as social or commercial enterprises. Such partnerships have the capacity to strengthen these organizations and enhance their peacebuilding potential.

Further, the economic sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation projects is likely to be related to other types of sustainability relevant to the continuous process of building peace and reconciliation. Thus, peacebuilding and reconciliation projects that are economically sustainable are likely to lead to more cross-community interaction and community-building, which in turn may lead to building long-term sustainable relationships among members of both communities. Further, there are a number of initiatives that strongly contribute to the sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts, including (1) investing in training and capacity building, (2) education and empowerment, (3) building partnerships that connect several peacebuilding projects, and (4) enabling people to work together.

The stories concerning the sustainability of peacebuilding and reconciliation projects expressed by the 120 study participants may have important implications for both the IFI and the EU Peace III Fund as well as international funders who support peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts worldwide. In order to understand which peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts are sustainable in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties, it is important to consider what worked and what did not work in terms of specific interventions and peacebuilding and reconciliation projects funded by the EU Peace III Fund or the IFI. Did the economic aid really tackle the specific problems that grassroots communities in Northern Ireland now face? How effective and sustainable were the funded projects in the long-term? Will the funded projects have the capacity to continue after the external funding ends in 2013? Is a hybrid local-international funding approach possible, especially in the light of recent critiques of the Western liberal peacebuilding approach?[44]

The challenge for international donors who invest in the economic reconstruction of post-accord societies is to target and allocate their aid appropriately and effectively. The success of external economic aid may be

defined in terms of accessibility, fairness, effectiveness in targeting particular problems and issues, the degree of community participation, efforts to achieve the goals set by the donors and aid recipients, and the sustainability of funded projects.[45] Further, a transformative approach to evaluating the role of peacebuilding projects is based on the vision of a peacebuilding intervention as a tool for learning, and a space for transforming relationships and building peace.[46]

In conclusion, sustainability is a critical factor that needs to be taken into consideration early on by international funding agencies and by local community groups together as they co-design and implement local peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives. There are many sustainability dimensions to consider. These include the economic sustainability of projects, community participation and support of these initiatives, and the long-term implications of these initiatives in building relationships, generating trust, and encouraging collaboration between conflict-torn communities in their work towards building understanding and a just peace for all.

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Successful Local Peacebuilding in Macedonia: Sustained Dialogue in Practice

Ann Kelleher and Kelly Ryan

Local peacebuilding projects should receive systematic and sustained analysis given their number and importance in creating conditions for peace in post-conflict societies. This analysis of the Nansen Integrated School in Jegunovce, Macedonia brings to light causal factors and specific practices that can produce successful local peacebuilding. Harold Saunders's concept of "sustained dialogue" enables an analysis of the factors contributing to the school's success, while five operational characteristics recommended by Dorothea Hilhorst and Mathijs van Leeuwen provide useful guidelines for examining the school and its sponsoring local peacebuilding organization.

While much of the academic analysis of peace processes focuses on peacemaking—official negotiations and the implementation of resulting agreements—the significance of grassroots, intergroup civic engagement is worthy of systematic study and should not be taken for granted. Post-violent conflict peacebuilding has increasingly attracted academic analysis, including of local peacebuilding strategies. John Paul Lederach, one of the earliest and foremost proponents of local peacebuilding, highlights the importance of local people: "The international community must see people in the setting as resources, not recipients."[1] His citizen-based approach aims for "development of people and their communities in such a way that it facilitates and sustains an infrastructure for peace within their setting."[2] "The greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term," says Lederach, "is always rooted in the local people and their culture."[3] Other authors such

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as Pamela Aall and J. Lewis Rasmussen agree. Aall notes,

> Indigenous people should be viewed as primary resources for conflict resolution and encouraged to take up the task of building peace themselves in their own locales. We have to look for the cultural resources that exist for building peace. . . . In many cases, relying solely on a top-down approach to peace building results in failure and frustration.[4]

Rasmussen emphasizes the need to engage all levels of society: "The transition toward a peaceful democracy must be premised on a sense of national reconciliation from the bottom up and from the top down."[5]

Recent scholarship on local peacebuilding in post-violent conflict societies has proffered theories regarding the relationship between a society's political decision-makers and people at the local level. Oliver Richmond identifies four "generations of theory and practice."[6] The first two are noted above: the "conflict management" approach with its reliance on traditional international relations conceptual frameworks for analysis, and the "conflict resolution" approach which incorporates civic society organizations and social psychological conceptualizations in its analysis of peacebuilding. The third generation of approaches to peace, "liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding," highlights the need for "bottom-up grass roots" support for positive peace as part of a comprehensive, good-governance-through-democracy approach. This conceptual framework emerges from the liberal peace processes that are anchored in Western experience and implemented by United Nations practice.

The fourth generation, "liberal-local hybridity," fully incorporates civic society and ordinary people into the analysis of post-violent conflict peacebuilding. It posits international liberal intervention and local popular support for peace as a difficult but necessary combination, thereby elevating the recipients of peacebuilding to the status of equal partners. According to Richmond, "a 'peacebuilding' that is not localized, cannot engage with the non-liberal subject, fails to build a liberal social contract or develop customary and hybridized understandings of what is viable, or is not context-driven but rather internationally or donor-driven, will not lead to a sustainable process or outcome."[7] In a formative article, Roger Mac Ginty explains the concept of liberal-local hybridity:

> Hybrid peace is in a constant state of flux and reflects a multilevel and multi-issue exercise of cooperation and contestation.

> International actors may not always be well placed to recognize local signs of resistance or subversion. The information-gathering antennae of Western military, political and humanitarian organizations are often very well developed, with institutionalized reporting mechanisms. But, often these organizations are lacking in the anthropological skills needed to recognize and decipher local behavioral patterns that might be subtle and passive.[8]

Given the potential pitfalls MacGinty points out, examples of successful liberal-local hybrid peacebuilding should become part of the literature. This article provides such a case study of hybridity in action. It contends that projects developed via an inter-community dialogue process among local people from the groups impacted by a violent conflict can help overcome the difficulties embedded in international liberal-local partnerships.

This study of an effective example of local peacebuilding applies Harold Saunders's "sustained dialogue" as its core working concept.[9] Sustained dialogue focuses on inter-community dialogue processes engaged in practical problem-solving. These are understood to develop social capital in whole societies. Thus dialogue moves beyond discrete inter-community activities such as workshops, and embodies the potential to create longer-term healthy interactions affecting society at large. Interpreted through the lens of sustained dialogue, the Nansen Integrated School in Jegunovce, Macedonia offers information useful both for ongoing academic analysis and for designing effective local peacebuilding initiatives with long-term implications. Further, besides presenting a conceptual-based analysis, this case study offers an explanation of *how* sustainable dialogue can work. Information from the Nansen Integrated School brings to light action guidelines that can produce successful local peacebuilding in deeply divided societies.

This article's findings result from ten months of qualitative field research that employed three distinct methods to ensure validity: participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and process tracing. These were triangulated and compared with each other to determine accuracy. The authors routinely observed participants in multiple primary and secondary classrooms and during teacher trainings. While all interviews with teachers and Nansen Dialogue Centre-Skopje (NDC Skopje) staff were formulated from prior research and covered the same topics, they were semi-structured, thus guaranteeing the interviewees space to explain their reactions and perspectives without feeling limited by set questions. Regarding process tracing,

NDC Skopje presentations, donor reports, external evaluations, and other documents provided a foundation to understand how the integrated model, and the Nansen process as a whole, had developed over time. Based on primary documents, this process tracing provided insight as to when, how, and why this particular education model was adapted to meet the needs of participants. Taken as a whole, the data resulting from this systematic process provided the information needed to assess what factors enabled "sustained dialogue" in Jegunovce, Macedonia. Useful for this assessment are guidelines for local peacebuilding distilled from an article by Dorothea Hilhorst and Mathijs van Leeuwen in which they analyze their field experiences.[10] These are presented in a subsection below.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Sustained Dialogue through Relational Power

Harold Saunders's "sustained dialogue" process is the core concept for this study. In his view, peacebuilding requires the transforming of relationships in "whole bodies politic." Interaction must occur among clusters of human beings, continuously shifting across permeable boundaries and not just comprised of actions and reactions of formal institutions. Sustained dialogue

> is a process designed to transform conflictual national, racial, ethnic, and even economic relationships. . . . Beyond resolving conflict, we are now learning that such dialogue can be used in building social capital—the civic relationships now seen as the long-unrecognized element essential to economic development. Funding organizations and governments can pay for physical infrastructure, but only citizens outside government can build the social capital—a system of shared practices and covenants—that produces sound economic development and efficient economies.[11]

For Saunders, dialogue connotes both constructive *verbal* interactions and *taking action*: citizens "acting together because they are concerned about particular problems." This expanded definition of dialogue implies ongoing problem-solving activity. "Through a continuous process of interaction they create a cumulative agenda, a growing body of shared knowledge, and an evolving context in which they do things literally together." Citizens "find common ground for ways of talking, thinking, and working together."[12]

Saunders also offers deliberation and dialogue as principles because they

produce effective problem-solving. These contrast with the confrontational interactions and adversarial politics that characterize inter-group political combat. Further, Saunders distinguishes "deliberative dialogue" from "sustained dialogue." The former functions in societies with established institutions for framing interactions and coherent communities experienced in working together. The latter applies where societies have experienced deep-rooted human conflict and torn relationships. Sustained dialogue operates less systematically than deliberative dialogue and features more "dumping" and "downloading" of grievances and perceptions of the "other."[13]

Interaction, says Saunders, creates relationships that generate power—"relational power." Relational power has five components: identity, interests, workings (decision-making implications) of power, perceptions and misperceptions, and patterns of interaction ranging from confrontational to cooperative. These categories provide diagnostic and operational research tools for analysis. Relational power "denotes power that grows out of people relating to each other in ways that produce a result . . . as the capacity to change the course of events." No one can control this multi-level, multi-actor political process, but "using the idea of a multi-level, multi-actor political process as one's conceptual framework provides a context for identifying and encouraging interactions that could help move events in a desired direction."[14]

In this interactive political process, citizens are an essential part of peacebuilding. Not confined to structures and institutions, civic society emerges from the way citizens interact as a whole body politic made up of complex groups creating relationships, generated by citizens themselves, to deal with problems that concern them. Saunders discusses three stages of sustained dialogue. His description of the first, second, and early third stages reflects common conceptions of dialogue in post-violent conflict societies. Then he moves into his expanded understanding of dialogue that includes action: "When they have finished the third stage, presumably their relationships have changed to the point of enabling them to identify a direction for action toward which they feel they can work together. They then design and move toward possible actions."[15] In the case of the Nansen Integrated School in Jegunovce, Macedonia, the "possible actions" became successful.

The factors designated by Saunders—citizen action, a dialogue process, ongoing interactions, all moving on to problem-solving actions—explain why the school has proven successful thus far, as is seen below. That said,

answering "why" begs the question of "how" the school achieved success. Understanding "how" requires analysis using explanatory characteristics that link actions and events to broader factors. Such characteristics are available in a study of local peacebuilding organizations published by Dorothea Hilhorst and Mathijs van Leeuwen.

Explanatory Operational Characteristics Generated from Observations

Hilhorst and van Leeuwen provide a way to operationalize Saunders's "sustained dialogue" through "relational power." In their analysis of two local peace organizations in South Sudan, they formulate five central elements in a "process approach" to how local organizations and groups can effectively build peace.[16] (1) Local organizations must be seen to reflect their social context as a whole and not just "how they operate in the context of conflict and peace." They embody a pattern of cultural conditions in the larger society, and these can change over time in a complicated process. Therefore the local organization or group engaged must be considered holistically, as it operates in a whole society context, and not only according to its expressed peacebuilding purpose. (2) Local organizations and groups have multiple internal identities and social networks, each with connections to the larger society through porous boundaries. How they all formally and informally relate to each other and the peace commitment should be taken into account. (3) Organizations have multiple roles and pressures from internal and external sources. These can work together or, if contradictory, create tensions. These multiple realities can reinforce or undermine the organization's peacebuilding activities. (4) People in organizations and groups attribute meaning to the stated objectives and implementing activities. In addition, they often reinterpret such meanings as they carry out the organization's daily work. As they and outsiders respond to ongoing practical group dynamics, differences can arise, and how they manage the resulting tensions matters to the long-term effectiveness of the organization and its peacebuilding activities. (5) Internal politics and decision-making, such as the allocation of resources and the making of policies, often interact with external political situations, and can reinforce or erode the organization's legitimacy. These internal and external legitimization politics become more difficult in resource-poor situations and when a post-violent conflict has created insecurities. The added complexity of multiple layers of public and private actors at the international, state, and local levels makes the situation

for local peacebuilders even more complicated.

The use of these five elements to analyze organizations and groups has several practical implications. It requires in-depth information, attention paid to informal as well as formal attributes, acknowledgement of the existence of multiple stakeholders and consideration of their perspectives, and recognition that changes can happen over time particularly in post-violent conflict environments where resources are scarce.[17] Thus we may see five relevant characteristics of peacebuilding organizations or groups. These groups (1) reflect the larger societal context; (2) include various identities and networks of people internally, with connections to external social networks through permeable boundaries; (3) carry out mutually reinforcing as well as contradictory roles, only some of which are overt and formalized (contradictory roles can produce tensions); (4) shift the meaning attributed to objectives relative to everyday practices as they carry out activities (differences may arise over which objectives should receive priority); and (5) deal with internal politics (the intragroup networks needed for effective internal decision-making) and external politics (the legitimacy needed for continued external support).

While Hilhorst and van Leeuwen developed these characteristics to explain major problems experienced by the organizations they studied, the five characteristics can also explain success. This study applies them as a working model to determine how, in applying sustainable dialogue practices and programs, the Nansen Dialogue Centre-Skopje's Integrated School in Macedonia developed as an effective local peacebuilder.

NANSEN INTEGRATED SCHOOL IN JEGUNOVCE MUNICIPALITY

Explaining the Nansen Integrated School's origins requires describing at least briefly two contexts external to Jegunovce, one in Norway that gave rise to the Nansen Dialogue Network (NDN) and its Centre in Skopje, Macedonia's capital, and the other the armed conflict in Macedonia that affected people living in the Jegunovce municipality. The relevant series of events in Norway and Macedonia both emanated from the ethnic violence that accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Establishing the Nansen Dialogue Network

As with many organizations that have proven their value over time, the NDN in the Balkans started with an idea that worked in practice and grew through a series of successful programs. The Network began at the Nansen Academy in Lillehammer, Norway. Founded in 1938, the academy originated as a counter to fascism with a set of ideas that remain relevant today:

> Humanism is understood as a basic attitude that can unite people with different religions, political and cultural backgrounds. Humanism is not defined once and for all, but should be explored through constant dialogue and commitment. It is built on the acknowledgement of the unique value of each human being and ties to other human beings and to history. . . . The active work for human rights, freedom of expression and democracy is important for the Nansen Academy.[18]

Given this mission, the academy responded to the 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer as the Bosnia War was raging (1992-95) by remembering that Sarajevo, the host of the Winter Olympics ten years earlier, had once been a place of peaceful inter-ethnic relations. Financed by Lillehammer Olympic Aid, the academy's director, Inge Eidsvag, traveled to Sarajevo when it was under siege to ask, "What can we contribute?" A twelve-week dialogue programme resulted at the Nansen Academy in 1995 for fourteen potential leaders from Bosnia's main ethnic groups. Titled "Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution," this seminar was held again in the spring of 1996 with participants from all the newly formed Balkan countries.[19] "The organizers at the Nansen Academy became aware of the power of inter-ethnic dialogue through their work with the participants in the course. They discovered that dialogue during the course had a much deeper impact on the participants than had been anticipated."[20] The seminars, funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, and Lillehammer Olympic Aid, reflected a cooperative effort by the Nansen Academy, the Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Church Aid, and Oslo's International Peace Research Institute (PRIO).[21] The participation of two more groups from the Balkans that year enabled facilitators to refine the process. Focusing on dialogue and its inherent elements as central concepts, they designed training activities in four categories: teaching, social activities, physical activities, and cultural activities.[22] By the end of 1996, created by Project Director Steinar Bryn,

a former Nansen Academy lecturer, and PRIO's Dan Smith, a systematic training approach that became the "Nansen Dialogue" was in place.[23]

By 2004, more than 300 participants—about equal numbers of women and men from all the new countries created from the former Yugoslavia—had participated in the "Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution" seminars. "Many of the previous participants are now involved in Civil Society organizations and dedicated to support local capacities for peace. More than 50 of them are actively involved in NDC work as full-time staff, project workers or volunteers." Some hold mid to high positions in government; others work as personal advisors to government ministers.[24]

Over the years, the Nansen Dialogue's growing reputation for effective local peacebuilding work in the Balkans stimulated ever more activities and networking meetings for Norwegian organizations, international groups, and people from and in the Balkans. By the fall of 2008, Nansen Dialogue and Peacebuilding events numbered fifty-three, ranging from one-day meetings or workshops to week-long seminars. Held both in Norway and in the Balkans, the events were generally led by Steinar Bryn and Heidrun Sorlie Rohr, the Nansen Dialogue's Pedagogical Coordinator.[25]

As more groups underwent the training seminars at the Nansen Academy, past participants wanted to have reunion meetings as well as seminars in the Balkans. At first, Norwegians provided facilitation, and then some past participants served in this role. During the years 1999 to 2001 the Balkan seminars evolved into multiple-activity centres with full-time administrators,[26] collectively called the Nansen Dialogue Network (NDN). Presently the NDN consists of ten centres, including the one in Skopje, that receive core funding from Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs with management and coordination by the Department of Dialogue and Peacebuilding at the Nansen Academy in Lillehammer.

> The Mission of the Nansen Dialogue Network is to empower people who live in conflict situations—through application of ideas and techniques of dialogue—to contribute to peaceful conflict transformation, democratic development and promotion of human rights . . . and [to provide] neutral and open space where different actors in a serious conflict can meet face to face in truthful and honest communication . . . [and to] break down enemy images, as well as to increase understanding of each other's positions, interests, and needs.[27]

Violence in Macedonia and Development of the Nansen Integrated School

According to an International Crisis Group report,

> Macedonia, during the 1990s considered a beacon of hope in the former Yugoslavia, was racked by intense fighting in spring-summer 2001 between the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and the state security forces. This came at a time when the Kosovo crisis had exacerbated existing tensions between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. . . . The government claims that 63 soldiers were killed and the insurgency lost 88 fighters. Some 70 civilians died. By August 2001 some 170,000 had been displaced.[28]

The NLA announced its existence in January 2001 and fighting began along the traditionally porous border with Kosovo. Most of the violence occurred in the heavily Albanian populated areas in northwest Macedonia and in an Albanian suburb of Skopje.[29] Made up of a loose network of groups rather than a highly structured army, the general goal of NLA leadership was reflected in the words one of the most prominent leaders, Ali Ahmeti: "It was not a territorial war. We want to live as equals in our land and be treated as citizens."[30] This limited objective contrasts with those of other insurgent groups in the Balkans that demanded a separate state. It enabled Ahmeti as well as other NLA leaders to "move on to become an impressively consistent advocate of change through political negotiation inside an undivided, multi-ethnic state."[31] Indeed, in March 2001 the NLA "announced a unilateral ceasefire and called for political dialogue."[32] This inclination to peace was reflected in the fact that "Albanian political leaders throughout the region condemned the use of force."[33]

Violent clashes ended with the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), thereby avoiding full-scale civil war. In general, the NLA agreed to disarm in return for Macedonian government reforms based on non-discrimination and integration of governmental institutions. The international community had heavily influenced the process leading to the agreement and a NATO force of over 4,000 carried out the NLA disarmament in "Operation Essential Harvest."[34]

Particularly relevant to this study, the agreement includes a major emphasis on language and education. Out of eight sections plus annexes, Section 6 mandates guidelines on "Education and Use of Languages." These include the following:

> 6.1. With respect to primary and secondary education, instruction will be provided in the students' native languages, while at the same time uniform standards for academic programs will be applied throughout Macedonia. 6.2. State funding will be provided for university level education in languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the population of Macedonia, on the basis of specific agreements.[35]

Of Macedonia's minorities, who include Albanians, Turks, Roma, and Serbs, only Albanians meet the 20 percent baseline.[36] These statements in the OFA are balanced by the following: "6.4. The official language through Macedonia and in the international relations of Macedonia is the Macedonian language."[37] The next items, however, may be interpreted as a caveat:

> 6.5. Any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official language, as set forth herein. . . . 6.6. With respect to local self-government, in municipalities where a community comprises at least 20 percent of the population of the municipality, the language of that community will be used as an official language in addition to Macedonian. With respect to languages spoken by less than 20 percent of the population of the municipality, the local authorities will decide democratically on their use in public bodies.[38]

The 2001 armed insurrection directly relates to the initiation and development of the Nansen School in at least three ways: (1) it made highly relevant the stated mission of the Nansen Dialogue Centre-Skopje in its use of dialogue to establish inter-community problem-solving relationships, (2) the school was located where some of the fighting had occurred, and (3) the Ohrid Framework Agreement has served as an endorsement. All three are reflected in following quotations from NDC Skopje's website:

> NDC Skopje's vision is of a democratic society in which dialogue is the everyday tool for problem resolution between individuals, groups or communities; a society in which peace, multiethnic cohesion, integration, equality and tolerance are the main values. Our mission is to contribute to peace building, supporting and strengthening through our activities the dialogue, reconciliation, and integration process in the Macedonian society in general and, more specifically, within the educational system. . . . After the end of the conflict in Macedonia and signing the Framework

> Peace Agreement in 2001, NDC Skopje has focused its activities towards promotion of the Framework Peace Agreement.[39]

The project Integrated Bilingual Primary School[40] is part of the Program for dialogue and reconciliation which NDC Skopje started implementing in the municipality of Jegunovce in 2005. The municipality of Jegunovce was chosen as a target community because of its involvement in the conflict in 2001 which resulted in total ethnic division of the villages and schools.[41]

As with the Nansen Dialogue in Lillehammer, the Integrated Bilingual School in Macedonia's Jegunovce municipality evolved rapidly. Facilitated dialogue seminars began in 2005 with people from various groups: the Municipal Council and the mayor, presidents of local village councils, parents, and teachers. Dialogues included "seminars and trainings for communication skills, cooperation, tolerance, teamwork, and peaceful conflict resolution" since the 2001 violence had "resulted in total ethnic division of the villages and schools."[42] These dialogue processes enabled grassroots decision making and a consensus formed to create voluntary primary education opportunities in information technology (IT) and English after regular school was over for the day. The classes would be attended by Macedonian and Albanian children together and be taught in both languages. Within six months, participating parents wanted to expand instruction to include the Albanian language, and Macedonian was added soon afterwards.[43]

This plan for integrated classes after regular school instruction was very different from the established segregated education system that taught children of the two ethnic groups separately, each in their language. Many accepted this segregated system as the way to implement the OFA's mandate on "Education and Use of Languages" quoted above, but those involved in designing the Nansen School thought that the OFA could also be implemented with ethnically integrated instruction.

In 2005, classes in IT and English began in parents' houses because of the potential risk posed by participating in integrated activities. Instruction in basic English began in Ratae, a predominantly Macedonian village, while the Albanian town of Shemshovo hosted the new IT class. Within a few months, success and a softening political atmosphere enabled the after-school special instruction to move into existing school buildings and other locations in villages in the southern region of the Jegunovce Municipality. Locating classes in various sites made it necessary for parents to take their children to both Albanian and Macedonian villages, further enhancing the

integrated nature of the project. By the end of the first year, about 50 percent of the eligible children in grades five through eight attended the integrated bilingual classes. Every class had two teachers, one speaking Albanian and one Macedonian. They were and continue to be taught every weekday from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m.[44]

Subjects	2005	2006	2007
English	132	165	148
IT	180	250	178
Albanian	45	45	53
Macedonian	26	35	61

Local requests for the school to have its own building surfaced during dialogues, and in 2008 the Fridtjof Nansen Integrated Primary School was opened in Prelubishte, a village acceptable to both communities. Learners from fourteen villages attended. With the addition in 2010 of the Fridtjof Nansen Integrated Secondary School, the two schools became the Nansen Integrated School. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided funding at every step. The Norwegian Ambassador as well as Macedonia's Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Education attended the secondary school's official opening.[45]

The primary and secondary schools each have four teachers. They instruct the country-wide required curriculum during the regular school day and the supplemental subjects using the integrated bilingual process beginning at 3:00 p.m. Two adjunct teachers in English also provide supplemental instruction at the secondary school. The voluntary, after-school instruction is designed to augment and reinforce regular day-time subjects.[46] This was noted by Snezana Misajlovska, a Nansen Primary School teacher: "[I found] difficulty in the beginning in joining the extracurricular and regular curriculum, but now it is good because I can use what I teach in the extracurricular activities in my regular classes."[47]

The following five factors contribute to the school's success.

1. Dedication to an inspirational and necessary mission. The NDC Skopje has lived up to its goal of peacebuilding through dialogues, multi-ethnic problem solving, and civic action that create practices needed for democracy. It continues to work closely with local government officials, parents, and teachers, linking them to international supporters, facilitators, and funders.

As part of its coordinating role, the Centre's personnel maintain and build on connections with relevant Macedonian government agencies and legislators plus international organizations with offices in the country. Clearly conscious of the need for networking, NDC Skopje personnel link every workshop, seminar, training session, meeting, conference, and ceremonial occasion to their peacebuilding mission through dialogue.

The dialogue process continues in support of the Integrated School; for example, the 2010 "Final Report on the Use of Project Funds" noted that two seminars were held with forty-six parents of potential secondary school students. Also organized were three weekend seminars with the thirty-five students from the secondary school, twenty Macedonians and fifteen Albanians. The report also noted a "study visit" to Norway, another form of Nansen Dialogue practice. Participants included mayors of five multi-ethnic municipalities interested in the Nansen School's integrated bilingual methodology, directors of other primary and secondary schools, and officials in various relevant Macedonian government agencies.[48] Other multi-ethnic study visits to Norway have included a parents' group in 2009 and one for secondary students in the summer of 2011.[49]

2. An Ongoing Participatory Decision-Making Process. Inter-ethnic dialogue not only provides the mission's core concept, but also leads to a balanced, interactive, participatory decision-making process. The rapid development of the school reflects the dedication of parents, teachers, and learners plus those in local governing councils who were part of the process, and not without personal risk. The NDC Skopje emphasizes a triangle of direct involvement—parents, teachers, and learners—who provide input as well as receive benefits.[50] Participatory development of the Nansen Integrated School instruction means that its practices, policies, and subjects relate directly to its social location and the needs of participants.

The establishment of the school and the NDC Skopje's continued use of dialogue seminars in its facilitation process provides a practical example of Saunders's sustained dialogue. His "relational power" concept is seen in the growth of shared interests and the beginnings of a common identity when people worked on a project together, particularly one that proved itself in a short period of time. The people who made decisions about the school had worked through "perceptions and misperceptions" and experienced "patterns of interaction ranging from confrontational to cooperative." A spinoff activity of the Integrated School illustrates how taking action can

create shared interests: parents of primary school learners may take three-month IT courses as a bilingual group, and thirty—half women and half men—have completed them.[51]

3. Timely implementation of results after initiating a sustained dialogue process. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' funding for the school illustrates the Norwegian government's policy of carefully selecting and fully supporting promising development/peace projects over extended periods of time. Promised financial support is delivered as soon as possible, and can take months instead of years. This Norwegian policy is important because it contributes to a project's positive momentum and helps keep potential spoilers on the defensive. Timely implementation also marked the Nansen Academy's establishment of its "Democracy, Human Rights and Peaceful Conflict Resolution" dialogue seminars in 1995 and its follow-up Nansen Dialogue Network Centres from 1999 to 2001. Further, Norway's long-term commitment to local peacebuilding processes involves not only funding but also substantive evaluation reviews and reports.

The Nansen School's external funding—including stipends for the teachers, instructional materials, building the primary and secondary school, and the Nansen Dialogue Centre Skopje—has given rise to questions in Macedonia about whether or not the Nansen Integrated School can be replicated. Some think of it as a showcase project that works because of its external funding, but others with knowledge of the school say there are other ways to achieve integrated inter-community education. The issue arose, for example, during a 16 April 2011 presentation in an NDC Skopje's teacher training seminar. Jashar Kasami of the Republic of Macedonia's State Education Inspectorate expressed support for the Nansen School methodology and hoped that it could become relevant in other schools. In the discussion that followed, several participants noted the need for resources. One response to the question appears in Marshal Tito Primary School in Strumica Municipality, which has adopted the "Nansen Model for Integrated and Bilingual Education" at the first grade level at its own expense. Thus it appears that Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs funding has enabled the evolution of an effective teaching-learning methodology that can work in other environments.

It is true that in Macedonia, a resource-scarce country, the Nansen Primary and Secondary Schools stand in stark contrast with many others. Observers may view the Nansen Model as a promising beacon or a target

of criticism. Whatever their reaction, in Jegunovce Municipality the model used in the Nansen Integrated School has enabled a constructive response to Macedonia's deep ethnic divisions. This is particularly noteworthy in light of the 11 August 2011 report of the International Crisis Group: "Macedonia is justified in celebrating its success in integrating minorities into political life," but it also has "worrying trends," including "increased segregation in schools," that "risk undermining the multi-ethnic civil state Macedonia can become."[52] Ultimately, any strategy to integrate education will take resources. That one effective method has been developed and piloted is remarkable, and the Nansen Model deserves accolades for its national, international, and particularly local networks.

4. Development of an effective instructional methodology. The NDC Skopje's phrase "integrated bilingual education through activities" means a specific teaching-learning methodology using a cooperative decision-making process that includes parents and teachers as well as the Centre's curriculum design specialists. Developed in consultation with education specialists in Belgium and Switzerland,[53] Nansen School teachers use paraphrasing and activity-based instruction. Paraphrasing means that the two teachers, one speaking Macedonian and the other Albanian, take turns sentence-by-sentence when talking to the learners. Sometimes the sentence begins in Macedonian and ends in Albanian, and other times vice versa. Neither translates what the other is saying. The pedagogical strategy is to learn by listening and by doing what the teachers have explained. The activities aspect of the process is as important as the paraphrasing used to teach and give directions for action.[54] Learning by paraphrasing and interactive activities makes sense since the long-term objectives are for learners to become comfortable with personal interaction and bilingualism in a shared society.

The paraphrasing and activities-based instructional methodology has also worked elsewhere—in Strumica Municipality in the above-mentioned Marshal Tito Primary School, a school with a Turkish minority. During the fall of 2010, thirty-two first grade learners, sixteen Macedonians and sixteen Turks, participated. The Strumica Municipality budget financed the project.[55]

5. Competence of Nansen Dialogue Centre Skopje personnel. The central role of NDC Skopje personnel in facilitating and helping manage the Nansen School provides evidence of their well-developed multiple capabilities. They have served as dialogue facilitators, training designers, workshop

leaders, grant writers, administrators, idea initiators, and networkers both within Macedonia and internationally. Not surprisingly, the number and range of requests for information has risen exponentially along with several spinoffs, such as the Marshall Tito Primary School project and a request from a university for an elective course on "Integrated and Bilingual Education" to be offered by its faculty of education.[56]

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NANSEN INTEGRATED SCHOOL AND NDC SKOPJE THAT ENABLE EFFECTIVE SUSTAINED DIALOGUE

Hilhorst and van Leeuwen named characteristics that emerged from their understanding that local peacebuilding organizations reflect their divided societies in various ways. Because violence produces severe social fracturing, inter-community organizations involved in post-agreement peacebuilding must demonstrate the ability of people from various ethnicities to work together. In carrying out projects that are intensely scrutinized and politically sensitive, local organizations are expected to exemplify healthy relationships during daily interactions and inevitable disagreements. All involved in the Nansen School—NDC Skopje personnel, parents, teachers, learners, and local government representatives in Jegunovce—deserve credit for producing a series of successful projects, thus creating a cumulative ongoing process.

The Hilhorst-van Leeuwen five-point framework provides a set of interrelated analytical categories. The following information about the interaction of those involved in the Nansen School and NDC Skopje, embedded in the Macedonian context and internationally networked, illustrates how sustained dialogue can work in practice.

1. Reflect the larger societal context. When dealing with local peacebuilding organizations, "it is wise to take into account their history and trace where they come from." According to Hilhorst and van Leeuwen, analysts should always locate local peacebuilding in its national and international contexts. "Strengthening local capacities for peace is crucial because, in the first place, higher-level conflicts are always manifested locally in specific conflicts that need to be resolved on the ground."[57] The Nansen Dialogue Centre-Skopje and the Nansen School reflect Macedonia's "higher-level conflicts" in three notable ways: they represent the primary ethnicities, they respond to development needs in Macedonia as a whole, and they expand

activities to include ethnic communities in other regions of Macedonia.

First, NDC Skopje reflects the ethnic demographics of Jegunovce, which differ from those in Macedonia as a whole in that Albanians comprise about 43 percent instead of 24-25 percent of the population, with Macedonians at 56 percent.[58] The Centre has six full-time personnel. The executive team consists of the director, a Macedonian, and the program director, an Albanian, who share responsibility for day-to-day operations, community relations and engagement, and long-range planning. They manage the organization's relationship with international contacts, donors, and national and municipal leaders, and recruit families, learners, and teachers to participate in the Integrated School programs. A Macedonian office manager supports the executive team, and the Education and Curriculum Development team has three education specialists, one Albanian and two Macedonians. The Centre's Management Board, which advises on projects and finances and sets long-term goals, has nationally known Macedonian and Albanian members as well as four Norwegians.[59]

Second, the approach used by NDC Skopje to initiate a project meant that it would be a response to a major need. Through a multiple-year process of dialogue seminars, various local people in the Albanian and Macedonians communities reached a shared response to the question, "what do you want?" They responded, "a better education for our children."[60] By not framing the question in terms of the armed conflict or the peace agreement, seminar participants could identify a mutual need regardless of ethnicity. That moved the resulting education project beyond conflict issues and built it on the common ground of a generally recognized social deficit affecting the larger society. Instead of investing in an organization-centric project, the Centre facilitated the development of a community-based project. This significant distinction, important for Hilhorst and van Leeuwen, boded well for the project.[61]

Third, the Nansen School's paraphrasing and learning through activities approach to an integrated bilingual education has attracted attention and already taken root in Marshall Tito Primary School with a large Turkish student population in Strumica Municipality. Located in Macedonia's southeast, Strumica has Macedonians, Turks, and Roma. While the current project serves Macedonian and Turkish learners, NDC Skopje staff members hope in the future also to include Roma.[62] This support of an integrated school in Strumica reflects NDC Skopje's commitment beyond the armed

conflict area to the larger society and nation.

2. Connect to external social networks through permeable boundaries. The second Hilhorst-van Leeuwen characteristic highlights the fact that local peacebuilding organizations include people with various identities who have internal networks and connections to external social networks through permeable boundaries. In addition to representing both the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic groups internally, NDC Skopje works with local, Macedonian government, and international networks.

The Nansen School teachers comprise a vital element of the Centre's local networks. Like the NDC Skopje staff and given the paraphrasing methodology, the teachers have an even distribution between Albanians and Macedonians. They are unique in the teacher communities because they teach as a team with a counterpart of the other ethnicity, teach children of both groups, and have to prepare classes using two languages. They link the Centre's activities and goals to village level networks. One connection is with teachers in Jegunovce who teach in segregated schools. Dushko Perinski, a Macedonian teacher in the Nansen Secondary school, described other teachers as initially doubtful of the NDC Skopje program. In the beginning they thought the program would fade away, but after two years of successful integrated bilingual education, they know the program is there to stay.[63] This lasting example of successful peacebuilding through education helps other teachers in the community to see the NDC Skopje approach as valid.

The Nansen School teachers also provide a link to various Jegunovce villages. The municipality has seventeen small villages. In some, such as Kopance, Albanians and Macedonians are about evenly represented, while others, like Zilche, are almost entirely Macedonian or, like Shemsovo, are predominantly Albanian.[64] Most teachers live in villages in or around Jegunovce, but some come from as far as Macedonia's capital, Skopje, to teach.[65] NDC Skopje, then, is connected to local leaders and citizens around Jegunovce through the teachers. For instance, Snezana Misajovska, a Macedonian primary school teacher, lives in Skopje but knows municipal leaders in Jegunovce where she was raised.[66]

The NDC Skopje also has connections with the Macedonian government. At the beginning, the Centre had to work with Macedonia's Ministry of Education for approval to begin the education program in Jegunovce. In addition, the Vice Prime Minister, Abdylaqim Ademi from Shemshovo, supported the project from the beginning, saying it would need to last two

years to prove its legitimacy.[67] Another government agency, the Secretariat for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (SIOFA), has expressed support after seeing the success of the Nansen Schools' integrated bilingual process in Jegunovce and Strumica,[68] and has identified NDC Skopje's integrated bilingual projects as useful for implementing the 2001 OFA peace agreement. Accordingly, in 2011, SIOFA funded two teacher training seminars in Ohrid and Struga for Nansen teachers from Jegunovce and Strumica.

The NDC Skopje's international connections are built-in since the Centre functions as one of ten such Nansen Centres throughout the western Balkans. Their directors meet with counterparts to coordinate and share information. In addition to the four Norwegians on the NDC Skopje's advisory board, the Centre enjoys explicit support from Ambassador Knut Vollebaek, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) High Commissioner for National Minorities. Vollebaek has visited the Nansen School twice and started an unofficial practice of cooperation between the NDC Skopje and OSCE. According to NDC Skopje's Program Manager, Veton Zekolli, "Ambassador Vollebaek has written documents of support. He understands we have to start at the grassroots with parents."[69]

In 2010, with Vollebaek's support, the Macedonian Ministry of Education and Science adopted a "Policy Paper" that illustrates how a synthesis of international, national, and local networks involving the Nansen primary and secondary schools can advance and support integrated education. The document, "Steps Towards an Integrated Education System," provides background information and the legal basis for the "overall aim" of bringing about "tangible and considerable change in the general approach within the education system in accordance with the multiethnic reality of the country, as it is reflected in the Constitution and relevant legislation deriving from the Ohrid Framework Agreement." It also stipulates five "thematic strands" with their implementing objectives: (1) "Promotion of Integration through Joint Activities," (2) "Integration through Language Acquisition," (3) "Curricula and Textbooks," (4) "Teachers' Qualifications," and (5) "School Management in the Context of Decentralization."[70] All of the five strands relate to Nansen School practices. The policy statement's "Annexes" section specifically notes the Nansen Integrated primary and secondary schools as representative of strands one and four.

3. Manage mutually reinforcing as well as contradictory roles. Hilhorst

and van Leeuwen's third characteristic—that peacebuilding organisations carry out mutually reinforcing as well as contradictory roles, only some of which are overt and formalized—explained how tensions arose, limiting the effectiveness of a local peacebuilding organization in southern Sudan; but in the case of NDC Skopje contradictory roles did not develop. Organizing the Nansen Integrated School has become the Centre's primary focus and it remains consistent with the core mission to engage in peacebuilding through inter-group dialogue. The Centre's personnel, its Board, Macedonian and international networks, and the school's parents and teachers all accept the direct connection of inter-community dialogue with NDC Skopje's role in primary and secondary education. The Centre as educator has implemented and reinforced its original peacebuilding purpose.

4. Connect the meaning attributed to objectives to everyday practices. Hilhorst and van Leeuwen explain that in carrying out their activities, organizational personnel formulate their own explanations for their work and develop their own specific interests. Thus, "research cannot be limited to formal organisational features, structures and reports. Instead it must take into account the everyday practices of the social actors in and around the organization. . . . Rather than taking organisations at face value, we have to ask and observe how their claims and performances acquire meaning in practice."[71]

The NDC Skopje's adoption of a larger budget and hiring educators as a new category of personnel did not produce tensions. Inter-community dialogue seminars continued (most focused on developing the Nansen School), while teacher training sessions and eventually having two school buildings constructed became major objectives. The Centre and its primary funder, Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, showed their flexibility and capacity to move quickly when the opportunity for substantial inter-community progress through education became clear. The idea for integrated bilingual education flowed seamlessly from the peacebuilding dialogues in Jegunovce. The Centre has designed a flexible set of programs and practices tailored to local communities in Jegunovce since their people participated in decisions made at every step in the process. This practice of working directly with local people was evident again in NDC Skopje's response to the request for a integrated bilingual education project in Marshall Tito Primary School.

As for the Nansen School teachers, the possibilities inherent in paraphrasing and active learning as an instructional strategy have created a sense

of shared purpose not only to produce a unique innovation in Macedonian education, but also to contribute to a healthy, multi-ethnic Macedonia. Teachers tackle lessons of ecology, drama, peace, and tolerance with one teacher beginning a phrase in one language and the other teacher almost seamlessly finishing the thought in the other.[72] By linking the objective of teaching to the objective of peacebuilding, this integrated teaching method creates a shared purpose. Not only do students learn about the subjects of instruction, they also begin to integrate socially and linguistically in the classroom through daily activity. Linda Jashari, an Albanian primary school teacher, recalls, "In the beginning the students didn't even know the other language. Last year they kind of understood. Now they understand everything."[73]

The daily interactions among teachers of different ethnicities have significantly transformed relationships. They deal with numerous challenges in creating joint lesson plans, and applying them in two languages requires them to think together. Jashari says, "Paraphrasing is the hardest during bilingual activities. You have to follow and coordinate with your fellow teacher. You have to coordinate your thoughts."[74] Achieving this is not easy and it encourages the teachers to work together outside the classroom. According to a Nansen secondary school teacher, Dushko Perinski, "Teachers in other schools think their job ends when the bell rings, but creativity begins before and takes work after. This is the best for students."[75] Snezana Misajlovska, a Nansen primary teacher, noted her greatest job satisfaction as "when I see students together playing and respecting each other." She adds another satisfaction: "it is not just cooperation with students but also with teachers professionally and privately. We go out for lunch or dinner to both Macedonian and Albanian restaurants now."[76] Clearly, daily interaction in the integrated bilingual Nansen School has proven constructive for all involved. According to Selajdim Beadini, a Nansen secondary school teacher, "Some teachers from outside our school have already volunteered to join our program. Most people say it is positive."[77]

5. Manage internal and external politics. According to Hilhorst and van Leeuwen, when local peacebuilding organizations deal with internal politics—the intragroup networks needed for effective internal decision-making—they build the legitimacy needed for continued external support. This fifth characteristic illustrates agency: the organization's personnel use knowledge, capabilities, and experience to interpret and respond in making

decisions and carrying them out. Consequently, researchers should "observe the way they implement their activities, because this conveys practical knowledge, implicit interpretations, and power processes taking place in and around organisations."[78]

Since 2001, NDC Skopje has demonstrated the capacity to interact constructively with people at all levels of Macedonian society and government as well as with international networks (the source of its funding). Its personnel have built on the solid foundation of identifying local needs and recommended responses expressed by the people themselves. The Centre has effectively served to connect international expertise and funding to projects that are locally defined and coordinated through relevant official Macedonian governmental agencies.

Early evaluation reports confirm this. In 2002 the Peace Research Institute of Oslo reported,

> The Skopje centre is staffed by two Macedonians and two Albanians who work well with each other. . . . In the beginning, the staff was uncertain about its own ability, but the first seminars were very successful and the centre began to gain momentum. . . . The centre has succeeded in profiling itself in the media and is also trying to have a more direct contact with political parties. There have been a variety of smaller activities, many in cooperation with other NGOs. . . . Skopje has been the first NDC to move towards a Western NGO structure by establishing a board, which acts as a governing body for the staff.[79]

A year later the authors of the report for the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights at the University of Oslo wrote,

> It is our impression that NDC Skopje is viewed as a strong and professional NGO in the field of inter-ethnic dialogue in Macedonia, both in the local NGO community and among international organisations. The inter-ethnic dialogue aspect of its work is well known by local and international organisations and among political leaders.[80]

To gain credibility and the trust of the local community, NDC Skopje needed to establish legitimacy with not only the people who would be participating in a project they deemed necessary, but with the elected council of Jegunovce.[81] After a series of meetings in the municipality, in

2007 NDC Skopje brought members of the council and the mayor to the Nansen Academy in Lillehammer, Norway for a dialogue seminar. The impact was immediate. For example, prior to the seminar in Norway the council president was required to conduct council business in Macedonian; however, following the seminar and after NDC Skopje worked intensively with the group, a new policy was adopted. The council president may now use his/her own language to conduct council meetings and business.[82]

The positive relationship between Jegunovce's council and NDC Skopje became crucial in September 2009. In Shemshovo, a town in southern Jegunovce, a former commander from the 2001 conflict began a campaign to end the integrated bilingual primary school. He threatened families directly, stopped school shuttles carrying students, and attempted to gain community support.[83] The final decision regarding the school's continuation lay with the Jegunovce council. It decided to keep the school open and supported the project's expansion to include the secondary school. This positive response in an extremely tense and threatening situation illustrates the strength of NDC Skopje's relationship with the local community.

CONCLUSION

As of 2012, the Fridtjof Nansen Integrated Primary and Secondary Schools have demonstrated the following indicators of success: (1) growth in student numbers; (2) development of an effective teaching-learning methodology that generates enthusiasm among in the school's teachers, parents, and learners; (3) adoption of the Nansen Model by a second municipality in a primary school for Macedonian and Turkish learners; (4) support from various Macedonian government units including financing for teacher training seminars; (5) external assessments reporting positively on school activities; and (6) attracting attention from Macedonian and international organizational networks.

Using the Saunders conceptual approach and the Hilhorst-van Leeuwen operational guidelines, this study has analyzed the process whereby the Nansen School and its facilitator/manager, the Nansen Dialogue Centre-Skopje, have contributed to local peacebuilding in the Republic of Macedonia. Sustained dialogue, and its supporting concepts of social capital and relational power, help explain *why* the Centre and school achieved success. The five organizational characteristics developed by Hilhorst and van Leeuwen help explain *how* the process worked. Together, the ideas of Saunders

and Hilhorst-van Leeuwen offer a systematic analysis that may be useful for other case studies of local peacebuilding.

Two assumptions shared by Saunders and Hilhorst-van Leeuwen underpin their complementarity. First, both approaches understand local peacebuilding as a process. According to Saunders, "We would focus on their interaction—not just on the decisions each individual or group makes, not just on the actions they take or the proposals they make—but on how, through a continuous process of interaction, they create a cumulative agenda."[84] Hilhorst and van Leeuwen agree: "We have to take on board a dynamic approach to organisations. This starts by treating organisations not as things, but as open-ended processes."[85] Similarly, the NDC Skopje's Project Manager asserted, "We are not a project but a process."[86] This study reflects dialogue as a dynamic, ongoing interaction and tracks its evolution from the Nansen Dialogue seminars in Norway, through their application in the Republic of Macedonia via a Nansen Dialogue Centre, to the step-by-step development of the Nansen School in Jegunovce with its distinctive educational strategy based on people of different ethnicities and languages interacting equally.

Second, both Saunders and Hilhorst-van Leeuwen assert that an analysis of local peacebuilding must focus on the actions of citizens in a society. In the above quotation, Saunders highlights the interaction of grassroots people in an inter-community situation. Similarly, Hilhorst and van Leeuwen's assert that "peacebuilding is done by people, and the dynamics of their organization are crucial for its success."[87]

This case study offers solid evidence that effective peacebuilding attends to the local level where the basis for a shared future must take hold. Initial mixed community activities require courage, and the people who pioneer inter-ethnic action should receive the credit they deserve. In addition, their efforts should become known by policy makers, academics, and journalists, and by people who make decisions, fund, and dispense information about peacebuilding. Local level initiatives that work offer hope, but it takes time for awareness of them to filter up to political leaders whose positions rest on prior assumptions and/or antagonisms that have been articulated so long that they seem irrefutable.

The Nansen Integrated School also illustrates the viability of the Richmond/Mac Ginty concept of liberal-local hybridity. Norway provided the Nansen Dialogue approach and ongoing support, including funding. Local

people in Jegunovce took action to implement their idea for an integrated school facilitated by the Nansen Dialogue Centre in Skopje. The process of establishing the school demonstrates Mac Ginty's assertions that local "co-operation with the liberal peace becomes a route through which to access resources," and "promoters of the more emancipatory versions/elements of the liberal peace are careful not to regard liberal peace agents in host societies as mere recipients, supplicants and beneficiaries. Instead, they use a discourse of partnership and cooperation in which relationships are mutual and incentives are not conceived of as unequal economic transactions."[88]

Steinar Bryn, acknowledged by personnel at various Nansen Dialogue Centres in the Balkans as the heart and soul of the Nansen Dialogue Network, asserts that the Nansen Network process relates to sustained dialogue and focuses on local people as decision makers.[89] In this bottom-up approach, outsiders must listen without interruption to the local people who have experienced the violent conflict. Dialogues enable local inter-community engagement and, in the case of NDC Skopje and people in Jegunovce, led to a needs assessment process. A relatively small project was accomplished quickly by NDC Skopje personnel and Norwegian government funding, thereby demonstrating effective support and the capacity for success. This momentum led to development of the Nansen Integrated School. On a related note, this case study also shows how important it is for outside funding to materialize in a timely fashion.

The Bryn approach assumes a partnership and cooperative decision-making among local people taking action, an organization as facilitator, and funders. This fits with the Nansen Dialogue's mission and active engagement. Mistakes have occurred, but the dialogue process by definition includes reality checks and ways to make changes. Creating societal change begins on a small scale and develops incrementally in the daily activities of local people. As summarized in the PRIO report that evaluated the work of the Nansen Dialogue Network, "While this type of activity might not lead to the kinds of spectacular breakthroughs sometimes witnessed in diplomatic agreements, the slow and meticulous evolution of interpersonal and intercultural relations it involves may lead to a more profound and lasting transformation of society."[90]

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Evolutionary World Government

James A. Yunker

Development of the concept of "evolutionary socialism" around the turn of the twentieth century had a major impact on political and socioeconomic trends throughout the century. Revisionist thinkers such as Eduard Bernstein abandoned the orthodox Marxist position that socialism must necessarily involve social ownership of the nonhuman factors of production, and that socialism in this pure sense could only be achieved through violent revolution. In so doing, they laid the basis for the later success of social democracy in Western Europe and throughout the world. This essay argues that an analogous concept, "evolutionary world government," might lay the basis for a successful world federalist movement during the twenty-first century. By abandoning the current world federalist ideal of the omnipotent world state, and envisioning as the immediate objective a limited rather than an unlimited world government, a solid foundation might be laid for gradual, evolutionary progress toward the long-term goal of an authoritative and effective, yet democratic and benign, federal world government.

INTRODUCTION

The currently prevailing concept of world government, among both the large majority of world government skeptics and the small minority of world government supporters (the "world federalists"), is that of a very strong state entity that would stand in relation to its component member nations much as the federal government of the United States stands in relation to the fifty component states. Such a government would encompass all nations

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in the world without exception, would not tolerate the withdrawal of any nation from the federation under any circumstance, and would monopolize all heavy weaponry, including nuclear weapons. This concept of world government is referred to here as the "omnipotent world state." In addition, the world government would be subject to pure democratic control by its citizens through free and contested election of high government officials. According to proponents, such a government would virtually eliminate the possibility of nuclear holocaust, and would enable effective global action to be taken against such long-term threats as economic inequality and environmental deterioration. According to skeptics, such a government would either quickly dissolve amid civil war, or it would stabilize itself by means of imposing a draconic totalitarian regime on the world, most likely of a dictatorial nature.

Aside from the small minority of world federalists, it is almost universally assumed that there is no credible peaceful transition path from the current international status quo to the omnipotent world state described above. This essay does not challenge this consensus opinion. However, it does challenge the widespread view that no federal world government short of the omnipotent world state would be a worthwhile undertaking. The basis of the challenge is the proposition that there exist viable world government possibilities whose authority and effectiveness would lie somewhere between that of today's relatively ineffectual United Nations and that of the omnipotent world state, and that these intermediate possibilities would both significantly improve the processes of global governance in the proximate future, and lay a secure foundation for further gradual, evolutionary progress over the long term toward a highly authoritative and effective, yet democratic and benign, world government. In other words, a limited world government, as opposed to an unlimited world government, is both achievable and desirable; at least, a more persuasive case can be made to this effect than can be made for the omnipotent world state. In fact, it is arguable that were the notion of limited world government to become sufficiently familiar to the international relations profession and the general public, this might result in such a fundamental reappraisal of the general concept of world government that the establishment of an actual world government within the foreseeable future would become significantly more likely.

In support of this proposition, this essay explores the analogy between "evolutionary socialism" and "evolutionary world government." At the turn

of the twentieth century, revisionist socialists such as Eduard Bernstein laid a secure foundation for the increasing success of social democracy during the twentieth century in Western Europe and throughout the world by redefining the objectives of socialism, and by rethinking the strategy for attaining these objectives. By revising the orthodox Marxist concept of socialism, and renouncing the orthodox Marxist doctrine of the necessity of violent revolution to achieve socialism, the revisionists made this new concept of socialism more attractive to a broad range of people. It is possible that in the twenty-first century, an analogous revision of the world federalist objective away from the omnipotent world state and toward a limited federal world government would lay the basis for a viable and effective real-world political movement toward this revised objective. On the basis of real-world experience, it is now widely accepted that many if not most of the institutions and policies associated with social democracy have had a generally beneficial effect on the welfare of most of the world's population. If, in the future, a limited world government were to be established and given time to prove itself, it might at some point thereafter also be widely acknowledged as having significantly improved the welfare of most if not all of the world's population.

The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. First, we present a brief history of the idea of world government, with special emphasis on the rise and fall of the world federalist movement in the aftermath of World War II. We propose that the rapid decline of world federalism into political insignificance during the postwar period is largely attributable to the inability of both proponents and opponents, in both noncommunist and communist nations, to conceive of world government as anything other than the omnipotent world state. We proceed to a brief account of the socialist movement from its origins in the early nineteenth century to the present day. A pivotal point in this history was the recognition by a significant number of socialists, toward the end of the nineteenth century, that a viable alternative existed to the hard-line Marxist concept of socialism, a recognition that was signaled by the publication in 1899 of Eduard Bernstein's profoundly influential book *Evolutionary Socialism*. This recognition enabled the social democratic component of the socialist movement to attain significant political influence within several Western European nations during the course of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, as well as within numerous other nations throughout the world. Ensuing sections of the essay return to

world federalism. We note some promising recent developments in world federalist thinking; these developments may presage a revision of the world federalist goal away from the omnipotent world state and toward some alternative form of limited world government that might be a more serious contender for actual implementation in the foreseeable future. Parallels are observed between such a potential revision in world federalist thinking in the twenty-first century and the actual revision in socialist thinking that occurred around the turn of the twentieth century. We consider the salient practical distinctions between limited and unlimited world government, and take up the related issue of global economic inequality as an impediment to global political utility. The essay concludes with a brief summary of the argument that a properly designed limited federal world government would be an improvement over the existing international political status quo.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

The notion of a single political organization encompassing the whole of humanity—a world state—has intrigued humankind since earliest recorded history.[1] It is clear, however, that our contemporary idea of world government (formed peacefully through universal contract, with purposes encompassing not only the preservation of peace but the general advancement of the human condition throughout the world) did not reach full fruition until the recent modern era. Well-known earlier proposals for a supernational political organization encompassing all the nations of the earth, such as the Council of Ambassadors of the French monk Émeric Crucé, and the Congress of States of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, were actually for no more than a universal mutual assistance alliance for the exclusive purpose of preserving peace.[2] The essence of these early concepts was eventually realized in the form of the League of Nations, established in 1919 immediately after World War I. The League was notably unsuccessful in its primary objective not only because of the non-adherence of the United States, but also because it had the misfortune of operating during what turned out to be an uneasy truce separating World Wars I and II. The successor organization to the League of Nations, the United Nations, established in 1945 immediately after World War II, has also compiled an unimpressive peacekeeping record. Although it has indeed intervened successfully in a few cases of relatively minor regional conflicts, the UN was powerless against the Cold War confrontation between the communist and noncommunist blocs of nations that

threatened a nuclear World War III. That such a horrific war did not erupt at some point during the perilous Cold War decades cannot reasonably be attributed to the existence and activities of the United Nations.

Prior to the mid-twentieth century, there had been numerous proposals for political organizations superior to the nation-states. Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd, world federalist activists of the 1930s and 1940s, compiled a large collection of such proposals.[3] Part II of their compilation ("There Is Nothing New under the Sun—Old Plans to Unite Nations Dating from 1306 to 1914,") briefly describes seventy-four plans. Part III ("Theoretical Plans to Unite Nations since 1914") contains more detailed descriptions of an additional twenty-five plans (included in the categories "Universal" and "Federal" but not pertaining to the United Nations established in 1945) that were published between 1915 and 1944. However, a large proportion of these plans are for regional associations of relatively small subsets of nations, often amounting to little more than formalized military alliances. For example, many of the plans from the early modern era were motivated by the prospect that a tighter association among the Christian nations of Europe would enable more effective resistance against Muslim aggression, especially that emanating from the Ottoman empire.

The years just after World War II saw the most intensive envisioning and development of plans for world government in the current sense: a full-fledged government organization encompassing all the world's nations with purposes confined not merely to peacekeeping, but extending also to overall human welfare improvement by means beyond simply preventing wars. In other words, the current concept of world government involves a direct extrapolation of the manifold purposes of national governments toward their respective citizens, to the entire population of the world. Such plans were not unknown prior to World War II. During the World War I year of 1918, for example, Raleigh C. Minor, a professor of constitutional and international law at the University of Virginia, published a treatise describing a quite modern concept of world government.[4] Although Minor used the same name (League of Nations) as the real-world organization soon afterwards established by the Treaty of Versailles (1919), his proposal was for something far more ambitious than the real-world League. Minor's League would have been a genuine world state with strong enforcement powers and democratic control by its citizens. Proposals analogous to that of Professor Minor became far more abundant following World War II.

The dramatic but highly ephemeral post-World War II "world government boom" is plausibly attributed to a shock reaction to the first (and thus far only) use of nuclear weapons in warfare, the August 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This quantum leap in the destructiveness of weaponry lent more credence than ever before to the long-standing world federalist contention that the costs of war have become unendurable, and that the establishment of a strong world state is the only reliable means of avoiding these costs in the future. During the five years between the end of World War II in 1945 and the start of the Korean War in 1950, sympathetic interest in world government reached an unprecedented peak. An impassioned plea for world government (*The Anatomy of Peace* by Emery Reves) became an international bestseller, world-renowned intellectuals (Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Robert Hutchins, and numerous others) declared their support for world government, world federalist organizations proliferated, and millions of people around the world began thinking seriously about the possibility.[5]

However, enthusiasm for world government subsided almost as quickly as it had arisen. It soon became apparent that the wartime alliance between the USSR and the Western powers had not abrogated the underlying ideological conflict between communism and noncommunism. The Soviet government still adhered to the orthodox Marxist doctrine that capitalism is doomed, and in reaction to this the people of the Western nations came to regard the USSR, especially as it had progressed from being a wobbly infant in 1917 to a military colossus in 1945, as a dire threat to their accustomed way of life. Such events in 1949 as the communization of China and the first detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union, which ended the short-lived US nuclear monopoly, convinced many in the West that the communist leadership was seriously entertaining the possibility of a communist world empire within the relatively near future. As early as 1947, US president Harry Truman proclaimed the "containment" doctrine: further expansion of communism must be resisted by all means including military action, until such time as the communist leadership abandoned its messianic aspirations.

As for fears of nuclear war, human beings are—mentally, emotionally, and physically—remarkably resilient and adaptive. Within a remarkably short time, most people had filed away the threat of dying in a worldwide nuclear holocaust in the same compartment as the threat of dying in an

automobile accident. It was a regrettable but inevitable hazard; therefore, there was nothing to be done about it. Furthermore, almost as soon as nuclear weapons became a part of reality, a general consensus arose among the large majority of the population that no one would be "stupid enough" to start a nuclear war. To some extent, this consensus, which is still prevalent today, may manifest wishful thinking. Among other things, a nuclear World War III could occur as a result of miscalculated brinkmanship, the same thing that was responsible for both World War I and World War II. Be that as it may, this consensus was (and remains) undeniably reassuring.

World federalists took a far less sanguine view of the nuclear war threat. In their view, the development of nuclear weapons immeasurably increased the overall threat to human civilization embodied in warfare. While the prospect of nuclear destruction might somewhat reduce the propensity toward provocative and belligerent behaviour among nations, it would by no means eliminate it, and sooner or later some nation would stray over the line separating peace from unimaginably devastating warfare. What was obviously needed, in the view of world federalists, was something far stronger than the United Nations; what was needed was a genuine, fully functional world government with direct control over a large and dominant military force, with the power of taxation, and guided by officials subject to direct democratic accountability to the world population through free and open elections.

Although post-World War II world government proposals are highly diverse, most of them adhere in general terms to the 23 August 1947 declaration of the first World Congress of the World Movement for World Federal Government held in Montreux, Switzerland. Taken together, the six points of the declaration are a prescription for a very centralized, powerful, and authoritative world state, for what this article calls the "omnipotent world state." This became the common conception of world government at the time of the postwar world government boom, and it remains the common conception today. This conception was (and remains) simultaneously the world federalist ideal, and the *bête noire* of world government skeptics.

Contributions by postwar world federalists such as Giuseppe Borgese, Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, and various others, that advocated the omnipotent world state, were summarily rejected by mainstream opinion.[6] As early as 1951, Gerard Mangone's comprehensive and influential treatise distilled the final postwar majority verdict on world government: a fine

and noble idea in principle, but (alas) thoroughly impractical in the real world owing to the great strength of ideological preconceptions, cultural differences, and nationalistic prejudices. The basic problem, according to Mangone, is the absence of sufficient consensus within humanity on what constitutes a just and legitimate social order.

> If a structure of world government is to be imagined, then its size, strength and shape will be conditioned by the social order it intends to establish. Should there be a genuine consensus among the members on the hierarchy of values within such a community, the coercive element will be minimized; if but little consensus exists, an autocratic leadership would be the obvious recourse for universal conformity. [7]

The problem of "little consensus" was especially serious in the area of communist versus noncommunist ideology: disagreements over the relative merits of socialism versus capitalism, planning versus the market, Western-style democracy versus Party democracy, and so on. The negative verdict on world government enunciated by Mangone rapidly achieved consensus status among the vast majority of professional academics, political leaders, and rank-and-file citizens. On the other side of the ideological gap, communist ideologues were equally skeptical of world government. Just as Western analysts were leery of world government on grounds that it might be subverted and made into a tool of communist expansionism, so too communist ideologues were leery of world government on grounds that it might be subverted and made into a tool of capitalist reaction.[8]

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s could reasonably have been perceived as opening up new opportunities for world government. Throughout the Cold War, the first and foremost reason commonly cited for disregarding the possibility of world government had always been the ideological gap between the communist and noncommunist nations. But this impediment became less important. Just as the end of World War I had seen the establishment of the League of Nations, and the end of World War II had seen the establishment of the stronger United Nations, it seemed to world federalists that perhaps the end of the Cold War might see a further advance toward an even stronger form of supernational organization, possibly even a legitimate, full-fledged, authoritative world government.

However, this did not happen. For one thing, World Wars I and II had been "hot" wars whereas the Cold War, as the term implies, was not.

Although the threat of nuclear war had imposed a certain amount of psychic strain on humanity, this was not at all comparable to the prodigious amount of physical death, disability, and destruction wreaked by World Wars I and II. Furthermore, the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union had not totally abrogated the problem of ideology in the contemporary world. For example, the People's Republic of China still maintains formal allegiance to communist principles, although it is apparently not currently interested in having these principles adopted by other nations. In the Middle East, the continuing unrest sparked by Israel's 1948 creation, which has been directly responsible for several wars in the region and indirectly responsible for terrorist attacks throughout the world, including most horrifically 9/11, is to some extent exacerbated by religious doctrinal differences.

Last but not least, the economic gap between the richest First World nations and the poorest Third World nations continues to grow. Although the ideological impediment to world government has been markedly reduced by the subsidence of the Cold War, the economic impediment remains as significant as ever. People in the rich First World nations envision the possibility that an authoritative world government will decide to establish a global welfare state, by which the populations of the rich nations will be heavily taxed in order to provide welfare entitlements mostly benefiting the impoverished masses of the poor nations. Meanwhile, the poor nations are also apprehensive, envisioning the possibility that an authoritative world government will impose a global trade and investment regime that will essentially re-establish the exploitative relationships of the colonial era.

With these thoughts in mind, the contemporary mainstream consensus (the "conventional wisdom") is that, idealogy aside, there is far too much heterogeneity in the world today for world government to be a viable proposition. In the hundreds of articles and dozens of books published every year in the popular and professional literature on contemporary international relations, terms such as "world government," "global government," "world state," and the like rarely appear, and when they do, more often than not it is in the context of a cursory dismissal. The following typical example has been provided by the prominent authority on international relations, Anne-Marie Slaughter:

> People and their governments around the world need global institutions to solve collective problems that can only be addressed on a global scale. They must be able to make and

> enforce global rules on a variety of subjects and through a variety of means. . . . Yet world government is both infeasible and undesirable. The size and scope of such a government presents an unavoidable and dangerous threat to individual liberty. Further, the diversity of peoples to be governed makes it almost impossible to conceive of a global demos. No form of democracy within the current global repertoire seems capable of overcoming these obstacles.[9]

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIALISM

Although the modern history of socialism is commonly said to have commenced with the French Revolution of 1789, vague "socialistic" ideas (or ideals) of economic egalitarianism may of course be traced back to long before then. According to some sources, the term "socialism" itself was coined in 1832 by Pierre Leroux in the liberal French newspaper *Le Globe*. In its earliest and most general form, socialism was perceived as a means by which the adverse socio-economic consequences of the Industrial Revolution, especially the poverty, misery, and insecurity of the urban proletariat, could be ameliorated. Various avenues toward amelioration were envisioned. Some reformers, such as Charles Fourier, proposed the creation of relatively small, economically self-sufficient communes. Others, such as Robert Owen, proposed a sort of progressive capitalism by which the owners, perhaps under the authority of government regulators, would pay their workers generously and treat them fairly in the interest of higher productivity and greater workforce loyalty.

In their profoundly influential pamphlet *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels dismissed these proposals as "utopian socialism." Fourier's ideas would not work because they ignored the economies of large-scale production only achievable through factory methods. Owen's ideas would not work because the capitalists were incapable of the sort of enlightened self-interest necessary to make them feasible. Marx and Engels' "scientific socialism," on the other hand, involved two core propositions: (1) fundamental reform of the modern industrial economy requires nothing less than the ownership of the capital means of production by society; (2) the only way this fundamental reform can be achieved is through violent revolution. Just as violent revolution had been necessary to the overthrow of the land-owning nobility by the industrial bourgeoisie, so

too it would be necessary to the overthrow of the industrial bourgeoisie by the proletariat.

The Marx-Engels specification of socialism soon became dominant, to the point where the primary dictionary definition of "socialism" became (and remains today) "public ownership of capital." As the second half of the nineteenth century wore on, however, increasing doubt emerged even among committed Marxists. For one thing, intermittent efforts to achieve a socialist revolution, such as the Paris Commune of 1871, were notably unsuccessful. For another, the material condition of the working class seemed to be improving. It was becoming apparent that technological progress was enabling the improvement of general living conditions, while (perhaps) the threat of socialist revolution was persuading capitalists and political authorities to take advantage of these emerging economic opportunities. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, what we would today describe as the "social safety net" had taken hold throughout much of Western Europe and the world. Even such undemocratic nations as Imperial Germany under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck were leading the way in certain areas such as social insurance. In 1899, the ongoing reorientation of a substantial part of the socialist movement was dramatically manifested by the appearance of Bernstein's seminal contribution.

In that year, Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932) published *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgabe der Sozialdemokratie (The Preconditions of Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy)*. In 1911, a somewhat abridged English translation by Edith C. Harvey was published by the New York publishing house B. W. Huebsch under the famous title *Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation*.[10] In 1875, Bernstein had been one of the founders of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD–Social Democratic Party of Germany), in which he remained active until his retirement in 1928. Based on a series of articles published in the party newspaper during the latter 1890s, his book explicitly rejected such fundamental tenets of conventional Marxist thought as the inherent immorality and inefficiency of private ownership of land and capital, the inevitable immiserization of the proletariat, and the necessity for violent revolution to overthrow capitalism and inaugurate socialism. Bernstein argued that the condition of the working class was manifestly improving, that such reforms as business regulation, social insurance, and progressive taxation were effective means of achieving the underlying objectives of socialism, and that these reforms could and

should be pursued through peaceful democratic means. From its initial appearance, his book was recognized as a major contribution to the theory and practice of socialism, eliciting both enthusiastic acclaim and furious denunciation.[11]

Among the denouncers was Vladimir Lenin, later to become famous as a prime mover of the successful Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, and afterwards the first head of state of the newly established Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. To Lenin and like-minded critics such as SPD members Karl Kautsky, Karl Liebknecht, and Rosa Luxemburg, revisionist socialism was a craven reformist sell-out of the traditional socialist vision, a sell-out that sought only "crumbs off the table" of the dominant class of capitalist plutocrats. To their minds, the only way to fully achieve the objectives of socialism was through socialism in the pure sense of public ownership and control of the means of production, and such a transformation could only come about by means of violent revolution. Although Marx's original view had been that the preconditions for revolution would eventually emerge through ever-worsening business depressions afflicting the industrially advanced capitalist nations, the vicissitudes imposed on the mainly agrarian Russian nation by World War I enabled Lenin's successful Bolshevik revolution in 1917 that established the USSR. But when Liebknecht and Luxemburg attempted an analogous revolution in defeated Germany in 1919, the revolution failed and its leaders were executed. This outcome seemed to vindicate the position of such centrists as Karl Kautsky that it would probably require a very long period of time to bring about conditions in the advanced capitalist nations under which a socialist revolution would be successful.

Whether the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in fact contradicted Kautsky's position ultimately turns on the question of the degree of "success" attained through that revolution. The radical nature of Soviet communism, seen in policies such as the nationalization of agricultural land and industrial capital with little or no compensation paid to the former owners and actions such as the execution of the Romanov royal family, elicited determined opposition from the outset. (Such policies might be compared to a rash attempt to establish the omnipotent world state in today's world.) Years of civil war and famine ensued. Although the Soviet Union recovered somewhat under the relatively moderate New Economic Plan of the 1920s, radical transformation was again pursued through the collectivization of

agriculture and the crash industrialization program of the 1930s. Although impressive economic progress was achieved, the drastic internal stresses and strains imposed on the Soviet people by such policies were seen in the consolidation of Joseph Stalin's dictatorial powers, comprehensive Party purges, mass executions, and the creation of the gulag archipelago of concentration camps to confine actual and suspected dissidents, and to extract slave labor from them under horrific conditions. Under Marxist leadership, the Soviet people then suffered through a second world war, followed by more than four decades of a perilous Cold War confrontation with the bloc of noncommunist nations, a confrontation that threatened nuclear holocaust. To aggravate matters, the sluggish performance of the Soviet economy in the later stages of the Cold War was making a mockery of the leadership's promises to overtake the major Western nations in terms of per capita living standards. By the early 1990s, the Soviet people had finally had enough. The Marxist leadership was ousted and the Soviet Union was dissolved. (A peaceful political transformation of this magnitude had been almost unknown in prior human history—an extraordinary event that might hold out some hope that a federal world government, assuming it were properly designed, might be established peacefully at some point in the future.) Since then, its successor republics and former Eastern European satellites have been endeavouring to emulate the economic and political characteristics of the more successful Western nations. (In most cases, the emulation effort has not been easy.) Over the more than seven decades separating the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 from the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, it cannot be said that the revolution was a success.

Neither can success be plausibly attributed to such offshoots of Soviet communism as the People's Republic of China (PRC), Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. At the present time, the PRC is making dramatic economic progress, the result of abandoning Soviet-style central planning and strict egalitarianism, both of which were once considered fundamental to genuine socialism. But its political system remains fully oligarchic, fueling speculation that perhaps the contemporary Chinese model is incompatible with democracy as known elsewhere in the world. Aside from China, the economic and political performance of the handful of other nations in the contemporary world that continue to subscribe to communism is generally unimpressive.

Meanwhile, various key elements of social democracy as specified by

Eduard Bernstein in *Evolutionary Socialism* have become integral parts of socioeconomic and political reality in all the most successful First World nations. Leaders of social democratic parties in these nations have taken an active part in governance throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. For example, the German SPD was at times the largest political party in Germany (when not being suppressed by the Nazi government from 1933 through 1945), often participated in coalition governments, and remains today a major player in German politics. Even "less progressive" nations such as the United States and Australia, which for the most part adamantly deny being tainted in any way by "socialism," are characterized by an abundance of business regulations, welfare programs, and progressive taxation. These elements of social democracy may be more advanced in other nations, especially in the Western European nations comprising the European Union (EU), but this is arguably a matter of degree rather than of essence.

Of course, any real-world level of achievement falls short of the imaginable ideal. Even in those nations that proudly advertise themselves as "socialist" in the social democratic sense, retention of private ownership of most of the means of production under modern conditions (domination of economic production by large corporations, separation of ownership and control, important role of institutional investors, and so on) results in highly unequal distribution of capital property income, a category of income that has the appearance of being unearned. Aside from that, there are other continuing problems with the existing system (whether it be deemed "capitalist" or "socialist"): recurrent business recessions, persistent unemployment, speculative bubbles, and so on—though many of these may be the necessary concomitants of any market system, whether it be market capitalist or (in the case of the PRC) market socialist. It is held by some idealists that until all these kinds of shortcomings are completely eliminated, society cannot be described as "genuinely socialist." If this viewpoint were accepted, then nothing short of utopia would be genuinely socialist.

The success or failure of a socioeconomic system is necessarily evaluated in terms of some basis. If, for example, we compare nations such as the United States, Britain, France, and Germany as they were in the year 2000 relative to what they were in the year 1900, only the most contrarian mentalities would refuse to acknowledge significant progress. Living standards are higher, equality is higher, and democratic influence on the government is

higher. Not that there was a linear trend of progress throughout the twentieth century. During the tumultuous decades of the first half of the twentieth century, the nations of Western Europe suffered through economic depression, fascist dictatorships, and devastating warfare. But during the second half of the twentieth century, Western Europe sailed through calmer waters. Among the reasons for its long-run success would appear to be the renunciation of the orthodox Marxist doctrine of pure public ownership socialism through violent revolution, and its replacement by the revisionist Marxist doctrine of virtual socialism through peaceful evolution.

What, if anything, does the above-described historical development within the socialist movement imply about the potential future development of the world federalist movement? There are two salient questions to be addressed: (1) whether an analogous renunciation might be possible within the world federalist movement away from the omnipotent world state concept and toward a limited federal world government concept, and (2) if so, whether such a renunciation would strengthen the world federalist movement and enhance the prospects that a real-world federal world government might be achieved within the foreseeable future. Prior to addressing these central questions, it will be useful to consider certain recent trends in world federalist thought that might be promising indicators, and to specify in more detail what is implied, in a practical sense, by the notion of "limited" federal world government.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WORLD FEDERALIST THINKING

Despite the continued prevalence of the conventional wisdom on world government exemplified by the above quotation from Anne-Marie Slaughter's *A New World Order*, the historian Campbell Craig has written of a recent "resurgence" of interest in world government.[12] What evidence is there for this alleged resurgence? To begin with, during the mid-2000s, perhaps in response to the traumatic 9/11 event, there may have been a spike in the production of appeals for world government from world federalist enthusiasts whose strident "one world or none" message harks back to the 1945-50 world government boom.[13] Of course, if appeals of this nature went unheeded during the perilous decades of the Cold War, they are even less likely to be effective now that the Cold War is history and the threat of nuclear world war in the near future has greatly receded.

What may be more significant is that a trickle has apparently begun of more restrained and scholarly world government advocacies from authors with reputable academic credentials.[14] While these more reflective and balanced advocacies are more likely to elicit serious interest among those who are currently skeptical of world government, the fact remains that they are still very few in number. Moreover, they are generally somewhat vague on the institutional specifics of the world government being advocated. Advocacies that focus on the potential benefits of world government without paying sufficient attention to the potential costs, specifically the danger that an omnipotent world state of the sort envisioned in conventional world federalist thought might soon degenerate into totalitarian tyranny, are unlikely to be taken seriously.

A major focus in Craig's "resurgence" article is on a very unusual article by the eminent international relations authority Alexander Wendt, provocatively entitled "Why a World State Is Inevitable" (2003).[15] Inasmuch as the question of inevitability is only sensibly considered with reference to existent reality, and as world government is not yet part of existent reality, Wendt's proposition is clearly not meant to be taken literally. Rather it is deliberately provocative, intended merely to elicit additional serious thought about the world government possibility. Wendt's inevitability essay has indeed been cited in a substantial number of contributions to the professional literature.

Whether this attention will engender a serious challenge to the existing strong consensus against world government remains to be seen. While most of the contributions that cite Wendt's article seem at least somewhat sympathetic toward world government, none of them significantly amplifies or expands Wendt's argument. In fact, thus far the only full-scale engagement with Wendt's "inevitability thesis" has been a critical commentary by Vaughn Shannon.[16] Many of the citations fall into the "see also" category. Eric Posner points out the lack of immediate relevance of the thesis: "Wendt is in a very small minority, and as he puts off the creation of world government for at least another century, the possibility has no relevant short-term implications even if he is correct";[17] while Thomas G. Weiss suggests that there is nothing especially innovative about the thesis: "From time to time a contemporary international relations theorist, like Alexander Wendt, suggests that 'a world state is inevitable' (Wendt 2003, 2005; Shannon 2005), or Daniel Deudney (2006) wishes one were because war has become too dangerous."[18] If indeed the inevitability thesis is eventually recognized as a serious challenge to the

mainstream consensus against world government, the outcome may simply be a further refining and strengthening of the conventional case against world government that underpins the current consensus.

In support of his argument that a world state is "inevitable," Wendt marshals an argument based on teleological reasoning. According to teleological reasoning, everything in the universe has a purpose toward which it inevitably tends. Just as human babies tend to fulfill their purpose by developing into human adults, so too global human civilization is tending toward its final purpose: a global state. The argument is clever and fleshed out impressively with facts and concepts derived from a wide range of human knowledge. As a piece of erudite writing, Wendt's article is quite impressive. But it is more likely to be persuasive to a theoretical philosopher than to the typical international relations professional, let alone to the typical international relations practitioner or the typical member of the general public.

Be that as it may, Wendt offers skeptical readers of his inevitability essay two pieces of reasonably solid practical evidence that a world state will eventually be established: (1) the very long-run historical trend toward greater and greater political consolidation that has brought humanity from the tens of thousands of small, autonomous tribal units of pre-history down to the 200-odd nation-states of today, several of which encompass populations in the tens and even hundreds of millions; and (2) the fact that a world state would benefit both large nations (lower probability of debilitating wars with other large nations) and small nations (lower probability of being subjected to the oppressive hegemony of large nations). Both of these points are significant and worthy of consideration, but in and of themselves, they are far from conclusive.

With respect to the long-term trend toward ever greater political consolidation, the hard fact remains that almost all of this consolidation was brought about, in one way or another, by means of warfare. In the nuclear age, it seems unlikely that additional warfare offers a plausible avenue toward further political consolidation leading to a world state. One must also consider the fact that there has been much political deconsolidation in the recent past, ranging from the dissolution of the great European colonial empires to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

With respect to the potential benefits of world government for both the large nations and the small nations, these must be acknowledged and taken

into account in any sensible evaluation of the world government possibility. But potential benefits have to be weighed against potential costs. The contemporary consensus is that the potential costs of world government (totalitarian tyranny, bureaucratic suffocation, cultural homogenization, global civil war) far exceed the potential benefits. Simply enumerating benefits while paying little or no attention to costs is unlikely to be rhetorically effective, given that the costs are so widely accepted.

Although there are obvious difficulties with Professor Wendt's "inevitability of world government" thesis, the facts that the author is a recognized and respected international relations authority, and that his article was published in a reputable, mainstream international relations periodical, are quite significant. It is not too much to suggest that thirty years ago, with the Cold War still raging, no recognized and respected international relations authority would have dreamed of writing such an article, and no reputable, mainstream international relations periodical would have dreamed of publishing it. Therefore, the appearance of this article alone may be a significant indicator of increased receptivity toward the concept of world government, at least among academic professionals in the international relations discipline. In due course, increased receptivity among the attentive elite may lead to increased receptivity among the intelligentsia generally, the general public, and the political leadership.

Also relevant for our present purposes is that within his influential article, Wendt suggests that the putatively "inevitable" world state he has in mind might well be something quite different from the traditional world federalist ideal of the omnipotent world state:

> Lest I be accused of lacking imagination, however, it should be emphasized that the systemic changes needed for a world state could be fulfilled in various ways, and so a world state might look very different than states today. In particular, it could be much more decentralized, in three respects. First, it would not require its elements to give up local autonomy. Collectivizing organized violence does not mean that culture, economy or local politics must be collectivized; subsidiarity could be the operative principle. Second, it would not require a single UN army. As long as a structure exists that can command and enforce a collective response to threats, a world state could be compatible with the existence of national armies, to which enforcement operations

> might be sub-contracted (along the lines of NATO perhaps). Finally, it would not even require a world "government," if by this we mean a unitary body with one leader whose decisions are final. . . . As long as binding choices can be made, decision-making in a world state could involve broad deliberation in a "strong" public sphere rather than command by one person.[19]

It is the position of the present author that in a practical sense, no world state is inevitable, and this holds especially for the omnipotent world state. On the spectrum of possibility over the foreseeable future, limited world government is far more likely than unlimited world government. This perception seems generally consistent with the above-quoted remarks of Professor Wendt.

LIMITED VERSUS UNLIMITED WORLD GOVERNMENT

What may eventually be perceived as the single most significant post-Cold War challenge to the conventional wisdom on world government is simply increased awareness, among both world government skeptics and world government supporters, that there might exist viable world government possibilities that would go well beyond the existent United Nations, but would stop well short of the traditional world federalist ideal of the omnipotent world state. Just as Eduard Bernstein made social democracy a politically viable movement throughout the twentieth century through his development of "evolutionary socialism," world federalism might become a politically viable movement in the twenty-first century through the development of "evolutionary world government." According to Bernstein's redefinition, "socialism" need not involve public ownership of all or most of the stock of nonhuman factors of production. Its goals can be substantially achieved by means other than public ownership of capital, such as progressive taxation, social welfare programs, and business regulation. Consequently, in this more widely acceptable form—a "kinder, gentler socialism"— it need not be achieved by means of violent revolution.

An analogous redefinition of a "kinder, gentler world government" would remove such requirements as universal membership, prohibition of withdrawal from the world federation of member nations, and monopolization by the world federation of all heavy weaponry. If potential member nations in a world government do not expect to be disarmed as a consequence of taking membership, and if they are allowed freedom to

leave the federation in the future if they so desire, resistance to the idea of world government could decline. Most people today are opposed to world government—even though they will grant that such a government would be, at minimum, a reliable guarantor against nuclear holocaust—because they fear that a militarily all-powerful world government would undertake policies that would be detrimental to their nation and to themselves personally, and there would be no means available for their nation to opt out of the world federation. Their nation would be "trapped" within a hostile and dysfunctional political structure. A constitutional promise to the member nations of the right of free exit from the world state if they so desire—and of independent control over sufficient military force to back up this right—would reassure the people of potential member nations that a means of escape would be available if needed. These rights would play the same role as putting fire escapes on buildings and equipping ships with lifeboats. The hope is that these safeguards will never be needed—but if the need does arise, they are available.

The obvious question presents itself, however, whether a government that shares military power with its subsidiary components, and that allows the departure of subsidiary components at their own unilateral discretion, can be considered a legitimate state. Certainly these provisions are incompatible with the common conception of statehood at the national level. For example, the United States does not permit the state governments to exercise independent control of military forces (as opposed to police forces) stationed within their borders, and the US Civil War of 1861-65 manifested the determination of the national government to maintain the integrity of the union against secession efforts by some of the component states. Be that as it may, the common conception of statehood at the national level is not necessarily the only legitimate conception of statehood. The power and authority of a given state entity might lie anywhere along a wide spectrum from weakest to strongest. As long as power and authority are not totally absent, the entity may arguably be deemed a legitimate state.[20]

Perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed blueprint for a limited federal world government currently available in the international relations literature is James A. Yunker's proposal for a Federal Union of Democratic Nations.[21] Although the word "democratic" is included in the name of the proposed federation, for those nations in which democratic institutions do not currently exist, the only requirement for membership would be the

intention to establish them once their citizen bodies have been properly prepared for their responsibilities under the democratic form of government. No time frame would be specified for such preparation. The practical purpose of this provision, of course, is to make available membership to various nations that are not presently fully democratic in the generally accepted sense, the prime example of this being the People's Republic of China.

The proposed Federal Union would be a full-fledged government entity, composed of legislative, executive, and judicial branches, whose high officials would be directly elected by the populations of the member nations. It would be constitutionally based, would possess the authority to levy taxes, and would directly control an armed force roughly comparable to the armed force of one of the smaller nuclear powers such as the UK. It would possess the ordinary trappings and emblems of state authority: flag, anthem, capital city, permanent administrative apparatus, and so on. On the other hand, it would operate under the critical constraints mentioned above: member nations would be free to depart the federation at their own unilateral discretion, and member nations would retain independent control over as much military force as desired, even including strategic nuclear weapons.

Another important safeguard against possible tendencies toward unacceptable policy directions would be adoption of a "dual voting system" in the federation legislature. Proposed legislation would have to be approved by a majority on two different bases: the population basis and the material basis. In the population vote, the weight given to the vote of each particular representative would be proportional to the population of the district represented relative to the total population of the federation. In the material vote, the weight given to the vote of each representative would be proportional to the financial revenues derived from the district represented relative to the total financial revenues of the federation. Representatives from the rich nations would be disproportionately represented in the material vote, while representatives from populous poorer nations would be disproportionately represented in the population vote. Since measures would have to be approved on both the material basis and the population basis, only measures on which rich nations and poor nations could achieve reasonable consensus would be approved by the federation legislature. The dual voting system is designed to preclude the passage of any legislation that would be unacceptable to either the First World nations or the Third World nations. Prime examples would be legislation aimed at a drastic redistribution of current

world income by means of a global welfare state (which would be opposed by the rich nations), and legislation that might be deemed an effort to re-establish conditions of colonial exploitation (which would be opposed by the poor nations).

Obviously the proposed dual voting system is inconsistent with the ideal of pure democracy, wherein each citizen of the polity exercises one and only one vote. This is a third major departure, along with free exit and independent national military forces, from the conventional world federalist concept. In an ideal world in which all nations had comparable living standards, this departure from the one-person-one-vote principle would not be necessary. But it is important to recognize that the distinction between the population vote and the material vote would not be necessary were all nations of the world to have approximately equal per capita income. In that case, the revenues raised from each district would tend to be proportional to the district's population.

PROSPECTS FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EQUALITY

To realize the long-term objective where the results of the population vote and the material vote are identical, Yunker proposes a complementary economic proposal for a World Economic Equalization Program, in effect a Global Marshall Plan. Since he is an economist by profession, it is understandable that Yunker's political proposal for a Federal Union of Democratic Nations is closely linked to his proposal for a greatly expanded, worldwide economic development assistance program. The idea of greatly reducing, or even eliminating, the world poverty problem through the global equivalent of the Marshall Plan, which facilitated the rebuilding process in Europe following World War II, has long been a staple of visionary thought, and continues notably in the activities of the Global Marshall Plan Initiative, a pressure group primarily active in Europe.[22]

Against the currently prevalent opinion that an increase in the level of foreign development assistance would have little impact on global economic inequality (since the aid resources would be diverted and/or misallocated), Yunker has adduced evidence derived from computer simulation of a model of the world economy to the effect that, despite the very formidable size of the current economic gap, it could in fact be overcome within a relatively brief period of time, something on the order of fifty years, by a sufficiently massive and coordinated economic development assistance effort.[23] The

benchmark simulation results suggest that a dramatic acceleration in the rate of growth of living standards in the poor nations could be achieved at the very minor cost of a slight retardation in the rate of growth of living standards in the rich nations. The cost to the rich nations would not be a decline in their living standards, nor even a noticeable decline in the rate of growth of their living standards. In other words, the material cost to the people of the rich nations would be very minor. That said, the benchmark parameter values used to obtain these positive results may be too optimistic. Sensitivity analyses using sufficiently adverse values of certain critical model parameters demonstrate that the outcome could be just as pessimists would predict: despite huge investments, very little improvement in average living standards within the recipient nations. Therefore the results of these computer simulations do not prove that the outcome from a Global Marshall Plan would be favourable. However, they do demonstrate the possibility that the outcome would be favourable.

Yunker's argument is not that world government and a Global Marshall Plan would assuredly be successful. These initiatives should be regarded as experiments, experiments which may or may not succeed. The currently available evidence is inconclusive, because these experiments have not thus far been undertaken. Unless we actually undertake such experiments, we cannot know how they will turn out. If, after a reasonable period of time, it is becoming compellingly evident that they are not working, then the Global Marshall Plan could be shut down and the world federation disbanded. There is a workable "exit strategy," so to speak. Even in the event of failure, however, no doubt some lessons will have been learned that will be useful to the future development of global human civilization.

Perhaps the most potent argument against world government at the present time is that if such a government were to be established, there would be no way to return to the *status quo ante* short of violent revolution. Were this argument to be widely recognized as specious, this might significantly improve the odds that an actual world government will be established in the real world within the foreseeable future. It has long been acknowledged that the main basis of progress in physical science is experimentation. Clearly there might be a role for experiment in social policy. The repeal of alcohol prohibition in the United States in 1933, and the renunciation of communism by the Soviet Union in 1991, are two examples of a society "changing its mind" on the basis of experience ("experience" being a form of

"experiment"). What happened to alcohol prohibition in the United States and communism in the Soviet Union might also happen to a world government in the future. Nevertheless, most policy analysts will agree that most of the social and political innovations that come about in the real world, against much opposition and with great difficulty, are eventually recognized by the large majority as having been generally beneficial, and thus they become permanent.

The vision of world government as a probable catalyst to global civil war is so firmly embedded in many people's minds that they might think it implausible for a global government to permit the peaceful departure of component nations following its formation—whether or not this is a constitutionally guaranteed national right. They may invoke the example of the United States Civil War of 1861 to 1865: the US national government, supported by the northern states, undertook a long and costly civil war rather than allow the peaceful secession of the southern states. But aside from the fact that the US Constitution that went into effect in 1789 did not address the issue of secession, either to allow it or disallow it, the question of slavery introduced an extremely emotional element into the situation, an element that made it impossible for either the northern states or the southern states to give in and allow a peaceful compromise. Since the legal institution of slavery has been outlawed throughout the contemporary world, this particularly emotional and combustible issue should not disturb the equilibrium of a potential future world government.

THE CASE FOR (LIMITED) FEDERAL WORLD GOVERNMENT

It was during the hyper-violent twentieth century, with its two world wars and the threat of a nuclear third world war, that the world federalist concept of a world state to ensure world peace came to full fruition. But just as the case for world government came into sharper focus during the twentieth century, so also did the case against world government. The two most important arguments against world government are as follows: (1) it would quickly degenerate into a horrific totalitarian nightmare, as in Kenneth Waltz: "And were world government attempted, we might find ourselves dying in the attempt, or uniting and living a life worse than death";[24] and (2) there is no need for world government because the intelligence and good sense of national leaders will keep nations from going to war with one another, as in the "anarchical society" of Hedley Bull.[25] For obvious reasons, the second

argument is hardly mentioned when wars are in progress, as in 1914-18 or 1939-45. But in peacetime, the longer the peaceful interlude, the more it flourishes.

This second argument is nowadays frequently enunciated using the vocabulary of "global governance." In the early 1990s, following the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the idea emerged that now that the ideological problem had greatly diminished, international cooperation through the United Nations and other trans-national organizations could advance to such a high level that the results would be comparable to what would be achieved if there were an actual world government in operation. This idea has since been explored in numerous contributions in the international relations literature.[26] In its neutral sense, "global governance" simply refers to the existent degree of international cooperation, whether that degree be high or low. But according to most dictionaries, "governance" is what governments do, so that the phrase "governance without government" (utilized as the title of the seminal 1992 contribution of Rosenau and Czempiel) might suggest that a very high level of peaceful, cooperative coordination among the nations might be achieved in the absence of an effective governmental authority.[27] In fact, use of the term "global governance" to characterize the present international regime may be wishful thinking.[28]

Despite the ebbing of the Cold War twenty years ago, the military superpowers still feel it necessary to maintain large armed forces equipped with nuclear weapons. Some small, non-nuclear nations ("rogue" nations) are endlessly fascinated by the prospect of acquiring such weapons, as are terrorist groups desirous of surpassing the 9/11 success of al-Qaida. This situation elicits concern over such questions, for example, as just how far the other nuclear powers will allow the United States and its allies to go in quest of security against nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Leaving aside apocalyptic visions, localized conflict situations (as in Rwanda, Bosnia, Darfur, and elsewhere) continue to produce much human misery, the population explosion throughout the world over the last century is putting ever-greater pressure on both the natural resource base and the purity of the natural environment, and the AIDS crisis has reminded us of our potential vulnerability to catastrophic epidemics of contagious diseases. These are global problems in that they have important ramifications in almost every nation on the planet. The extent to which humanity will be able to cope effectively with these problems is critically affected by the predisposition

among nations toward mutual respect, trust, and cooperation. The persistence of us-versus-them attitudes in the various national populations makes it more difficult for national governments to reach effective, binding agreements on global problems.

If the world federalist ideal of the omnipotent world state existed in the real world, then clearly there would be little or no possibility of a nuclear holocaust, and it also seems likely that dramatic progress would be assured toward the amelioration of other global hazards such as environmental deterioration. But despite these advantages of the omnipotent world state, which have been virtually self-evident for many decades, the possibility has been thoroughly rejected by the vast majority of the world's people for fear of totalitarian tyranny, bureaucratic suffocation, cultural homogenization, and so on. Common sense would seem to dictate that the possibility of establishing an omnipotent world state in the real world within the foreseeable future is negligible to non-existent.

According to the ancient proverb, "half a loaf is better than none." What may be possible in the real world within the foreseeable future is the establishment of a limited federal world government along the lines of the Federal Union of Democratic Nations described above. Clearly, the establishment of such a limited world government, even if it were accompanied by the initiation of a Global Marshall Plan, would not immediately abrogate the problems of the world. At the outset membership would probably not be universal, and moreover, even among the charter members, some nations would retain virtually the same military machines they possess now. This is especially true of military superpowers such as the United States, the Russian Federation, and the People's Republic of China. The possibility of nuclear world war would not be eliminated, and in the very short run it might not even be noticeably reduced. Furthermore, even with a massive Global Marshall Plan in operation, it would almost certainly require several decades to achieve virtual economic parity between First World and Third World nations. Until then, economic differences will continue to generate conflicts of interest between rich and poor nations, conflicts that will continue to impede effective global action against such long-term threats as natural resource depletion and environmental deterioration.

But the fact that global perfection will not be instantaneously achieved is not a sensible argument against proposals for a limited world government and a Global Marshall Plan. The appropriate comparison is between the

status quo as it exists now, and the probable situation were these possibilities to be implemented. A plausible case can be made that the global human condition would be better were these initiatives undertaken. There would be some improvement in the processes of global governance in the short run, but more importantly, a more secure basis would have been laid for accelerating improvement in these processes in the long run.

Despite the terrible vicissitudes of the twentieth century (World Wars I and II, the Nazi holocaust, the gulag archipelago, and numerous other instances of gross inhumanity), that century also witnessed unprecedented progress toward higher forms of international harmony: the United Nations and the European Union, to name only the two most obvious examples. The ongoing work of these institutions is supplemented by the activities of a host of international non-governmental organizations. The network of global cooperation described by the term "global governance" is steadily advancing and strengthening. True, progress has not been linear, and obviously existent institutions such as the UN and the EU are not without serious problems. Still, they keep forging ahead, doing their part to ensure a benign future for global human civilization. Now that we are well into the twenty-first century, it is perhaps time for humanity to start giving serious consideration to the next step: to the foundation of a properly designed, properly limited federal world government. No doubt such a government would be subject to problems and liabilities, no less than the UN and the EU. But it would also probably continue to forge ahead.

An existing, functioning world government would provide a focus for the furtherance of impulses within national governments toward international cooperation, and for deepening cosmopolitan tendencies within the global human population. Many people today, not just world federalists, believe that it would be good if people everywhere thought of themselves as "citizens of the world." A possible difficulty with this objective is that the condition of citizenship normally implies a political entity of which one is a part, and to which one owes a significant degree of loyalty and allegiance. The "world" as such is a planetary body and not a political entity. But if there existed an operational supernational federation open to all the nations of the world, of which a certain nation happened to be a member, in a juridical sense a citizen of that nation would also be a citizen of the world federation. It might then be easier for him or her to subscribe whole-heartedly to the positive attitudes, sentiments, and behaviours associated with the phase

"citizen of the world."

The existence of a formal world government, even though relatively weak at first, would tend to support a growing sense of world community, and strengthening world community would enable a stronger and more effective world government, which in turn would further strengthen the spirit of world community, and so on. A snowballing effect could be set in motion, leading eventually to a very strong sense of world community, and a commensurately authoritative and effective world government. Reserved national rights such as free exit and independent military forces, rights required to permit the foundation of the world government in today's nationally oriented world, would by then be little more than dimly remembered historical relics. Thus the concept of "evolutionary world government" might underpin a successful world federalist movement in the twenty-first century, in much the same way that Eduard Bernstein's concept of "evolutionary socialism" enabled the success of the social democratic movement throughout most of the world in the twentieth century.

ENDNOTES

1. According to Derek Heater's authoritative history, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), the conceptual roots of the notion of world government may be traced back to the ancient Greeks.
2. Émeric Crucé's *The New Cyneas* was originally published in French in 1623. Its English translation by Thomas Willing Balch was published under the title *The New Cyneas of Émeric Crucé* (Philadelphia: Allan, Lane and Scott, 1909). The 1909 edition was reprinted by Kessinger Publishing in 2010. Originally published in German in 1795, Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay* was translated into English by Mary Campbell Smith (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1903). The 1903 edition was reprinted by Cosimo Classics in 2005.
3. Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd, *Searchlight on Peace Plans: Choose Your Road to World Government* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1944).
4. Raleigh C. Minor, *A Republic of Nations: A Study of the Organization of a Federal League of Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918).
5. Emery Reves, *The Anatomy of Peace*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945). For accounts of the period, see Joseph P. Baratta,

The Politics of World Federation, Vol. I: *United Nations, UN Reform, Atomic Control*, Vol. II: *From World Federalism to Global Governance* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), and James A. Yunker, *The Idea of World Government: From Ancient Times to the Twenty-First Century* (London and New York: Routledge Global Institutions Series, 2011).

6. Giuseppe A. Borgese, *Foundations of the World Republic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). Borgese's volume included as an appendix the "Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution" that was developed after World War II by a committee of distinguished citizens chaired by Robert M. Hutchins, then president of the University of Chicago. Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace through World Law*, 3rd enlarged ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966). The Clark-Sohn volume took the form of an annotated revision of the existing United Nations Charter.

7. Gerald J. Mangone, *The Idea and Practice of World Government* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), 19.

8. Eliot R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 396.

9. Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 8.

10. Eduard Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation*. Originally published in German in 1899. Translated by Edith C. Harvey (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1911). Reprinted by Random House in 1961 and Kessinger Publishing in 2009.

11. Illustrative of the substantial literature on this pivotal development in the history of socialist thought are the following: Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx* (New York: Octagon, 1979); David McLellan, *Marxism after Marx: An Introduction* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979); J. M. Tudor, ed., *Marxism and Social Democracy: The Revisionist Debate, 1896-1898* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Manfred B. Steger, *Eduard Bernstein and the Quest for Evolutionary Socialism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

12. Campbell Craig, "The Resurgent Idea of World Government," *Ethics & International Affairs* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 133-42.

13. Examples include Jerry Tetalman and Byron Belitsos, *One World Democracy: A Progressive Vision for Enforceable World Law* (San Rafael, CA: Origin, 2005); Errol E. Harris, *Earth Federation Now: Tomorrow Is Too Late* (Radford, VA: Institute for Economic Democracy, 2005); Jim Clark, *Rescue Plan for Planet Earth: Democratic World Government through a Global Referendum* (Toronto: Key, 2008).

14. Examples include Luis Cabrera, *Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Louis Pojman, *Terrorism, Human Rights, and the Case for World Government* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Torbjörn Tännsjö, *Global Democracy: The Case for a World Government* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).

15. Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State Is Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 4 (October 2003): 491-542.

16. Vaughn P. Shannon, "Wendt's Violation of the Constructivist Project: Agency and Why a World State is *Not* Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 4 (October 2005): 581-87. Wendt's response is contained in "Agency, Teleology, and the World State: A Reply to Shannon," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 4 (October 2005): 589-98.

17. Eric A. Posner, "International Law: A Welfarist Approach," *University of Chicago Law Review* 73, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 487-543.

18. Thomas G. Weiss, "What Happened to the Idea of World Government," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (June 2009): 253-71.

19. Wendt, "Why a World State Is Inevitable," 506.

20. See, for example, recent work on "governance in areas of limited statehood": Thomas Risse and Ursula Lehmkuhl, "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: New Modes of Governance," SFB-Governance Working Paper 1, December 2006; Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, "Governance without a State: Can It Work?" *Regulation and Governance* 4, no. 2 (June 2010): 113-34. Also relevant is the abundant literature on the mixed political nature of the European Union; examples include Jeremy J. Richardson, ed., *European Union: Power and Policy-Making* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Richard McAllister, *From EC to EU: An Historical and Political Survey* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Clive

Archer, *The European Union* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

21. James A. Yunker, *Political Globalization: A New Vision of Federal World Government* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007); James A. Yunker, *The Grand Convergence: Economic and Political Aspects of Human Progress* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

22. Franz Josef Rademacher, *Global Marshal Plan: A Planetary Contract* (Hamburg: Global Marshall Plan Foundation, 2004); Florian J. Huber, *Global Governance and the Global Marshall Plan* (Saarbrücken, Germany: Verlag, 2007); Andreas Pichlhöfer, *World in Balance–Global Marshall Plan* (Saarbrücken, Germany: Verlag, 2010).

23. James A. Yunker, *Common Progress: The Case for a World Economic Equalization Program* (New York: Praeger, 2000); James A. Yunker, "Could a Global Marshall Plan Be Successful? An Investigation Using the WEEP Simulation Model," *World Development* 32, no. 7 (July 2004): 1109-37.

24. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 228.

25. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

26. Illustrative references from the abundant literature on global governance include the following: Albert J. Paolini, Anthony P. Jarvis, and Christian Reus-Smit, eds., *Between Sovereignty and Global Governance: The United Nations, the State and Civil Society* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998); Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair, eds., *Approaches to Global Governance Theory* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999); Rorden Wilkinson and Stephen Hughes, eds., *Global Governance: Critical Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

27. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

28. See James A. Yunker, "Effective Global Governance without Effective Global Government: A Contemporary Myth," *World Futures* 67, no. 7 (2004): 503-53, for an argument that the term "global governance" is an example of "tendentious terminology," defined as the putting forward of a controversial proposition not by means of direct, explicit

statement but rather by indirect, implicit means that utilize certain terms with generally understood and accepted meanings, according to which the proposition would be true. In this case, the controversial proposition is "The current level of international cooperation and coordination is equivalent to what would be achieved if there existed a functioning global government."

Book Reviews

Craig Zelizer, ed. *Integrated Peacebuilding: Innovative Approaches to Transforming Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013. ISBN-13: 978-0-8133-4509-3 (Pbk). Pp. 360.

Craig Zeliger's goal is to create a text that shows how peacebuilding can be integrated across multiple sectors of society, before, during, and after violent conflict. This edited volume meets his goal effectively and thoroughly. Moving beyond the "do no harm" approach to development and conflict transformation, the authors in this text explain that peacebuilding focuses on connecting local and external actions to build capacities for peace. It combines the action of professional work—focused on reducing violent conflict and setting positive peace systems in place—with training to use particular skills. The book covers ten varied sectors: health, security, business, media, legal, and others. In addition, it intersects with important cultural practices concerning gender, religion, and environmental awareness.

Experts in each area contribute theoretically strong introductions to each of the sectors. Significant but missing from the list is the education sector. Of course, any reasonably sized volume cannot cover all aspects of conflict and peacemaking but the exclusion of education seems short-sighted. With wonderfully richness, each chapter reviews the relevant literature and provides concrete examples or case studies from a range of contexts. The solid literature reviews and the diverse cross-sector analyses make this book a good place to start for readers new to the concept of peacebuilding but well-steeped in their own discipline or professional practice. In the classroom environment the book could work well with upper-level undergraduates (especially in globally-oriented courses) or as a baseline text in a graduate program at the masters level. It effectively crosses disciplines and would be appropriate for courses in political science, sociology, peace studies, or international relations.

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Zelizer argues that training practitioners in conflict prone situations must understand the dynamics of conflict and how to use a systems analysis. In his own contribution (chapter 2) he carefully maps how approaches to international development have changed in recent decades. This lays the groundwork for a sub-theme developed in the book around the misalignment of short-term aid goals and the need for long-term social transformation in deeply divided societies. The duties of aid workers, the funding priorities of donors, and the recommendations of conflict analysis professionals do not often neatly align. While open and regular communication among these different constituencies has helped to close the gaps, the author makes clear that serious flaws in the response systems remain a challenge.

As Ashley Laura McArthur points out in chapter 8, at the root of the challenge is the dilemma that "conflicts typically have multiple contributing causes, which typically do not instigate violence separately but can combine to foster violence and predation" (180). Conflict analysis uncovers complex systems which need equally complex approaches to peacebuilding, but organizations often have specializations in only one or two sectors that contribute to the web of a conflict. Therefore, the book highlights the necessary development of integrated responses. A few chapters give examples of how integration functions or has been achieved. However, the summary chapter could do more to concretize this theme and chart out future steps to deepen an integrated practice. Chapter 9 by Feigenbaum, Goldberg, and Vance-Cheng provides a thought-provoking discussion of how security and peacebuilding might be integrated in a way that weaves together "soft power" and "hard power" approaches (204) to change conflict dynamics. More of this creative thinking is needed across the volume.

With deep thought on the theoretical questions and practical challenges of the field, *Integrated Peacebuilding* is an important addition to the growing literature on peacebuilding. Zelizer has made the many layers of analysis required in the integrated approach eminently readable. Vibrant and timely examples in each chapter create an engaging text. The care with which each contributing author presents a variety of perspectives on how peacebuilding is developing in her/his sector makes the book a significant resource for new and well-established scholars alike. There is no gloss here; integrated peacebuilding is challenging to achieve but many examples in the book show it is both possible and reasonable to expect. The key is in adequate training and knowledge, and this volume provides a good place to

start.

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Pippa Norris. *Making Democratic Governance Work: How Regimes Shape Prosperity, Welfare, and Peace* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. ISBN: 978-1-107-60269-4 (Pbk). Pp. 235.

There is great confusion and contradiction in the literature that explores the relationships between democratization, good governance, prosperity, poverty, and peace. Pippa Norris's *Making Democratic Governance Work* offers considerable clarity about these relationships, showing both parsimony and depth of analysis without glossing over the complexity inherent in these problematics. Interrogating the many schools that weigh in regarding these relationships, Norris offers a unified theory that relies on what she understands the empirical evidence to reveal. At times one encounters research that renders a problematic far clearer than previous scholarship. When reading it, one thinks repeatedly, "Of course!" and wonders why the literature has failed to make clear what the present author has, only now, made clear. Norris's book is of this kind.

Norris's survey of much of the research on the relationships between the variables under analysis makes the book valuable. Her greatest contribution is the persuasive argument that the evidence reveals a relationship between the variables that warrants a unified theory that democratization and good governance are insufficient on their own to advance human security. Taken together, however, they quite positively do advance security. Norris's argument is that regimes matter. Liberal democracy *and* bureaucratic governance promote economic growth. "Bureaucratic democracies" and "bureaucratic state capacity" consistently outperform "all other regime types on human development" (190-91). In short, Norris argues convincingly that either-or conclusions found in the literature are weak. The much stronger inclusive argument can be summarized as the need for liberal democracy *and* state capacity. Her interrogation and analysis do not fundamentally factor in transnational and multilateral considerations.

Readers of this journal may be most interested in her argument about

the relationship of democracy, good governance, state capacity, development—and peace. In her view, the evidence reveals that "liberal democracy is not significantly related to the degree of internal armed conflict in a society" and that "only bureaucratic governance proved significant" (181) to such conflict. This is a critique of the anemia of *liberal* democracy. In contrast to such thin democracy, she rightly notes that, according to the evidence, consociational democracy does tend to reduce internal conflicts (not that power-sharing *always* reduces, let alone eliminates, conflict). It is worth noting that she does not discuss arguments that consociational democracy also locks minority parties out of power.

It is surprising, therefore, that the primary weakness of Norris's book is in insufficient interrogation and an assumptive use of "liberal democracy." She treats liberal democracy as a regime type in rather narrow terms. To her credit, she claims that it "includes a broader range of criteria than minimalist accounts of representative democracy reflecting Schumpeterian notions" (55). Yet she falls in line with the prevailing literature that, she reports, treats democracy and democratization as one set of phenomena, state capacity as another set, and good governance as still another. Whereas she argues for democracy *plus* state capacity *and* good governance, she hardly considers theories that present democratization as sufficient or authentic *only* insofar as considerable state capacity and good governance are manifest. She helpfully uses the concepts of "patronage democracy" and "bureaucratic democracy" as opposed to "liberal democracy," but avoids the problematic ways in which liberalism and democracy are at odds rather than existing in complimentarity. She conceptualizes liberal democracy as fundamentally free and fair voting procedures. However, democratic theorists increasingly see voting, however free and fair, as a mere starting place for understanding the many *necessary and definitional* criteria of democracy.

One of the many valuable features of Norris's book is the use of case studies that pair countries that are both meaningfully similar and different to test theoretical hypotheses. A small but particular misstep in which her analysis falters in her case study of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the countries that share the island of Hispaniola. Against the context of their histories together, the Dominican Republic is considerably more prosperous and more democratic than is Haiti. Norris understands the history and "social structure" of these two countries to be significantly similar. Somehow, she fails to grasp the profound difference between the histories of

exploitation in the Dominican Republic (much less of it) and Haiti (much more of it). In a telling sentence she writes, "On February 29, 2004, Aristide submitted his resignation as president of Haiti and flew on a chartered plane to Africa" (131). Inexplicably, she ignores the robust surge of democracy in both of Aristide's administrations, and the vile and violent opposition to that democratization by exploitive forces within both Haiti and the United States—opposition that climaxed in the *coup d'etat* that led to Aristide's so-called resignation from office. Norris's comparative analysis would read differently if, for example, she had availed herself of Peter Hallward's excellent, *Damming the Flood: Haiti and the Politics of Containment*.

These two shortcomings are small matters in relation to the value and power of the book. Her unified theory may be destined to reshape future research. It is a book to be read and consulted many times.

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Andrew Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart. *Peacemaking and the Imagination: Papua New Guinea Perspectives*. St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 2011. ISBN 978-0-7022-3908-3 (Pbk). Pp. 269.

Strathern and Stewart's text explores the role of imagination in peacemaking in Papua New Guinea (PNG), specifically as it is expressed in ritualised forms of compensatory peacemaking that take place through kinship networks. They contrast the ethnoconflict praxes in the Highlands of PNG (which are based in horizontal negotiations between groups) with the more hierarchical processes implemented by the government during and after pacification and colonisation. The western nation state's conflict resolution frameworks to some extent threaten Highlanders' ritualised forms of compensation, which are designed to mend relationships and resolve conflicts. The authors point to contestations of sovereignty that shape how people perceive and evaluate different forms of peacemaking, and note that Papua New Guinea communities perceive the government to be obstructing local conflict resolution practices. The authors argue for the revitalisation of ethnoconflict praxes in Papua New Guinea, stating that "the best chances for peacemaking lie in those local contexts where compensation practices, or other modes of

the ritualisation of conflict, can flourish, be creatively modified, and act as symbolic markers of local identities and cultural patterns" (xviii).

Strathern and Stewart describe the importance of relationship ties in peacemaking in Papua New Guinea. When pulled into a conflict, people in these relationship networks naturally have an interest in bringing a conflict to a close, partly because of the costs of the conflicts to local economics and to the relationships involved. "If the cost of a violent act is already written into that act itself, it contains its own potential for closure" (197).

Strathern and Stewart also explore the role that revenge and sorcery play in contemporary violence in the Western Highlands of PNG, practices that have at times increased in response to limitations on physical violence enforced by externally introduced governance structures. They point out that contemporary uses of ritualised peacemaking face a number of tensions that originate in introduced governance, religious, and educational systems. Their resilience is challenged by the expansion of relationship networks; not all relationships are strong enough to be constrained by ritualised compensatory exchanges. Thus some members of contemporary relationship networks resist the persuasive peacemaking rhetoric of "big men" (145). Nevertheless, the authors also offer examples of creative contemporary adaptations to peacemaking, including the formation of effective women's peace groups, and the increase of intermarriage as part of effective peacebuilding processes.

Although the text focuses on the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, the authors also explore comparative ritual peacemaking processes from West Papua, The Solomon Islands, and East Africa. They claim that ritual raises "action to a symbolic level at which other actions are transformed, encompassed or transcended" (167), encouraging people to develop more sustainable visions of peace. The ceremonial exchange relationships analysed by Strathern and Stewart represent forms of embodied, rather than codified, practice. This echoes Diana Taylor's research into the transformative potential of performative rituals, which she calls the repertoire, which contrast with the archived, codified conflict resolution practices employed by many western governance structures.

The authors do not romanticize rituals, explaining that they may be engaged to exacerbate violence as well as to build peace, and that they are sometimes unsuccessful in transforming conflict. Nevertheless, compensatory rituals in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea have historically been, and continue to be, largely successful peacebuilding processes. This may be

partly due to their "symbolic aptitude, which enables ritual acts to operate as holistic condensations of value, affect, intention and supposition on the part of those who undertake it" (192). The authors describe ritualised compensation as a political art involving "finetuned ways of debating, negotiating and mediating" that require great attention to "social and individual details and concerns" (208).

Peacemaking and the Imagination is based in the discipline of anthropology, which at times may make it difficult for peace and conflict studies scholars to fully understand all the terms and concepts. Nevertheless, the authors provide important perspectives on ethnoconflict praxes often lacking in Western conflict resolution. Other works by Strathern and Stewart that may interest scholars in peace and conflict studies are *Kinship and Action: Self and Group Ritual* and *Violence: Theory and Ethnography*.

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Charles P. Webel and John A. Arnoldi, eds. *The Ethics and Efficacy of the Global War on Terrorism: Fighting Terror with Terror*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. ISBN: 978-0-230-11098-4 (Hbk). Pp. 278.

Webel and Arnoldi's edited book, *The Ethics and Efficacy of the Global War on Terrorism* (GWOT), succeeds in two areas where many books on this subject do not. First, it critically analyzes the perspectives and approaches being used to fight the GWOT and combat the "The Evil Scourge of Terrorism" (Chomsky, 15-17), whether the terrorists are non-state actors or the American state. Second, this book collects the viewpoints of thirteen authors from various disciplines, providing a stimulating analytical collage. This results in an excellent university text on the subject of the GWOT. The essays are well-selected, intellectually variegated, and informative; most importantly, they open windows of critical analysis on a subject so often devoid of all these features.

Webel and Arnoldi have divided their collection into four parts. Part I, "Understanding Ethical Challenges" of the GWOT, begins with an essay by Noam Chomsky, who reorients the discussion by placing it in a broader and oft-forgotten context. He locates the start of the GWOT with Ronald

Reagan's entry into the US president's office in 1981. Based on millions of "tortured and mutilated corpses" (15) around the world, Chomsky points out that Reagan's war was really more a War *of* Terror than a War *on* Terror. The events of 11 September 2001 and the dozen years since are really only a continuation of Reagan's war. Chomsky offers three "remedies": (1) to "end our own role as perpetrators," (2) to "attend to the grievances," and, (3) "if an act of terror occurs, deal with it as a criminal act" (26-27). These become key themes reiterated by many of the essays throughout the collection despite the authors' diverse orientations and points of view.

Charles Webel focuses on definitions of terrorism, especially on the distinction between "terrorism from above" (TFA) and "terrorism from below" (TFB) (32). Pitting TFA against TFB does little to solve terrorism, he says, leaving nonviolent intervention as the only potential way out. Scott Attran re-examines the oft-asked question, "Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?," by focusing on the culture of young *Takfiris*, youth excommunicated from their communities who kill and die in order to belong to a friendship subgroup in the community. It is "not theology or ideology" (57).

Laurie Calhoun's lucid essay, which begins Part II on "Applying Ethics" to the GWOT, places the GWOT into the framework of moral philosophy. She assails the spurious notion of "collateral damage" and appropriately calls for the universality of moral principles. William Cohn then provides an examination of laws designed to prevent abuse and protect citizens who were systematically degraded in order to wage the GWOT. The end result has been both "unethical and ineffective" (88), and "we" are less secure. Jørgen Johansen uses Albert Bergeson's model (in which the victim harmed by the perpetrator is not the target) to ask why intervention and engagement with the perpetrator have not taken place when there is opportunity to prevent acts of terror.

Part III addresses the complicit and difficult role of journalists. Stephen Reese and Seth Lewis describe how journalists "frame" the story, promote it, and then ascribe these perspectives to citizens who close the loop simply by repeating what they originally heard from the journalists. John Arnoldi examines the collusion of journalists in perpetuating false narratives provided by government or military leaders while also tailoring reports about deaths and killings according to the nationality of the victims. Molly Bingham interviewed "insurgents" in Iraq for journalistic balance. Her reflections regarding her fear of her own country—both abroad and

upon her return—provide a valuable first person perspective on the difficult relationship between war patriotism and journalism.

Part IV examines "The Dark Side" of the GWOT. Michael German utilises his experience as an FBI undercover agent with domestic terrorists to explain the counterproductive approaches of the GWOT. Lisa Hajjar critiques "The Liberal Ideology of Torture." Cris Toffolo examines the unethical alliance between the US and Pakistan and the resulting catalogue of human rights violations. She points out that other countries now justify their unethical practices by comparing them to US actions. The last essay, "The Agent" by Mark Arax, tells the story of a decorated FBI agent who was refused permission to testify in the Lodi, California terrorism case against a father and son. The perceived need to uncover active terrorism was so great that all contrary evidence was excised from the trial.

Despite the varied approaches, there is a deep-seated unity in this collection. All contributors see the global war on terror as an ill-begotten war, ineffective and counterproductive. All call for a criminal justice response to acts of terror. All see the complicity of the American state in global terrorism. All understand that real issues of global justice have to be addressed and that perpetrators need to be engaged—whether they use "terror from above" or "terror from below." For both general readers and university students, the value of this volume is found in its ability to comprehensively critique the ethically, morally, and practically mistaken direction of the GWOT. The target of the GWOT may be the "terrorists" but too many victims thus far have been civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the citizens of the United States itself. By any measure available, the GWOT has been and continues to be a disaster and an ethical nightmare. Of this the book is a timely post-mortem.

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