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Canada and Afghanistan: Peacemaking as Counter-Insurgency Warfare; A Study in Political Rhetoric

George Melnyk

This essay examines the political rhetoric used by Canadian politicians and others to support Canada's military involvement in the war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011. It exposes the contradictions and flaws in these arguments by examining how the terms peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding have played out in public discourse. This case study of the Afghanistan war explores how political rhetoric works to change national identity and what barriers this rhetoric has faced in making fundamental changes to public attitudes formed in earlier years.

The conflict in Afghanistan will be far more costly and much, much longer than Americans realize. This war, already in its seventh year, will eventually become the longest in American history.[1]
—Richard Holbrooke in 2008, US Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan appointed by President Obama

A BRIEF HISTORY

If the Afghanistan War (2001-) will indeed be America's longest war, surpassing even the Vietnam War (1960-1975), then Canada's involvement in the Afghanistan conflict will also be Canada's longest war. Canadian soldiers have been fighting in Afghanistan since December 2001 and the withdrawal from Canada's combat role, approved by Parliament in March 2008 for July 2011, has evolved into a "non-combat" role lasting until 2014.[2] This is a total of thirteen years, longer than Canada's involvement in World War One and World War Two combined. Although deaths have been limited during

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this lengthy period (158 dead up to December 2011) and the number of personnel involved relatively minor (2,800 troops at the peak or fewer than 3 percent of the foreign troops in Afghanistan in 2010), the impact on Canadian public discourse and the national self-image has been much greater than these limited numbers would suggest. The Canadian military commitment to remain in Afghanistan after 2011 in a military and police-training capacity may be a reorientation (its fourth reorientation since 2001) but it remains a military presence bolstering one side in the conflict.[3]

Three different administrations have kept Canada on the battlefield for over a decade. By doing so, both Liberal and Conservative governments have redefined Canada's role in the world from one of a prominent peacekeeper to one of a belligerent.[4] When and how this shift came about and what its effects have been for Canada's political identity and discourse is the main focus of this study. Since the United States under the Obama administration has made a major troop commitment to the Afghanistan theatre, it is entirely possible that Canada's military involvement will last as long as that of the United States. This could mean Canada's transformation into an ally wed to the American propensity to military solutions and imperial conquest, which would be a radical departure from its previous international identity.[5]

The pivotal point in the remaking of Canada from peacekeeper to belligerent was the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. Canada joined in the military campaign to unseat the Taliban government of Afghanistan and destroy al-Qaida cells because of the traumatic events of 11 September 2001 and the American claim that both elements be held responsible for the attack on the Twin Towers in New York. The rhetoric that successive Canadian governments and mainstream media have generated to justify Canadian participation in the occupation of Afghanistan has led to a fundamental redefinition of Canada's image in the global community. Whether this redefinition has taken hold in the Canadian psyche to such an extent that Canadian military involvement becomes normative rather than exceptional is yet to be determined. A decade of government and media propaganda for the war may have caused a fundamental shift in Canadian expectations, if not values.

The arguments raised for Canada's military engagement have been varied, but consistent. One of the main academic proponents of Canada's participation in the military occupation of Afghanistan has been David Bercuson, founder and Director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies

at the University of Calgary. As a public intellectual who writes op-ed pieces regularly for the prestigious Canadian daily, the *Globe and Mail*, he has argued on behalf of Canada's military mission. For example, in an op-ed piece on 20 April 2007, he condemned the Opposition Liberal Party's motion to end Canada's military involvement in February 2009. He claimed that adopting this motion would mean that "Canada's reputation as a reliable ally . . . would be shattered," and the country's "national interests would suffer grievous harm."[6] These national interests, according to Bercuson, include standing firm with its American ally, creating democracy and progress in Afghanistan, defeating a foe (the Taliban) whose social and political values are repugnant to Western values, having Canada appear as a significant player in international affairs, and, finally, not letting the lives that have been lost be dishonoured by not finishing the job (that is, by winning the war). The cumulative result of these "national interests" is a redefinition of Canada away from peace and toward war, but in a curious way—identifying war as a legitimate form of peacekeeping. This conflation of war and peace in the minds of those who have sought to redefine Canada's post-Korean War military history is exemplified in the title of Bercuson's 2010 op-ed piece, "There's a New Peace 'Warrior' in Town."[7] Waging war and glorifying warriors is presented as a legitimate way to peace. This conflicted terminology echoes the twisted justifications for the war-torn route to security and peace offered by numerous imperial powers, including Russia in Chechnya, China in Tibet, and the United States in Afghanistan. A study of Canada's historical relationship to peacekeeping can expose the contradictions in the warrior as peacemaker image.[8]

From the end of the Korean War in 1953 until the first Gulf War in 1991, Canada's military was involved in only two kinds of military actions: military training with NATO and NORAD, and United Nations peacekeeping operations, of which it was considered a leading contributor. Because Canada was not actively involved in making war for almost forty years, there emerged in Canada and abroad a widely held perception that Canada was a nation that did not participate in imperial projects, and that it could be counted on to help end conflicts and supply military personnel to supervise ceasefires and lines of demarcation. Canadian government rhetoric under Liberal Prime Ministers Pearson in the 1960s and Trudeau in the 1970s identified Canada with United Nations peacekeeping operations and with a global diplomacy centred on the concept of peace.

Jack L. Granatstein, a historian and senior research fellow at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, has been another strong academic proponent of the Canadian military and its engagement on the battlefield ever since the Afghanistan war and has been a regular media commentator on the subject. Like Bercuson, he has attacked "the centrality of the peacekeeping myth in the public mind."[9] According to Granatstein, "not much of this belief system is correct" and a focus on a previously defined form of peacekeeping would mean less money spent on the military, which according to him is "folly."[10] Yet he acknowledges that Canadians want the military to move to peacekeeping and away from combat.[11] The inauguration of a "training" role in Afghanistan is meant to appease the Canadian public's growing anti-war sentiment. With the combat mission morphing into a training mission, Bercuson and Grantstein published a joint op-ed piece in the *Globe and Mail* in which they blamed politicians for the lack of public support for the war, concluding that "the Afghan war was a just one and Canada was right to participate."[12]

When Canada joined the United States in the first Gulf War in 1991, the Liberal government of the day took the first significant step toward turning its back on its UN peacekeeping image and its own political legacy. The goal of driving the Iraqis out of Kuwait, a country allied to the United States, was sanctioned by the Security Council of the United Nations. At the time, two permanent Security Council members—Russia and China—were not in a strong position; the Soviet Union had broken apart, leaving Russia in a seriously weakened state, while China was only starting on the road to capitalist transformation and reform that would link it to world markets, especially those of the United States. Neither country was in a position to stand up to the United States and its allies. This confluence of strategic weakness in its adversaries allowed the United States to redefine its position as the pre-eminent world power in the post-Cold War environment. After this war, Canada again joined the United States in the UN-sanctioned and NATO-directed bombing of Serbia, forcing that formerly dominant Yugoslavian country to vacate its province of Kosovo in 1999. Russia's attempt to bolster its ally was openly rebuffed. Two years later, in 2001, Canadian Special Forces joined the American invasion of Afghanistan. In a single decade, Canada transformed its international identity as a peacekeeper to one of a confirmed belligerent in various wars, all of which were led or instigated by the United States.

This change of identity should not be a total surprise because of two developments. First, the establishment of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States by the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney in 1988 created an economic imperative for closer political and ideological ties. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought to an end the Cold War, which had been the pre-eminent geopolitical framework for Canada's foreign policy. The division of the world into three camps—capitalist, communist, and non-aligned—had Canada linked via NATO and NORAD to the capitalist camp, but because of its non-belligerency during this period it was also associated with the non-aligned movement, especially through its membership in the Commonwealth. In 1991, when the transformation began, Canada held first place among UN peacekeepers, but by 2008 it was in fifty-first place and its contribution in terms of personnel dropped to fewer than 1 percent of all personnel involved in UN peacekeeping.[13] Meanwhile, the amount of money Canada spent on UN peacekeeping operations dropped from $94 million to $15 million.[14]

It is clear that the decade of the 1990s, when two of the United States' most feared adversaries—Russia and China—were undergoing massive changes, was the period in which Canada increasingly aligned itself with American foreign policy and military engagements. That alignment found its full fruition in Afghanistan in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

MATTERS OF DEFINITION

Three key terms currently define the peace process on a political/military continuum: *peacekeeping*, *peacebuilding*, and *peacemaking*. *Peacekeeping* refers to a military involvement by a third party sanctioned by the global community via the United Nations that ensures the maintenance of ceasefires and peace agreements. This third party intervention has been agreed to by the former belligerents and its role is primarily passive. *Peacebuilding* refers to a post-conflict reconstruction of civil society and state institutions through third-party activities such as the disarmament of belligerents and support for rebuilding economic, social, and political structures in a war-torn state. This is a proactive rather than a passive process that tends to be civilian-driven, though there is a military component. The final term, *peacemaking*, refers to a military action that is robust and intense. It generates conflict and combat until such time as there is a military resolution. Peacemaking has been used as a descriptor of Canada's role in Afghanistan. While the UN still links the

term peacemaking more to diplomacy than to military action, peacemaking is more generally held to relate to third-party intervention, whether UN-sanctioned or not.[15]

Under the United Nations Charter, Chapter VII resolutions allow the Security Council to approve military intervention to secure peace. UN interventions in East Timor, Rwanda, and Somalia were all Chapter VII Security Council resolutions, as was the Gulf War in 1991. Beginning with that war, the UN began a more robust interventionist role. This came about because of the political imbalance after the Cold War and the rise of non-state actors in conflicts. The UN's foreign military intervention can generate an insurgency aimed at removing the intervention, and peacemaking can degenerate into protracted counter-insurgency warfare. This is the case in Afghanistan, where the links between a military intervention, a reactive insurgency to that intervention, and the establishment of counter-insurgency warfare are critical.

THE RHETORIC OF THE GOOD WAR

The Government of Canada argued at the beginning of its involvement in Afghanistan that it was supporting the United States in its "war on terror." This is when it sent Canadian Special Forces troops to aid the Americans in their war on the Taliban in December 2001. This low level of involvement (orientation one) was moved up to a higher level soon after the Taliban defeat in early 2002. The Western powers installed a pro-Western government in Kabul to replace the Taliban, who had been the victors after a brutal civil war in the 1990s that had come on the heels of an American-supported insurgency against the Soviet occupiers from 1979 to 1989. To prop up the newly installed government, the United Nations established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Canada contributed troops to ISAF, whose mandate was restricted to the support of the Kabul government (orientation two), while the United States pacified the remainder of the country either directly or through proxy warlords. The UN Security Council expanded the role of ISAF to the whole country in 2003 and NATO took over its command. Canada's initial contribution to ISAF was centred in Kabul and remained there until 2006, when it was increased to 2,500 soldiers who were then stationed in Kandahar, Afghanistan's second-largest city, home of the Pashtun resistance, and a key battlefield of the insurgency. In doing this, Canada moved its military from a defensive and relatively safe

role in Kabul to a front-line role in Kandahar (orientation three). As a result, Canadian casualties increased substantially. Likewise, the Afghanistan war came under the control of two occupying Western entities—NATO and the United States. Originally, the Canadian presence in Kandahar was to be limited to two years, but it was extended to 2009 and then again to 2011. The level of troop deployment levelled off at 2,800 and did not increase.

The increase in the complement of troops plus its attack and destroy actions led the Canadian media to report on the war on a daily basis, rationalizing Canada's involvement using government voices and pundits alike. The Conservative minority government of Stephen Harper initially framed the war as Canada's leadership contribution to the world and adopted the previous Liberal governments' 3-D policy (defence, diplomacy, and development) for Afghanistan. This meant that Canada's military efforts were there to build security, that is, to destroy the Taliban insurgency, and to encourage development in order to win the allegiance of the local population, while fostering "democratic" institutions aligned with Western values and Western interests. The corrupt and militarily ineffective Karzai government, which has been in power since his installation by the United States in Bonn in December 2001 (subsequently winning two corruption-riddled elections), was the prime vehicle for installing Western values and defending Western interests. Because Canada refused to participate in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it has been argued that it felt compelled to offer its services to the Americans in Afghanistan.[16]

From its first election in 2006, the minority Conservative government adopted tough militarist language, praising its soldiers for fighting terrorists and vowing that military casualties would never lead to a "cut and run" policy. Then, in mid-2007, a public relations firm named The Strategic Counsel reported to the government that it needed to soften its rhetoric and emphasize "rebuilding, enhancing the lives of women and children and peacekeeping"—terms that resonated with Canadians.[17] Earlier in 2007, Prime Minister Harper, when speaking to the troops in Kandahar, was reported to have said that the soldiers were fighting to stop terrorism from coming to Canada.[18] The Obama administration in 2009 also used this argument to justify increasing US forces in Afghanistan.[19] For the Americans, who were increasing their commitment by another 17,000 troops, the reason offered was counterterrorism. Terrorism and the insurgency were meant to be synonymous in government propaganda.

The key strategy of counterterrorism is counter-insurgency warfare, but that was downplayed by the Harper government when it took over the war from the Liberals. In 2010, it was revealed that the government also scripted a message of engagement in development work as the foundation of its Afghan mission.[20] But defining peacemaking as counter-insurgency warfare leads to a military mindset that focuses on victory. The public initially accepted the claim that a more robust counter-insurgency war would lead to security, but it grew weary of this argument as the insurgency increased with every increase in Western military escalation.[21] Every new general, whether Canadian or American, promised a quick victory, but after a decade of such unfulfilled promises,[22] scepticism and disillusionment set in.[23] The Americans had used a "surge" of troops in Iraq in 2008, which allowed it to claim the country was more or less pacified; they applied the same approach in Afghanistan, bringing in an extra 30,000 troops in 2009-10, so many that the large British force already stationed in Helmand province was outnumbered by the Americans.[24] There were over 100,000 foreign troops fighting in Afghanistan by the spring of 2010, including 47,000 Americans in the ISAF force plus tens of thousands more under its own command in Operation Enduring Freedom.[25] Diplomacy to end the conflict was absent; negotiation with the insurgents was ruled out and expenditures for development were a tiny part of overall Canadian costs in the war compared to the military cost of keeping the Karzai government in power. Afghanistan remains as war-torn now as it has been for the past decade. This is evident in the figures for foreign military involvement. In 2003, when NATO took over ISAF, there were 5,600 troops involved from various countries. By 2007, there were 35,000 NATO and US troops operating in ISAF plus another 8,000 US troops operating under their own command, titled Operation Enduring Freedom. A year later, there were 47,000 troops in ISAF plus another 14,000 US troops outside of ISAF. By April 2008, there were 61,000 foreign troops fighting the war.[26] Two years later, there were over 40,000 more.[27] The vast majority of the occupying forces are now American; in 2009, the United States took control of ISAF, replacing a rotating NATO command with its own permanent command because the Americans were displeased with NATO efforts. In addition to foreign troops, there are approximately 125,000 Afghan army and police personnel, who are paid for by the occupying forces.[28]

In mid-2010, the Canadian commander, whose predecessor had been

sent home in disgrace over sexual misconduct, expressed the view that "if NATO's counterinsurgency operations this summer are successful," the Taliban will "wither away into irrelevancy."[29] A year later this comment itself has withered away into irrelevancy. Can peacemaking as counter-insurgency succeed in the present Afghan social, political, and economic environment? What has been the actual result of this decade-long emphasis on a military solution?

WHO ARE THE TALIBAN?

War is a phenomenon that divides people into friend or foe. In counter-insurgency warfare, it is more difficult to discern friend from foe than in conventional war because the population, which is supposedly the object of protection, is also the source of the insurgency. The enemy in the Afghanistan War is called the Taliban by most Canadians who follow the news. But who are the Taliban? The initial rhetoric of the Canadian government associated the Taliban with a repressive Islamic fundamentalism and its support of anti-Western terrorist attacks. For example, Chris Alexander, a Canadian UN official, was quoted in 2007 as calling the Taliban "a violent, drug-fuelled rabble."[30] Major-General Hillier, the former head of the Canadian military, was even more colourful. He called the insurgents "scumbags."[31] This kind of language does not stop objective observers from concluding that the insurgency, commonly called the Taliban, is rooted in the Afghan population. This Pashtun-based movement of Muslim militants sees its struggle in both patriotic and religious terms. When the occupying foreign forces are Christian and Western (European and North American) and the government of the country is dependent on those forces, it seems self-evident that the Taliban believe they are resisting foreign occupation and a corrupt puppet government.

The Taliban explanation of the war is shared by non-Taliban Afghans as well. For example, Malalai Joya, a young female member of the Afghan parliament and author of *A Woman Among Warlords*, called for the withdrawal of Canadian forces because in her view the government of Afghanistan was simply a government of warlords propped up by the Americans.[32] But this interpretation of the war has had little impact on public opinion in Canada, especially in the early years when the official explanation was the norm—that the Taliban were anti-Western fanatics and a threat to the most powerful nations and military alliance in the world because their control of

the country would lead to more attacks on the United States. Eventually, the Canadian public began to get a more nuanced understanding of the nature of Afghan society and history. For example, in 2008, *The Globe and Mail*'s Graeme Smith, reporting from Afghanistan, stated that recruits for the insurgency came from tribes that had been excluded from government power.[33] Another source of recruits was the campaign against opium production, which was selective and corrupt, depriving many farmers of their subsistence income. "Air strikes and drug eradication fuel the insurgency," he concluded.[34] Initially, the insurgents were lumped under the term "terrorists," which was a catch-all government and media term for the enemy, but as 9/11 faded from memory and it became clear that the Taliban were resisting a foreign military occupation on their home territory, the word "terrorist" was gradually replaced with the word "insurgent." But even this term, while less demonizing than "terrorist," was a label referring to those engaged in a military campaign against Canadian troops and their allies. At least it had the benefit of allowing for a modicum of neutrality in the designation and a grudging recognition of military prowess.

As the war drags on, it can be argued that the tactics of counter-insurgency warfare themselves fuel the insurgency, and the quest to secure the pro-American government breeds resistance and further insecurity and military escalation. Wanting to deny the Taliban credibility or legitimacy and yet explain its relative success, the Canadian government has claimed that drug production is a financial underpinning of the insurgency, and that sanctuary in Pakistan strengthens the insurgency's growth. If the Pakistan-Afghan border could be sealed and the opium trade terminated, military victory would result. After 2008, the Canadian government identified a third obstacle to victory: the corrupt government in Kabul, which went on to win another presidential election widely considered fraudulent. After a decade-long insurgency, the Taliban leadership is acknowledged as the *de facto* alternative government of the country with an increasing influence. These obstacles to defeating the insurgency as claimed by the Canadian government are actually integral to the war economy. They are interrelated and, when studied together, serve to show the contradictions in the war approach to peacemaking.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OCCUPATION

It has become clear to the international community that there are two major drivers of Afghanistan's current war economy. The first is the investment in military and political activities by foreign powers, which total many billions of dollars. These are funds to support the Afghan army and police, and to bolster the Karzai government that has been in power for a decade. This is an external cash-flow. There is also an external flow of NGO funds into the country. By the end of 2006, there were 277 foreign NGOs and 891 Afghan NGOs operating in the country, all dependent on foreign funding.[35] Internally, a single domestic product is both the main export of the country and its only significant indigenous economic driver—opium. The production of opium involves farmers, criminal elements, warlords, and government officials (the latter are often interchangeable), as well as the insurgency itself, which at minimum taxes production in the areas it controls and at maximum oversees production and distribution. The balance of agricultural production is either subsistence farming or for local consumption.

In the first year of the US occupation (2002), opium production skyrocketed to 3,400 metric tonnes from a modest 185 in 2001 when the Taliban was still in power and had outlawed production in late 2000.[36] By 2007, Afghanistan was producing 8,200 tonnes and supplying 95 percent of the world's opium, the basic ingredient of heroin.[37] The opium was estimated to be worth up to one-third of the country's gross domestic product, the balance coming from other agricultural production and foreign aid. This meant that Afghanistan had become a narco-state. In 2009, opium production fell off to only 6,900 metric tonnes because of a switch to wheat production due to the drought. For the first time, wheat was a more profitable commodity for farmers because of increased demand and prices. Further, there is a glut on the heroin market; supply exceeds demand, with enough opium stored to supply the world's illegal demand for two years without any new production.[38]

About 5 percent of the heroin is used in Afghanistan, which has an estimated one million addicts. The rest is moved from Afghanistan into three neighbouring countries as it makes it way around the world. Forty percent of the heroin goes into Pakistan, 30 percent into Iran, and 25 percent into central Asia on its way to Russia and Europe.[39]

Why is there so much production and why has it not been stopped or severely curtailed when the military power of the occupation has increased?

First, Afghanistan is one of the six poorest nations in the world, with a 2008 per capital GDP of under $350 and an unemployment rate of 40 percent. It is basically a country of subsistence farming and significant illiteracy.[40] Families tend to be large, and agricultural production is fundamental to their economic survival. Growing poppies has been one of the few stable commodities in terms of cash crops. Because of opium's economic importance to the local population, the Canadian military did little to combat production. "The Canadian national policy prevents us from doing too much about it" is the explanation offered by a Canadian major when stationed in Kandahar.[41] In his view, destroying the fields would make the farmers support the Taliban because of the threat to their livelihood. Basically, the occupying powers do not want to, or cannot for military reasons, reduce or eliminate a major underpinning of the insurgency.

Second, the Afghan government, which depends on local warlords and tribal strongmen in positions of provincial and regional power, is completely entangled in the drug trade. This corruption has undermined its legitimacy. For example, the president's brother, who before his 2011 death was considered a major drug lord, was also a local governor appointed by the president and, according to news reports, on the payroll of the CIA. A strong thread seems to run from the drug trade through the government and the insurgents right to the occupying powers.

The United States and its NATO allies have launched only superficial eradication campaigns because of their need to court the favour of local governors and tribal leaders. But inaction on opium production may have another reason. It has been noted that Iran and Russia, opponents of the United States, are major destinations. The drug trade may be a strategic weapon to demoralize them. Thus a hands-off approach to the drug trade serves American interests because it keeps the Karzai government subservient and compliant, and encourages drug addiction in countries that the United States considers strategic enemies. For the United States, to encourage government elite corruption as a way of keeping it under its thumb suggests that it wants, not an independent entity as its partner, but a subservient one. This strengthens the Taliban rationale for waging an insurgency.

Third, the insurgency is funded primarily by Afghanis, while the Karzai government is dependent on foreign funds. This indigenous characteristic increases the insurgency's legitimacy in the eyes of the population, while delegitimizing the US and NATO forces. All the key players—the occupying

powers, the insurgents, the government, and Afghan farmers—view opium as a commodity that serves their needs and purposes. This convergence of interests has turned Afghanistan into a leading narco-state, one of the fundamental outcomes of this war for democracy and Western values.

Another outcome has been the spread of the war to Pakistan, whose autonomous tribal border areas have become a war zone with American-promoted government military campaigns to eliminate pro-Taliban elements, constant use of drones by the CIA and US military to hit human targets, and the appearance of suicide bombing in major urban centres. The American attempt to deny the insurgency a safe haven (a fundamental tenet of counter-insurgency warfare) in western Pakistan has resulted in a major de-stabilization of the Pakistan government, a permanent sense of being under political siege by the United States, and an escalation in anti-government militancy. This destabilization makes Pakistan's authorities ever more dependent on US support and drags their territory into the Afghan conflict.

When President Karzai "won" a new term as president in 2009 in a manner criticized by the international community (including his allies) as lacking in legitimacy, one might have concluded that the Canadian government's finger-pointing at the Karzai regime was a valid explanation of why the war was not going well from the Western perspective. However, Canada's failure to remove itself from the conflict is a tacit indication of its support for the unpleasant status quo. Karzai's recent attempt to offer himself as the father of an Afghan solution to the civil war was shattered when the peace *jirga* (a gathering of elders and notables) in May 2010 was shelled by the insurgents. The division between the Karzai government and the United States and its allies as revealed in the WikiLeaks exposé of late 2010 is now entrenched without any immediate solution. One might come when the United States orchestrates Karzai's departure. However, when an occupying power replaces one leader with another, the fundamental reality of power does not change, nor do the basic dynamics of the situation and the interests of the entrenched stakeholders.

THE COST OF THE WAR TO CANADA AND POPULAR OPINION

With the occupation weighed down by growing contradictions over corruption and opium production, it is worthwhile to explore the cost to

Canada of its "mission" in Afghanistan. There are three costs to consider: the economic cost of the war to the taxpayer, the personal cost of lost and destroyed Canadian lives, and finally, the cost to national identity. The economic cost has attracted widely varying estimates, depending on what parameters one uses. The major cost increases came in 2006 when Canadian troops took on front-line operations around Kandahar.[42] For example, the annual expenditure was projected at $1.2 billion.[43] However, two years later, in 2008, the budget officer for Parliament concluded that costs were running at $200 million per month (double the earlier figure) and that the total cost of the war effort would be between $14 and $18 billion by the planned withdrawal in 2011.[44] By 2007, Canada was spending more on its military as a percentage of the federal budget than in the Korean War in 1952-53.[45] Some experts claim that total cost will exceed $20 billion in 2011.[46] There is even a high-end estimate of $28 billion.[47] Government figures now claim savings of $1 billion to $1.5 billion annually because of the withdrawal.[48] At the same time, Canadian expenditures on Afghan reconstruction were less than 15 percent of the military campaign.[49]

As costs increased, Canadian casualties skyrocketed. In 2005, prior to the move to Kandahar, only ten Canadians were killed or wounded. After the move to Kandahar and a combat role, the number grew in 2007 to 412.[50] Numbers kept increasing into 2010, with casualties often announced weekly, but as the United States took over, the figures began to drop.

So what has been the public reaction and how does it align with government and media discourse? In 2006, ongoing polls of Canadian attitudes indicated that support for Canada's military role varied monthly from 35 percent to 55 percent. Opposition varied from 41 percent to 61 percent, so there was slightly more opposition than support at that point. In 2007, support varied from 36 percent to 40 percent and opposition varied from 55 to 59 percent—an indication that the war was becoming unpopular. These figures have remained more or less consistent over the past two years. Polls from October 2009 indicated that support stood at 45 percent and opposition at 55 percent.[51] The major opposition is in Quebec. A May 2009 poll indicated that only 9 percent of Canadians wanted Canada's military role to continue post-2011 while 40 percent wanted them back earlier and another 46 percent could accept the 2011 withdrawal.[52] Data provided in 2010 by the polling firm EKOS summarized the ebb and flow of public opinion over a decade. Support was higher than opposition from 2002 until

mid-2006 when opposition became dominant. By mid-2010, opposition to Canadian involvement had stabilized at 50 percent of the population, support at 35 percent, and noncommittal responses at 15 percent.[53] In the four years during which Canada conducted counter-insurgency warfare, public opinion turned against the war. The same has happened in both the United States and the United Kingdom.[54] In Canada's case, there was also the major 2009-10 public issue of the torture of detainees handed over by the Canadian military to the Afghan authorities, which the government tried to stonewall, but which tarnished the image the Canadian government was trying to project.[55]

So what may we conclude from the public opinion figures and their relationship to the cost of the war financially and in terms of human lives? It would seem that as casualties increase, opposition grows, but not in a dramatic way. In the case of the American and British publics, this may be the result of war weariness associated with the Iraq War and an increasing skepticism about the rationale for both wars. State and media rhetoric about brave soldiers dying for a good cause is being eroded. The Canadian public is conflicted and divided over the issue.

One of the main casualties (wounded, not dead) has been the link between national identity and peacekeeping. In a major media piece entitled "Canadians Re-Imaging Their Country as a Military Nation," Michael Valpy, a long time columnist for the *Globe and Mail*, argued that "our national mythology has moved beyond the idea of peacekeeping and embraced the culture of the warrior."[56] He pointed out that this has come about because of the value assigned by the ruling Conservative Party to the military in its combat role in Afghanistan. Yet this valorization and glorification of Canada as a military nation confronts serious contradictions in the Afghan situation: peacemaking as counter-insurgency supports the opium industry, keeps a corrupt regime in power, antagonizes Pakistan, appears to Afghan nationals as foreign occupation, and fuels the insurgency.

THE FUTURE OF CANADA'S INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

Politically, the matter of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan has been determined over the years by the continuance of minority governments in Canada from 2004 to 2011. In late 2009, Bercuson wrote an op-ed piece for the *Globe and Mail* titled "Don't Head for the Exit," in which he argued

that the defeat of the Taliban, in his eyes a laudable goal, requires "much greater military power" than already present in Afghanistan.[57] He went on to say that the war cannot be Afghanised for many years, implying that foreign powers have to fight until victory. But this Afghanisation of the war is precisely what the Conservative government of Prime Minister Harper is calling for through its training mission. In late 2009, Stanley McChrystal, the American general in charge of the war, was promising that by the time Canadian troops began to leave, "we will have reversed Taliban momentum," thereby making the Canadian departure feasible.[58] The new timeline for the Afghanisation of the war from the US perspective is now being listed as 2014.[59] Obama has promised a reduction of American forces starting in late 2011 now that the United States is vacating Iraq, but the speed of that reduction is yet to be determined. The political rhetoric of the Canadian government has evolved to some degree and has become a bit more humble and less jingoistic. Yet the United States remains, Canada remains, NATO remains, Karzai remains, and the Taliban remain. Nothing fundamental has changed. Since peacemaking through counter-insurgency warfare remain, what can be said about the ideological underpinnings of Canada's role in Afghanistan and its impact on national identity?

PEACEMAKING AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY WARFARE: A CONFLICT IN TERMS

There continues to be a struggle between Canada's former identity as a peacekeeper and its current one as a peacemaker.[60] The latest polls show a lack of support for the war after a decade of no noticeable progress for the people of Afghanistan. But the "support for our troops" mentality still has sway in public consciousness because the war is being sold to the public in terms of ideals, which is typical of political war rhetoric. To change the situation, even slightly, requires a widespread acknowledgement that Canada's role in Afghanistan since its deployment to Kandahar has been one of counter-insurgency warfare, and that the training of Afghan military and police in a post-2011 scenario continues to be part of a counter-insurgency strategy. The generals, both Canadian and American, talk about the war in terms of counter-insurgency, and thus so must the government. In this way, the public becomes more fully conscious of the contradiction in creating peace through war in Afghanistan. Defining Canada's role in defeating the insurgency as "peacemaking" is a conflict in terms because the securitization

project itself is fomenting the insurgency. According to the French Deputy Ambassador in Kabul, "the military presence of the coalition is part of the problem, not the solution."[61]

Counter-insurgency warfare can take a long time. Two respected academic researchers, Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, have stated that the Canadian public needs to be informed that the war will take "a generation."[62] With Canada there since 2001, if a generation is anywhere from seventeen to twenty-two years, we may expect fighting to continue to 2018 and probably beyond. The last time Canada fought a counter-insurgency war was 110 years ago in the 1899-1902 Boer War in South Africa. The public's appetite for such a long commitment differs from that of the pundits and the rhetoric-prone politicians.

The promise of peace, interpreted as a stable state of security and development at the end of a successful counter-insurgency, has become less likely with each year. The term "Vietnam War" with its connotations of defeat is appearing more frequently in commentary.[63] Any serious attempt to offload the war to the Afghan government and its military would result in disaster similar to what happened to South Vietnam's government and military.[64] Pakistan, on the east and south sides of the country, remains a semi-safe refuge for the insurgency in spite of drone-killings, the murder of Osama bin Ladin, and its vacillating governments. There is little likelihood of an American invasion of such a vast and populated country. Iran, an avowed enemy of the United States, is also a safe haven for the insurgency on the west side. Removing the large American force from Iraq and moving it to Afghanistan as has been happening since 2010 will certainly delay any Taliban victory, but it will not ensure an American victory because there is no military solution to the war if the growth of the decade-long insurgency is any indicator.

Malalai Joya, the young Afghan parliamentarian quoted earlier, summarized the occupation as a way to have "access to the gas and oil of the Central Asian Republics. They are not there for my people. They are there for themselves."[65] So when President Obama says (to his own people) that the war must go on to protect America from terrorism, Afghans ask why they must pay the price. The contradiction that counter-insurgency warfare creates between the goals of the Afghans living in the war and the goals of the foreigners fighting that war (defending America) means that peace recedes further and further. The military paradigm underlying peacemaking

means a win/lose scenario and it is the Afghan people who pay the price.

CANADA'S DUTY TO PROTECT AND AFGHANISTAN AS A PEACE PROJECT

Those who think only in the language of war see those who want a withdrawal as "defeatists" because the war paradigm is only about victory or defeat. Considering that the Pentagon budget for Afghanistan in 2010 exceeded that for Iraq, one can sense that the war option will remain the American option for some time to come.[66] Given the depth and strength of the Afghan insurgency, there is as much chance of losing as there is of winning.

A growing chorus of alternative approaches has appeared in Canada. A Liberal Senator is calling for a "negotiated settlement" that emphasizes a political discussion rather than a military solution.[67] Others have proposed a "regional solution" with various regional powers ensuring an Afghan peace. The move from the military approach to a political one would reduce the level of conflict. This would entail changing the meaning the Canadian government and media have attached to the term "Taliban." Negotiation with the insurgency implies legitimacy and recognition. Re-branding the insurgency away from terrorism is a requirement for peacebuilding and/or peacekeeping. Any political solution means that Afghanistan will be left to the Afghans to govern, which means an end to the occupation and a possible Taliban government. The nature of that government can be influenced through diplomatic means, especially if Pakistan plays a large role, for it is not in Pakistan's interest to have Afghanistan as a source of terrorism, which was the original rationale for the 2001 invasion.

Stein and Lang argue, "Canada can do little on its own to reverse the factors that cripple any prospect of [military] success."[68] Unfortunately, Canada's reduced military presence in a training capacity does not allow it to adopt a completely different strategy that would replace peacemaking with peacebuilding. Only a significant withdrawal can open up the possibility of a new direction for Canadian foreign policy. With a majority Conservative government in Ottawa until 2014, there is little chance of a new direction. However, the adoption of a post-conflict peacebuilding strategy is the best way to encourage a negotiated political solution. Such a solution grows more difficult each year that the insurgency and the counter-insurgency continue. Fear of a civil war of the kind Afghanistan suffered in the 1990s will only increase if the war drags on and war weariness arises in the United

States. Only compromise and the recognition of regional powers rather than Western ones can move the process forward.

Replacing peacemaking with peacebuilding and peacekeeping requires significant non-belligerency, such as a truce or a cease-fire agreement or even a unity government. According to the UN's definition, even peacemaking emphasizes diplomacy. To date, the war has not been an exercise in that kind of peacemaking because it has generated more war than peace, and every escalation of foreign troops in the country has been hailed as a key step to victory. The option of peacebuilding is also problematic because of Canada's decade-long role as a belligerent in the Afghanistan War. Peacebuilding in Afghanistan in a post-counter-insurgency war scenario offers Canada a way of disociating itself from American and Western imperial goals—the clash of civilizations scenario—and becoming a recognised player in post-conflict peacebuilding. To be a peacebuilder, Canada must end its military role in Afghanistan sooner rather than later. Its withdrawal may help create and hasten the coming of a post-conflict situation rather than perpetuate the current one.

The New Democratic Party, now the Official Opposition in Parliament, has consistently opposed the war and Canada's military role. With the vast majority of its MPs from anti-war Quebec, there is a new opportunity to influence public discourse away from the military approach. The Opposition is not compromised the way the former Liberal Opposition was, so it can emphasize the importance of Canada's putting into practice its responsibility to protect populations from war. An editorial contribution to the *Calgary Herald* stated that "we [Canada] should look at the world through our own eyes, not those of our neighbours . . . [and] shift from a reactive to a proactive stance on global affairs."[69] It called for a Canadian rather than an American-oriented foreign policy. Afghanistan is the ground that cries out for this reorientation. A new political rhetoric that builds on the older peacekeeper role, rejects the new peacemaking warrior role, and envisions Canada as a peacebuilding nation, is possible.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in George Packer, "The Last Mission: Richard Holbrooke's Plan to Avoid the Mistakes of Vietnam in Afghanistan," *New Yorker,* 28 September 2009, www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/28/090928fa_fact_packer, 1.

2. The then minority Conservative Government of Canada indicated in November 2010 that it was considering keeping up to 950 troops in Afghanistan as "trainers," which it claimed honoured the Parliamentary Motion of 2008 that specifically mentioned withdrawal from combat. The government argued that "training" was not combat. Canadian forces had been limited in their combat operations since 2009 when the United States took over operations in Kandahar and vicinity, where the Canadians were fighting. The trainers were transferred from Kandahar to Kabul by the end of 2011.

3. The Official Opposition Liberal Party published a foreign policy position paper in June 2010 titled *Canada in the World: A Global Networks Strategy,* which called on Canada to remain in Afghanistan as a military and police trainer. The *Globe and Mail* hailed the position as "welcome." *Globe and Mail*, 16 June 2010, A14.

4. The three Prime Ministers involved are Jean Chrétien (2001-03, Liberal), Paul Martin (2003-06, Liberal), and Stephen Harper (2006- , Conservative).

5. In spring 2010, accounts appeared in the Canadian press quoting "experts" who stated that it takes thirteen to fifteen years to defeat an insurgency. This figure only appeared when it had become obvious to non-military observers that the foreign troops were failing in their efforts to defeat the insurgency. At the same time the "mission" is cloaked in NATO-speak, which covers up the dominant role of the United States in directing the war.

6. David Bercuson, "Playing Politics with Afghanistan," *Globe and Mail,* 20 April 2007, A17.

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8. Bercuson's institute, the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, promoted its view of peacemaking in a course offered in 2011 titled "The Challenge of Contemporary Peacebuilding." It speaks of "modern international peace operations/peacebuilding missions" as a support for "war to peace transitions in such places as Afghanistan."

9. Jack L. Granatstein, "A Persistent Myth," *The Literary Review of Canada*, June 2010, 25.

10. Granatstein, “Persistent Myth,” 25, 26.
11. Granatstein, “Persistent Myth,” 26.
12. David Bercuson and Jack L. Granatstein, “Afghanistan’s Lessons Weren’t Just Military,” *The Globe and Mail*, 17 October 2011, A13.
13. Lucia Kowaluk and Steven Staples, eds. *Afghanistan and Canada: Is There an Alternative to War?* (Montreal: Black Rose, 2009), 98.
14. Michael Byers, “Canada’s Quagmire,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 June 2008, http://www.Canada.com.
15. See Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Penguin, 2007) for a discussion of international law and politics over intervention.
16. For a discussion of Canada’s refusal to invade Iraq, see George Melnyk, ed., *Canada and the New American Empire: War and Anti-War* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004). It was the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien who stopped Canadian participation in Iraq, but allowed the expansion of Canada’s role in ISAF.
17. *Globe and Mail*, 13 July 2007, A1.
18. *Globe and Mail*, 24 May 2009, A14.
19. In a speech on 27 March 2009, Obama stated that the prime reason for the US focus on Afghanistan and a military solution was the need to defeat al-Qaida, which was still a threat to the United States. Packer, “The Last Mission,” 45.
20. See Mike Blanchfield and Jim Bronskill, “It’s a Good News War in Harper’s World, Records Show,” *Globe and Mail*, 8 June 2010, A9.
21. For a revealing discussion of American military strategy in Afghanistan after a decade of fighting, see Robert D. Kaplan, “Man versus Afghanistan,” *The Atlantic*, April 2010, 61-71.
22. Doug Saunders provides figures for ISAF in 2010 in “Dutch Withdrawal Could Leave Key Afghan Province Vulnerable,” 22 February 2010, A10.
23. In a November 2010 poll published by the *Globe and Mail* just prior to the announcement of a continuation of Canada’s role in Afghanistan, 65 percent were opposed to renewal after 2011. The poll also indicated

that the public's commitment to UN traditional peacekeeping was 50 percent more than its commitment to future overseas combat missions. 25 October 2010, A1.

24. Richard Norton-Taylor, "Britain's Afghan Role up in the Air," *Globe and Mail*, 22 April 2010, A14.

25. Saunders, "Dutch Withdrawal," A10.

26. *Calgary Herald*, 1 April 2008, A1.

27. Juliet O'Neill, "U.S. Troop Surge Won't Win Afghan War, Say Canadians," *Calgary Herald*, 28 December 2009, A3.

28. Paul Koring, "NATO Upbeat on Progress over Long Haul," *Globe and Mail*, 3 April 2008, A4.

29. Tara Brautigam, "Insurgency Will Gradually Wither, Vance Believes," *Globe and Mail*, 14 June 2010, A5.

30. Jon Lee Anderson, "The Taliban Opium War," *New Yorker*, 12 July 2007, 14. In 2009, Alexander returned to Canada and announced his plan to seek a Conservative Party nomination for the next federal election.

31. Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War*, 200.

32. Sonia Verma, "Young Activist Wants Canadian Troops Out Now," *Globe and Mail*, 20 November 2009, A12.

33. Graeme Smith, "Tribal Animosity Drawing Taliban Recruits," *Globe and Mail*, 25 March 2008, A11.

34. Graeme Smith, "Air Strikes, War on Drugs Drive Taliban," *Globe and Mail*, 24 March 2008, A1.

35. Lara Olson and Andrea Charron, "NGO Myths, Realities, and Advocacy on the International Strategy in Afghanistan," in *The Afghanistan Challenge: Hard Realities and Strategic Choices*, ed. Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Charles C. Pentland (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2009), 88.

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38. Tu Thanh Ha, "Afghan Opium Production Down, UN Survey Finds," *Globe and Mail*, 2 September 2009, A10.
39. *Calgary Herald*, 21 April 2008, A15, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2009/October.
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41. Ethan Baron, "Afghan Opium Harvest Frustrates Troops," *Edmonton Journal*, 26 April 2010, A5.
42. Mike Blanchfield, "Afghan Spending to Top $1B in 2008," *Calgary Herald*, 21 April 2008, A6. In 2005-06, the cost was $402 million. In 2006-07, it doubled to $803 million. In 2007-08, it surpassed $1 billion according to Defence Department figures.
43. Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War*, 187.
44. Campbell Clark, "Afghan Mission's Cost Much Higher than Billed," *Globe and Mail*, 10 March 2008, A1.
45. David Pugliese, "Military Spending Passes Cold War Levels," *Calgary Herald*, 22 October 2007, A4.
46. Jim Brown, "Afghan War Cost over $20 Billion," Telus News, http://www.telus.net, accessed 9 October 2008.
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48. Campbell Clark, "Afghan Pullout Sets Budget Quandry for Harper," *Globe and Mail*, 19 February 2010, A5.
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50. Byers, "Canada's Quagmire."

51. "Support for Afghanistan Mission Dips to 45 Percent," *Calgary Herald*, 10 October 2009, A5.

52. *Globe and Mail*, 8 May 2009, A4.

53. See Sonia Verma, "A Leader under Siege Speaks His Mind," *Globe and Mail*, 10 April 2010, A10, for the graph.

54. Norton-Taylor, in "Britain's Afghan Role up in the Air," stated that Britain was spending $7.7 billion per year to keep its forces in Afghanistan and that there was "growing scepticism about the role of British forces there reflected in opinion polls." By mid-June 2010, the British had lost 300 troops since 2001. By August 2009, more than half of the Americans opposed the war and over 70 percent of Democrats had turned against it. Packer, "The Last Mission," *New Yorker*, 28 September 2009, 45.

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56. Michael Valpy, "Invisible No More," *Globe and Mail*, 21 November 2009, F1.

57. David Bercuson, "Don't Head for the Exit," *Globe and Mail*, 21 November 2009, A17.

58. Gloria Galloway, "McChrystal Not Worried by Canadian Pullout Plans," *Globe and Mail*, 17 December 2009, A8.

59. Campbell Clark and Doug Saunders, "NATO Allies Rethink Mission after Big Push from White House," *Globe and Mail*, 9 November 2010, A1.

60. See Lloyd Axworthy, "Time for a Civilian Surge," *Globe and Mail*, 17 December 2009, A23.

61. Mike Blanchfield, “Little Progress in Afghanistan: General,” *Calgary Herald*, 2 October 2008, A15.
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63. Gordon Gibson, “Winning in Afghanistan Sounds a Lot like Winning in Vietnam,” *Globe and Mail*, 23 April 2009, A13.
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65. Verma, “Young Activist,” A12.
66. According to Ann Scott Taylor in “US Spending on Afghan Conflict to Exceed Iraq,” *Calgary Herald*, 8 May 2009, A6, the proposed budget for the Afghan war will be $65 billion versus $61 billion for Iraq. In 2009, it was $87 billion for Iraq and $47 billion for Afghanistan.
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68. Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War*, 296.
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Re-imagining Canadian and United States Foreign Policies

Bruce E. Barnes

The foreign policies of the United States and Canada regarding international law and war have taken a bumpy road. Since the 1950s Canada has built a reputation in UN peacekeeping and collaborative leadership, but this is threatened by its current ties with the United States and its involvement in Afghanistan. Aggressive and unilateral foreign policies of US leaders, especially since 9/11, and powerful mercenary movements exemplified by the Blackwater group allied with the Bush administration, have marked contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. They have damaged the US image in the world and have made the Afghanistan war unsustainable. Better policies would be to strengthen the UN and the International Criminal Court, which Canadian foreign policy leaders helped launch. Such harmonized and progressive US-Canadian foreign policies would go far to establish the Rule of Law in the world and the well-being of the world's people.

INTRODUCTION

This article arises from research on Canadian and American foreign policy-makers and the fields of conflict resolution and peacemaking. With a focus on the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, it urges the strengthening of North America's position in the global community by merging the best ideas on progressive foreign policy-making from Canada and the United States. The ideas come from the fields of conflict resolution, negotiation, dialogue, strategic planning, and facilitated policy-making. The article identifies strengths and shortcomings in both countries' foreign policies, and suggests ways that

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collaboration, multilateralism, and harmonization of foreign policy initiatives could greatly improve these countries' international images and the overall well-being of countries within North America and beyond.

In recent decades, Canada has provided effective leadership to the world community in important ways, such as facilitating international legislation to remove land mines from fields of conflict and leading the movement to establish the International Criminal Court (ICC). Much work remains to be done to enhance Canadian and American collaborative support of the United Nations in its roles to keep peace, build peace, and police the many regional and international conflicts in the world. It is crucial that the United States and Canada strengthen their promotion of the Rule of Law internationally, and learn from the successes and mistakes made by previous leaders.

Canadians and Americans together can lead in the design of a new comprehensive security system that foregrounds human security. Human security attends first to the needs of individuals as world citizens rather than the needs of nation-states or multinational corporations. "Comprehensive security" is an evolving concept that addresses human security needs in a universal and sustainable way rather than providing more security to the rich and less or no security to the poor.[1] Both Canada and the United States have universities, think-tanks, and civil society and high-level conflict resolution groups that can facilitate and lead these complex conversations. My work, based in Hawai'i in the field of conflict resolution across cultures, and that of many colleagues in the Social Sciences Public Policy Center at the University of Hawai'i and the East-West Centre in Honolulu, represent just a few of many North American policy and peacemaking organizations that, along with our Asian Pacific Network, can contribute to such discussions. The Asian Pacific region, with at least 350 organizations active in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding, has close cultural and working ties with Hawai'i. In November 2011, at the initiative of Barack Obama, Hawai'i hosted APEC meetings that featured discussions about trade policies in this region. Many other international and North American think-tanks and university consortia would be happy to host and/or convene the foreign policy reform discussions and processes suggested here in order to help bring them to reality.

US FOREIGN POLICY AND IMAGE ABROAD

An important goal of such international policy discussions is to help Canada and the United States again lead the way toward a viable international legal system, even as they model the Rule of Law on the global stage. While on a 2010-11 sabbatical in Manitoba and Saskatchewan with support of Fulbright Canada and Canadian Mennonite University, I spent almost a year viewing US international policies through Canadian lenses and vice versa. This exchange has offered new insights and suggested possible directions toward better foreign policies for both countries, which have each, in the past, offered periods of positive leadership to the global community. Much of the effort to set new foreign policy directions must concern the United States. For too long, the United States has asserted dominance over much of the globe while wielding unilateral power. A key item on the reform agenda must include American leadership and commitment to create stronger international institutions to uphold the Rule of Law.

The US image abroad reflects a very negative international reaction to the events chronicled in this article. The Pew Global Attitudes Project found that "in many countries, including some long-time allies, the United States is viewed as the greatest threat to global peace—even greater than Iran and North Korea, the two countries that George W. Bush elevated, along with Iraq, to membership in the 'Axis of Evil.'"[2] How did this situation come about, and what are the challenges to bring about the necessary changes?

In *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawai'i to Iraq*, Stephen Kinzer outlines the chronology of US-orchestrated regime changes in a dozen countries.[3] Accompanying these actions was the US "claim that its dominant position carried special responsibilities and therefore prerogatives to act unilaterally."[4] Many agree that these endeavours, enacted by decisions primarily at the Executive branch of the US government, violate the spirit and the letter of the UN Charter. Although disregard for international law and the American "imperial presence" date back to prior administrations, both Republican and Democratic, disturbing new trends emerged during the George W. Bush presidency. After 9/11, the United States "launched an aggressive effort to assert U.S. interests, repudiate multilateral, collaborative governance and follow a radical security doctrine prescribing the use of U.S. military supremacy to establish the U.S.'s unchallenged right to determine the character and shape of the world—what might be called imperial ambition."[5] Mark Pilisuk, Jennifer Achord Rountree, and Gianina

Pellegrini, in "Playing the Imperial Game—The Mindset Behind the Attack on Iraq," elaborate further on these actions. The relationship between the United States and Iraq regarding oil resources was hidden from public view while the US foreign policy followed the corporate agenda. There were pre-emptive military actions against Iraq and Afghanistan which bypassed international constraints and ignored the rights of civilians. The thinking behind this approach permitted coercive action and removed moral and legal constraints from the overseas actions of the US government. Pilisuk, Rountree, and Pellegrini conclude,

> What has changed toward contemporary policy toward the Middle East is that the world's largest superpower has determined that the rules of the game can be changed at its option. . . . Under existing international laws for the conduct of war, those responsible for the war in Iraq have gone beyond the rules of war and have engaged in criminal behaviour.[6]

These trends must be addressed immediately to prevent further erosion of the US image abroad and severe damage to the US economy.

US actions overseas may also have tarnished the image of Canada, which in previous decades was known for its global concern, its generous support for the UN, and its multilateral global leadership. A prime example is Canada's loss to Portugal in the election for a rotating seat on the UN Security Council in 2010. To the chagrin of those who believed in Canada's hard-won international image as a leader in peacekeeping and multilateralist foreign policies, many in the UN General Assembly had lost their faith that Canada would continue to speak out for the collective good of the UN member states. For some, the fact that Canada had sent soldiers to support the US campaign in Afghanistan was enough to turn their vote elsewhere. Some countries previously committed to Canada, such as Brazil, switched their votes and lobbied in support of Portugal. Observers noted that putting Canada back on the Security Council would be like having two American votes.

CULTURAL ROOTS OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY TO 2000

Despite common origins as British colonies; populations of mostly European origin; similarities in dress, popular culture, and ubiquitous box stores; and overlapping interest in professional sports, fundamental differences exist between Canadian and American cultures that have shaped the evolution

of their respective foreign policies. In both countries, cultural factors came into play as the governing groups expanded their borders, negotiated with indigenous populations, and dealt with minority groups often composed of immigrants and refugees. These cultural-historic patterns influenced the shape and style of foreign relations.

Largely overlooked in foreign policy analysis is the role of the First Nations in Canada and the Native Americans. In *A Fair Country: Telling Truths about Canada*, a prominent Canadian intellectual, John Ralston Saul, outlines the unique Métis nature of Canadian culture: "We are not a civilization of British or French or European inspiration. We never have been."[7] Rather, argues Saul, Canada is a Métis nation, heavily influenced and shaped by Aboriginal ideas.

> We are far more Aboriginal than European. That we strangely fail to recognize this holds our country back. Our taste for negotiation over violence, our comfort with a constant tension between individuals and groups, our gut belief in egalitarianism—all of these come from our Aboriginal roots. The power of diversity in Canada has a long history, stretching back four centuries to the Aboriginal idea of the inclusive circle.[8]

In chapter 9, "Minimal Impairment on the Battlefield," Saul elaborates on the Aboriginal roots of Canadian attitudes towards war:

> What is our attitude toward war? Minimal impairment. What has it been for a century and a half? Minimal impairment. We are loath to be drawn in. We would rather talk and negotiate. We do not rise fast to national bellicosity in international affairs. . . . What appeared at first to be ad hoc decisions not to engage internationally soon took on the form of a clear pattern: a reluctance to be drawn into foreign wars, a preference for negotiations and a non-classical approach to warfare.[9]

These peaceable attitudes, states Saul, are visible from the early 1800s to the present.[10]

One arena of progressive foreign policy involvement by Canada, exemplified by its founding role in and ongoing contributions to international peacekeeping, began in the era of Lester B. Pearson, Canada's fourteenth Prime Minister. As Minister of External Affairs in the Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent, Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his role in defusing the Suez Crisis through the United Nations. The selection

committee claimed that Pearson had "saved the world." The United Nations Emergency Force was Pearson's creation, and he is considered the father of the modern concept of peacekeeping.[11] Saul comments,

> Where did the concept of peacekeeping come from? Lester Pearson produced and sold a way to end the 1956 Suez Crisis that was dividing the West, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the North and the South, the Judeo-Christian and Islamic. . . . The idea of a United Nations peacekeeping force and the sort of military diplomacy that surrounds it came from outside of the European and U.S. military-diplomatic tradition. It was an expression of *minimal impairment.* And it was a continuation of the development of a formal Canadian international strategy that had been gradually taking shape since 1867.[12]

Canada is rightfully proud of this peaceable, internationalist orientation and image.

CANADA, UN PEACEKEEPING, AND THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT

Canada's involvement in the Afghanistan war, however, is eroding this image. More constructive is the perspective of Professor Walter Dorn of the Canadian Forces College and Royal Military College of Canada. In testimony to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development in March 2007, Dorn articulated a peaceable, progressive, and internationalist foreign policy for Canada and Afghanistan. Since Pearson proposed the concept, Dorn said, Canada had often ranked first in UN peacekeeping contributions. Canada was the number one peacekeeper in 1991 and remained in the top ten in the 1990s. But by 2007, Canada had fallen to fifty-ninth place because military spending for the war in Afghanistan had crowded out Canada's spending on UN peacekeeping. While Canada used to contribute on average 10 percent of UN peacekeeping forces, the figure has dwindled to a mere 0.1 percent. In the fiscal year 2006-7, under Stephen Harper's newly-installed Conservative government, the Canadian Department of National Defence's spending on UN Peacekeeping—including equipment and personnel—plummeted to $8.5 million while its spending on Afghanistan increased by $1 billion. Although the demand for peacekeeping services has surged since 2000, the UN no longer seeks

contributions from Canada, knowing that because of Afghanistan, the answer will be "No." This is doubly tragic because the peacekeeping principles that helped resolve intractable conflicts in Cambodia, East Timor, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and the former Yugoslavia also point the way "to a long-term solution in Afghanistan."[13]

The three central principles of peacekeeping, said Dorn, are *impartiality*, *consent*, and *minimum use of force*, and these are lacking in Afghanistan, especially in Kandahar. Regarding *impartiality*, Bush's September 2001 statement that the United States would make "no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them" gave Canada and the United States a declared enemy, and this was a recipe for an endless war. Further, the United States did not seek or receive UN authorization for its war on terror or the operation designed to carry out this war, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Canada entered Kandahar under the banner of OEF, thus removing any hope of being impartial or objective, or of serving the whole population of the country. In much of the world's eyes, Canada was increasingly identified with the US effort to find and defeat enemies in the American national interest, and therefore a party to the conflict. Even while ostensibly serving under NATO, Canada bears this stigma of US partiality.

Further, said Dorn, Canada did not have the *consent* of the main parties to the conflict and much of the local population for its deployments in Kandahar. Given that winning the hearts and minds of the inhabitants is crucial to winning the war, or the peace, or consent to the presence of peacekeepers, the OEF approach was flawed. Although Canada had for decades urged parties in vicious conflicts around the world to come to the peace table, by joining the United States and OEF in Afghanistan, Canada was not taking its own advice.

Finally, regarding *minimum use of force*, Dorn pointed out that in joining the OEF, the Canadian posture was not one of self-defence or protection of civilians but of search and destroy missions and large scale offensives. OEF created more enemies than the US and Canadian military were killing, as angry brothers, sons, clan members, and other displaced people filled the ranks of the fallen. By March 2007, Canada had lost as many soldiers in Afghanistan (111) as in all its UN peace-keeping operations over sixty years. This was not because Canada, with the second highest level of fatalities in peacekeeping history, had avoided risks. Rather, under OEF and NATO,

Canadians appeared to many as aggressors. OEF's "Three Block War" mode of engagement, in which forces are expected to be able to conduct full scale military action, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian aid within the space of three city blocks simultaneously, said Dorn, is "fatally flawed because we cannot simultaneously fight offensive high-intensity combat and carry out effective humanitarian and reconstruction tasks."[14]

Much better, said Dorn, to pursue the following peacekeeping principles: (1) serve the local population first and foremost, not only to "win hearts and minds" but to make sure that their interests become our common cause; (2) negotiate for peace and always give a way out to those committing violence, except for the most egregious crimes which should be referred to the International Criminal Court or a special tribunal; (3) do not paint all who oppose the international presence with same brush. Recognize that that not all who oppose the Canadian (and US) OEF presence are Taliban terrorists.[15]

The UN should use force as a last resort, only when all negotiations and warnings have failed. The UN should also try to create national unity through establishing a broad-based government, which makes it easier to win popular support. Unfortunately, NATO successes in Peace Support Operations in Kabul and some provinces were being jeopardized by aggressive measures in other provinces. Better, said Dorn, to pursue the "ink blot" model, in which peacekeepers' areas of influence spread out only when and where they can succeed. Canada's role should be to build capacity, not dependency, and create unity, not animosity. Having evolved and learned many lessons over sixty years, UN peacekeeping operations have often achieved a balance between the under-use and over-use of force. Unlike the "hawk" approach, which is "too aggressive to establish a long-term stability and peace," or the "dove" approach, which is "too weak to deal with the messy problems in harsh war zones," Canada should adopt the "owl" approach, which "has the wisdom to know when and where to engage,"[16] and when to expand operations. While still contributing to NATO and NORAD, Canada should maximize its forte in peacekeeping, using Canadians' innovation, specialized expertise, and equipment to make UN peacekeeping more effective and the world safer.[17]

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Unfortunately, the United States has not been a consistently respected leader in the UN and on issues addressed by the UN Security Council. For example, the UN has often been impoverished by its non-payment of dues, which set a poor example for other, less wealthy nations. Nor has the United States strongly and uniformly supported UN peacekeeping missions over the last few decades. The Reagan Presidency, the Gingrich New Revolution, and the Bush administrations all had strong roots in conservative religious groups with a right-wing agenda centered on corporate tax cuts, law and order, and increased military spending. This agenda came to be known for a "strong antipathy to anything that suggested international governance, a deep-seated belief that the U.S. can and should go it alone and not participate in multilateral agreements of any kind, and an attitude, especially prevalent amongst Congressional Republicans, that the U.S. can legislate extraterritorially to compel other countries to abide by their decisions."[18] George W. Bush entered the world stage after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which strengthened and confirmed the pre-eminent position of the United States in the world and its inclinations to act unilaterally. Especially after the attacks of 11 September 2011, the United States repudiated multilateral governance in favour of military supremacy to assert US interests and influence the world.[19] One of the most controversial legal ideas put forth by the Bush administration is "anticipatory self defence" which, in the view of the neo-conservatives, means the right to attack or invade any country that might attack or threaten the United States. US economic interests, including access to oil resources of target countries, have played a key role in deciding which countries would be invaded, such as Iraq.

The imperial unilateralism recently demonstrated by the neo-conservative US leaders should be replaced by collaborative, consensus-based multilateralism, and be adopted as a benchmark of foreign policy by both the United States and Canada. Of course, this "harmonization" of the two foreign policies will be a hard sell in the Harper administration as it is presently postured. However, following the lead of forward-thinking leaders as such as Dorn and Axworthy, convincing economic arguments can be made that collaborative multilateralism will indeed lead to economic prosperity and better images abroad for both countries.

Central to this new construct of foreign policy leadership would be restoring the United Nations to a dynamic and truly global leadership role,

embodying the Rule of Law in the international arena, and rethinking and reforming the role and decision-making processes of the UN Security Council. With much abuse of the veto power of permanent members, and big-power wheeling and dealing in favour of multinational economic interests to the detriment of developing nations, the Security Council is long overdue for a restructuring towards a more democratic and egalitarian leadership role. This overhaul should include the creation of an effective, globally representative UN policing arm regarding violations of international law and international human rights. This is sorely lacking in the development of international tribunals such as those in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the recently-launched ICC. This weakness of functional and democratic policing mechanisms has allowed the malignant growth of a new variety of vigilante capitalism in a war environment epitomized by the name "Blackwater."

BLACKWATER AND REGIME CHANGE

Blackwater, an international bestseller by Jeremy Scahill, illuminates the depths and extremes of impunity, lawlessness, and vigilante killing carried out by the world's largest mercenary army assembled with the open support of the George W. Bush administration. Scahill's painstaking research has exposed to an astonished country and world the extremes to which the neoconservatives have gone to implement their "privatization" plans.[20]

In his farewell address to the nation in 1961, US President Eisenhower warned of the grave implications of the "military industrial complex":

> The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.[21]

What has unfolded in the ensuing years and particularly under the Bush administration is the very scenario against which Eisenhower warned.

The Bush administration first filled the Pentagon with neoconservative idealogues and former executives of large weapons manufacturing companies. This civilian leadership of the Department of Defense thus shared a common major goal with the Bush administration: regime change

in strategic nations and enactment of the broadest and most sweeping privatization and outsourcing in the history of the US military. After 9/11 this campaign received a boost, rendering it almost unstoppable, and the invasion of Iraq was at the centre. Halliburton and other large corporations were readied for this new business venture. The invasion of March 2003 was accompanied by the largest army of private contractors ever deployed in a war, at its peak some 100,000 strong in an almost one-to-one ratio to active duty US soldiers. The security firm, Blackwater, was a major player. Michael Ratner, President of the Center for Constitutional Rights, explains the rationale for using private security contractors:

> The increasing use of contractors, private forces or as some would say "mercenaries" make wars easier to begin and to fight—it just takes money and not the citizenry. To the extent a population is called upon to go to war, there is resistance, a necessary resistance to prevent wars of self-aggrandizement, foolish wars and in the case of the United States, hegemonic imperialistic wars. Private forces are almost a necessity for a United States bent on retaining its . . . empire.[22]

The installation of L. Paul Bremer to serve as a temporary "ruler" of Iraq with little effective opposition from the US Congress demonstrated the depth of US disregard for the UN Charter and the sovereignty of Iraq. This forced "regime change" turned an increasing majority of the Iraqi population and much of the Arab world against the American presence. In May 2003, Bremer, as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and Director of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, assumed the job of running the occupation of Iraq. Bremer moved quickly to take control, issuing decrees like "Order 1," which dismissed thousands of nurses, doctors, schoolteachers, and other workers. Order 2 disbanded the Iraqi military, putting "four hundred thousand Iraqi soldiers out of work and without a pension." According to a US official, Order 2 alone "made 450,000 enemies on the ground in Iraq."[23] Bremer also enacted "laws unprecedented in their generosity to multinational corporations."[24] His last act, issued in June 2004 with a rapidly expanding Blackwater presence, was Order 17, which immunized contractors from prosecution. Blackwater could now openly "declare its forces above the law." "While resisting attempts to subject its private soldiers to the Pentagon's Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)—insisting they [were] civilians—Blackwater . . . simultaneously claimed immunity

from civilian litigation in the United States, saying its forces [were] a part of the U.S. Total Force."[25]

On 16 September 2007, in Nisour Square in Baghdad, Blackwater operatives committed a massacre that became known as "Baghdad's Bloody Sunday." Blackwater agents in a convoy gunned down seventeen civilians and shot randomly at all drivers, Iraqi police, passers-by, and bystanders. No aggressive actions were taken nor were weapons shown by any of the Iraqis. The Iraq government of Prime Minister al-Maliki announced its intention to prosecute the Blackwater men responsible for the killing, but four days after being grounded, Blackwater was back on Iraqi Streets.[26] "Even though tens of thousands of these mercenaries were deployed in Iraq, private security forces faced no legal consequences for their deadly actions in the first five years of the Iraq occupation. As of spring 2008, not a single one had been prosecuted for a crime against an Iraqi."[27] International law to counteract this kind of impunity and regulate activities of mercenaries is still lacking. Juan Carlos Zarate states,

> U.S. laws are incomplete and ineffectively administered. This shows a lack of political will on the part of the United States to condemn all mercenary activity given that the development of a total ban on mercenary activity would put U.S. citizens in danger of prosecution abroad. It is no surprise, therefore, that the U.S. government has not prosecuted U.S. security companies under these laws and does not consider security companies to be mercenary organizations. Other countries have followed a similar pattern.[28]

Evidence is strong that Blackwater violated the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law in numerous situations in Iraq. It should be held accountable for these violations. If the United States wishes to continue a leadership role in the Security Council and the UN, it must re-evaluate its contracts with security firms such as Blackwater in its foreign policy and embody respect for international law.

COSTS OF THE IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN WARS TO THE UNITED STATES

As with the Vietnam and Iraq wars, the premise of the Afghanistan war is untenable and unsustainable. A nagging question is why the combat strategies of the Iraqi and Afghan fighters have ultimately prevailed against the

most powerful war machine the world has known—the United States Military. If the "insurgents" are convinced that the US invasion was launched to guarantee access to oil, and that they cannot win in a conventional battle with troops and tanks, what weapons have they evolved to defend their lands and ways of life? Against immense resources and sophisticated weaponry, their roadside improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and other methods have economically, psychologically, and physically crippled the US forces, the US economy, and much of a generation of young military men and women.

The United States is slowly realizing its inability to rehabilitate the many soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan with chronic pain, lost limbs, diseases, and major disabilities. Of equal concern are the mental health problems rampant among the troops sent to high conflict areas. For example, between 400,000 and 1.5 million Vietnam veterans suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).[29] The costs of dealing with these societal problems arising from the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars already threaten the future of the United States.

Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, in *On Killing: the Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (1995)—a review of male reluctance to kill in war—states, "War is an environment that will *psychologically debilitate 98 per cent of all who participate in it for any length of time* (emphasis added). The 2 percent who are not driven insane by war appear to have already been insane-aggressive psychopaths before coming to the battlefield."[30] In World War II, "thousands of soldiers did not fire at the enemy. . . . The average and healthy individual . . . has such an inner and usually unrealized resistance towards killing a fellow man that he will not of his own volition take life if it is possible to turn away from that responsibility. . . . At the vital point he becomes a conscientious objector."[31] This contradicts the notion that humans might somehow be natural born killers. Instead, Grossman's research argues that the principal task of military training is to "overcome the average individual's deep-seated resistance to killing."[32]

The connection here to foreign policy reform is this: if the United States has been able to overcome this innate resistance to killing in its military training programs and inculcate the ability to kill in its wars, then societal upheaval and dysfunction await. The massive latent impact of this killing ability on the psyches of hundreds of thousands of soldiers sent to Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan will be catastrophic. All the previous statistics on

PTSD become obsolete since, with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, we have a whole new crop of male and female soldiers coming home from horrifying and debilitating war experiences. The United States is not prepared for the unforeseen psychological, economic, and moral consequences of their homecoming.

Economists Linda J. Bilmes of Harvard University and Nobel Laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz of Columbia University acknowledge that "ten years into the war on terror, the US has largely succeeded in its attempts to destabilize al-Qaida and eliminate its leaders."[33]

> But the cost has been enormous, and our decisions about how to finance it have profoundly damaged the US economy. To date the United States has spent more than $2.5 trillion on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The operating costs, or monthly "burn rate" in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have been rising steadily since 2003, from 4.4 billion dollars per month to an estimated 16 billion dollars per month in 2008.[34]

Further, the United States chose to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan with a small, all-volunteer force, supplementing its military presence with a heavy reliance on civilian contractors. The decisions to wage these wars by outsourcing and privatizing many of the elements for combat, not just support, placed enormous strain on the troops and dramatically increased costs. According to US Congressional investigations, roughly one of every four dollars spent on wartime contracting was wasted or misspent.

The future is also bleak. According to Bilmes and Stiglitz, "the cost of caring for injured military veterans peaks decades after a conflict."[35] By mid 2007, approximately 264,000 returning veterans had sought care from Veterans Affairs medical centres and clinics. Of these, about 39 percent (100,282) received at least a preliminary diagnosis of mental health condition, and 20 percent (52,000) a preliminary diagnosis of PTSD. In 2011, for the 600,000 returning troops who qualified for disability compensation, the estimated bill for future medical and disability benefits was $600 billion. That number will surely grow as the hundreds of thousands of troops now deployed abroad return home. Bilmes and Stiglitz conclude, "Our response to September 11 has weakened both the current economy and our future economic prospects. And that legacy of economic weakness—combined with the erosion of the credibility of our military power and of our 'soft power'—has undermined, rather than strengthened, our national security."[36]

The above research suggests that the Afghanistan war will rapidly reach a tipping point. US resources will be exhausted in treating the returned psychologically debilitated military members at about the same time as potential recruits and the public learn of this information that was withheld from them. As in the Vietnam War, when the public absorbs these realities, it may force the politicians to end this war.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

One of the most effective and urgent responses to terrorism globally may be the inclusion of the United States and China in the ratification of the ICC, which went into effect in 2002. It is crucial that all nations ratify and support this new court, and make it an integral part of an international campaign against terror. The billions of dollars spent by the United States in the Afghanistan war would have been better used to help the UN and the ICC enforce international laws against terrorism by any group in the world, and to alleviate the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty, lack of health care, lack of education, and the use of children as child soldiers.

Canada played a key role in the establishment and launching of the ICC (in record time as compared with the establishment of other path-breaking global legal institutions such as the World Court). Axworthy describes the battle to convince the world's nations that this International Court was indeed the best vehicle to bring corrupt and violent individuals under the Rule of Law, including leaders around the world who killed civilians with impunity in their quest for more power or wealth. In Rome in 1998, as preliminary negotiations to establish the ICC were bogging down, a delegation of international NGO leaders asked Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) to act as "catalyst" to get ICC negotiations moving again, as Canada had done earlier on the land mines treaty process. Philippe Kirsch, DFAIT's senior official, and his legal team tackled the complex and challenging multiparty negotiations. During the last few days of the Rome meeting, Kirsch adjusted the drafting procedures in a way that allowed the process to come together with a surprising and unexpected affirmation vote of 120 countries in favour and seven against.[37]

By the end of 2002, 139 countries had signed—and 89 had ratified—the Rome Statute. This was marred by a US turnabout: although Clinton, as one of his last acts before leaving office, had signed the Rome treaty, President Bush renounced this commitment and launched a campaign to destroy

the court. If American soldiers were not granted immunity from the ICC, officials said, UN peacekeepers in Bosnia might no longer expect American support. At the UN, this threat to the ICC was overcome in large part due to leadership from Canadian diplomats led by Axworthy and Kirsch. The US countermeasure was to "persuade" individual countries to sign bilateral agreements exempting Americans from the court's jurisdiction. The import of this is that "by signing an impunity agreement with the United States, states parties and signatory states would be endorsing a two-tier rule of law: one that applies to U.S. nationals; another that applies to the rest of the world's citizens.'"[38] The tragic irony of this opposition to the ICC, writes Axworthy, "is that a nation such as the U.S., steeped in the practice of the rule of law, is using its formidable power to attempt to destroy an institution whose purpose is to advance a global rule of law."[39]

Without the support of the United States and China, a great lack is a sense that the ICC is an anchor institution in a multifaceted international justice network that includes truth and reconciliation commissions, national criminal legal systems, and international tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. There is no framework for embracing all these elements as a whole.[40] Support from the United States and China would go far to establish this framework. And, says Axworthy, "The concerted counterattack to the U.S. position has to start in the U.S. itself. We have to provide information to overcome the distortions put forward by Washington's spin machine. I believe that most Americans would be dismayed to know what their government is trying to do."[41]

Since its activation, the ICC has worked at a furious pace to identify, research, and prepare action against some of the most brutal leaders of murderous movements and governments. The rapid investigations and indictments of individuals such as Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir, war lords in the Congo, and drug lords in Colombia have already made an impact on the behaviour and the makeup of the leadership of these groups.[42] LRA leaders in Uganda have been put on public notice that they must stop the practice of forcing child soldiers to turn into killers. Many of Kony's lieutenants have left the ranks of the LRA because they fear the long arm of the Rule of Law, the ICC.[43]

On 25 February 2011, more news arrived of the "turning of the tide"

of the Rule of Law in Sudan. To the surprise of many, al-Bashir, who is responsible for thousands of killings, announced his retirement from office at the end of his current term.[44] This retirement may not be a coincidence. Much of this decision may be attributable to his prosecution by the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, and al-Bashir's sudden realization of his vulnerability and the imminent end of his impunity. The previously unthinkable high-speed mobilization of the ICC with rapid and critical prosecutions, plus highly visible trials of corrupt and violent leaders, have already brought change to some situations where civilians have been killed with impunity. Given Canadian credibility and experience, Canada can take the lead in this area.

The United States needs to be convinced that the time has come to stop selling massive numbers of guns overseas—weapons designed only to kill humans. The United States needs also to learn about the accomplishments of Canadians in the UN and international environments, and emulate the "soft power" and "middle power" approaches to diplomacy as practiced by progressive internationalists in Canada. Finally, the American public needs to be roused to convince its government immediately to sign and ratify the ICC. The United States needs to "walk its talk" regarding the Rule of Law rather than pretend that international laws apply only when convenient. The United States needs to stop pressuring smaller nations to sign bilateral agreements to refrain from bringing criminal charges against the US military for violations of the Geneva Conventions and other human rights conventions.

Conflict-resolution practitioner communities of Canada and the United States have had years of experience bringing together groups to do tasks such as negotiating or serving as third parties to negotiate various aspects of foreign policies along the lines described here. We can work with national and local legislators in our respective countries to draft and enact collaborative processes and foreign policies. Our leaders need to commit time and resources to enact these processes and stay the course until we reach the consensus results advocated in this article. In a collaborative style that originated with the First Nation inhabitants of North America, we must strengthen and live the Rule of Law in the world we pass on to our children. If we can undertake this task with an eye to the next seven generations, international peace will be one step closer.

A CHARGE FOR THIS DECADE

This paper proposes a major effort to jointly rework the foreign policies of Canada and the United States. The war in Afghanistan is extremely costly to both countries many human, economic, and societal ways. Because the rationale for invading Iraq and Afghanistan was flawed from the beginning, and because the United States has not learned the lessons of the Vietnam War or the USSR's disastrous breakup after its invasion of Afghanistan, its leaders need to hear clear outside voices, and Canada has some of these expert voices. At an enormous cost of human lives, the United States has mostly ignored the willingness of other countries to join in the global efforts to fight terrorism through the UN. What steps should take place in the immediate future?

First, the United States, Canada, Security Council members, and the leaders of various regions of the world need to convene a body to develop a universal definition of terrorism. This crime against humanity should be a part of the ICC's area of responsibility. Second, the United States and China should convene meetings to orchestrate their simultaneous signing on to the Treaty of Rome and, beginning with the law schools and legal systems of the world, launch simultaneous campaigns to ratify this treaty. Third, the UN Security Council should insist that all members of the permanent *and* rotating seats on the Security Council be parties to the Rome Convention (the ICC), and not be party to bilateral agreements that might exempt that member from the ICC's jurisdiction. Finally, the UN should take up legislation to make the actions of groups such as Blackwater in the Nisour Square massacre illegal under international law. The legislation should not allow them simultaneously to claim that they are to be treated both as armed forces of their country and as free agents not subject to the Geneva Accords, other conventions, the UN, or any other country's legal authority.

As US governments have over the decades developed some "bad habits," including successive regime changes, these reforms will require major shifts in American foreign policies, practices, and intelligence agencies regarding conflicts and security.[45] Canada faces challenges to rebuild its reputation for creating new peacemaking processes and to resolve the existing conflicts with its indigenous population such as evidenced in the residential schools conflicts. However, the strong leadership provided by the generation of Canadian leaders documented in this article, among others, combined with the resources and ingenuity of the American and Canadian people, can indeed

restore the North American countries to a global leadership position that other nations can support. A cooperative and multilateralist North American foreign policy could help unify our region, and could counterbalance, reinforce, and evolve in parallel fashion to the European Union on the road to normalizing and strengthening governance under the Rule of Law in our global village.

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Feminists Researching Fathering: What Do We See Through a Reconciliation Lens?

Deborah E. Conners

A reading of fathering discourses in the North American equality feminist communities and profeminist fathering communities reveals conflicting interests and beliefs, despite a shared goal of "gender equality." This article argues that identity conflict and reconciliation theory has application to this epistemological conflict and can illuminate the challenges and potential for the adoption of a feminist research approach focused on reconciliation. Theoretical understandings emerging from peace and conflict literature provide a powerful tool to reveal new insights regarding research on fathering. By extension, we can postulate the relevance and power of peace and conflict theory to analyze other gender conflicts and constructively address the issues involved in the reconciliation of these conflicts.

INTRODUCTION

Oppressed identity-based groups justifiably put their energy and resources toward righting the wrongs they have experienced, but this can lead to seeing the issues as purely external. A review of reconciliation literature would suggest that resolving identity-based conflict also requires a look inward. This article presents an attempt by a long-time feminist activist, Andrea Doucet, to undertake such an inward examination using identity-based conflict and reconciliation theory. The case study chosen for this exploration concerns North American social science discourses on involved fathering, discourses that usually focus on mothering. Feminist goals of gender equality are taken as the starting point in these discourses;[1] this allows the analysis to focus on

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aspects of identity-based conflict that emerge despite shared goals. The study highlights two identity-based epistemological communities with a common goal of gender equality but conflicting interests and beliefs: the equality feminist communities and the pro-feminist fathering communities. A 2x2 matrix provides the framework for analysis. The use of the matrix helps us see interests that remain unexpressed in the feminist analysis and that require expression for resolution of this deep-rooted conflict. Applying a reconciliation-focused analysis to this situation reveals unique insights that could help us in equality feminist communities move forward in our quest for social justice with greater understanding of where we have been and where we may go in the future.

Certainly, patriarchal social structures continue to have appalling effects in the lives of people around the world. It seems, however, that the massive social change effected by feminism in Canadian and other societies in the latter half of the twentieth century has slowed. My question is about how we can re-engage society in the process of change. I came to peace and conflict studies as a feminist activist looking for ways to name my sense that something needed to change in our approach to the analysis of gender issues. I found a community of scholars focused on the reconciliation of conflict with whom I could express and explore my feeling that "we" (my equality feminist identity group) were not only seeing but also *generating* a one-sided picture of the situation, and with whom I could explore the ethical responsibility to see and understand this larger picture. This paper presents my findings when I shone a reconciliation light on scholarly research regarding involved fathering.

Feminist theory is commonly used as a lens through which to view and critique mainstream theoretical frameworks. When analyzing identity-based conflict, peace researchers often include a review of gender issues, reporting on the given conflict through a feminist lens and highlighting the relevant issues for women. However, peace and conflict theory has rarely been used as a lens to examine feminist analyses of gender issues. Bringing insights from peace and conflict theory to feminist theory provides an opportunity to look at, and ask questions about, the new models we are creating to replace the patriarchal social structures critiqued by feminism. In examining feminist lenses, I am studying feminist researchers as members of epistemological communities, who possess produced knowledge bases and the resulting beliefs and models for explaining the world.

A major claim of this article is that equality feminism in North America may be viewed as a party to an identity-based conflict. This approach requires that we distinguish equality feminism as a visible identity group that can submit itself to analysis using tools from the conflict researchers' tool box, and that peace and conflict theory may help thinkers address the reconciliation of the conflict constructively. Although, as a reflexive exercise, this study focuses on what my group could learn from reconciliation theory, I want to be clear that I am not saying that my identity group is "wrong" or the Other(s) "right." Rather, the use of a reconciliation lens helps uncover the partial view of each identity group in a deep-rooted conflict. It also makes clear that the interests and goals of these groups are intertwined with one another. Mobilized identity groups tend to narrow the interests they represent, and the goals that become prioritized tend to be expressed in zero-sum terms. The use of reconciliation theory invites us to see the issues as they affect everyone touched by the conflict. Reconciliation theory makes visible what was previously invisible to the parties to a conflict, gives us language to express new goals that may emerge from these insights, and, though not discussed in this article, can indicate ways to act on these goals.

IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT

Amartya Sen notes that while identity is often presented as a matter of self-realization rather than choice, "there are a great variety of categories to which we simultaneously belong . . . [and] a person has to make choices—explicitly or by implication—about what relative importance to attach, in a particular context, to the divergent loyalties and priorities that may compete for precedence."[2] The creation of a successful identity-based activist community involves the mobilization of a particular set of these divergent loyalties and priorities. The mobilization process generates deep emotional attachment to the "truths" that have been generated in the interests of the group. Melford Spiro argues that this attachment leads to the formation of beliefs that then allow "one's life [to be] . . . lived as the emotionally satisfying enactment, as a member of a group, of a set of propositions that one knows, understands, and holds as conforming to the way things are and/or ought to be."[3]

Identity becomes of interest to peace and conflict researchers when it is mobilized in ways that generate or respond to tension, injustice, or conflict. An identity group names specific identity-related issues as central to the experience of social justice by its members. If enough potential group

members embrace these issues as important, and other necessary capacities and resources are present, an activist movement may emerge. While the group working for social justice bases its identification of key issues on how group members are negatively affected—or oppressed—by these issues, the very processes that lead to this identification can themselves become a source of oppression. Hence, Chela Sandoval states, "Even the most revolutionary communities come to prohibit their members' full participation; every marginalized group that has organized in opposition to the dominant order has imported [the] same desire to find, name, categorize and tame reality in a way that ultimately works to create marginalized positions within its own ranks."[4] This process can result in members leaving or being ejected from the group (or potential members not joining), and/or the development of splinter groups.

Besides legitimizing particular identity-based beliefs and interests of group members, identity group processes work to construct the Other, whose oppression "we" are countering in our fight for justice. The ascription of identity markers to the opposing group serves to define the interests and beliefs of "our" group. The complexities in the identities of opposing group members are reduced to a single monolithic identity. This serves the needs of the oppressed group to mobilize its members but, ironically, not to see options for reconciliation of the conflict. In the introduction to *Violence, Identity, and Self-Determination*, Hent de Vries states, "The creation of an identity group—even (or perhaps especially) an identity group which is created to fight for 'justice'—can often be the site of new oppressions that emerge from the struggle itself."[5] Two sites appear with the potential for new oppressions. First, the oppressed group can exclude some prospective members through a narrowed definition of its own identity and interests. Second, the oppressed group may deny the complexity of the identity beliefs and interests among members of the oppressing group by using broad brush strokes that consider only those beliefs and interests that pertain to their own oppression.

This construction of the salient issues can be a source of power for an identity group. If the group is successful in having its struggle for justice accepted by the larger society as one deserving of support, the requirements for social justice are now defined in terms of the oppressed identity group's beliefs and interests. The voices of individuals and groups with differing beliefs or experiences are muted, which raises questions about the search

for social justice. If, and as, conditions improve (or certain conditions improve in some places and times) and the group maintains its identity as an oppressed group, further discrepancies may emerge between its own stories of suffering oppression and the experiences of others marginalized by that group. Oppressed identity groups cannot easily see their own capacity for oppression. Thus, as Vern Redekop argues, "those who were oppressed often end up oppressing others when they are liberated. To prevent this from happening, there needs to be an open discussion about these structures and ethical standards must be developed to prevent another round of oppression."[6]

FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES

The workings of the identity processes described above are visible in the development of feminist thought in North America since the 1960s. While most feminist scholars speak now of feminisms (plural) rather than feminism (singular), the second wave feminist story privileged during the 1960s to 1980s sought to describe the common experience of women in a patriarchal society. This focus led feminist theorists to think in terms of a singular feminism responding to the needs of all women through the goal of "gender equality." The equality feminist lens views gender as a societal construct rather than a feature of biological difference between the sexes. Viewing gender as socially constructed leads to an interest in the removal of gender-based differences in social rights or treatment. This gender equality position was a response to centuries of writing by men that consistently used theories of biologically-based difference to posit the superiority of men over women. Given this research agenda, equality feminists have seen "difference" as a barrier to equality between the sexes. The concept of gender was therefore "incorporated into second-wave feminism . . . to differentiate between sex as a biological 'fact' and gender as socially constructed, and hence socially alterable."[7]

With the focus on gender equality came an inevitable eliding of differences among women, a move which is now widely acknowledged to have privileged the experience of White, heterosexual, able-bodied, middle-class women.[8] Along with this, the Western focus on individual rights eclipsed communitarian goals, such as strengthening the family, commonly found within some international feminisms,[9] and a secular focus obscured the perspective of Christian and other religious feminists.[10] That said, these voices

did have an impact, and the third wave of feminism, generally understood to have begun in the early 1990s, has seen an increasing focus on diversity and women's agency in the face of oppression. However, there continue to be significant debates/dialogues/conflicts regarding issues of power and knowledge production among groups of women, some mobilized by equality feminism, and others marginalized. An example is provided by Myrna Cunningham, a Nicaraguan feminist and Indigenous activist currently serving as Chair of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, who states,

> Even now, after decades of international conferences, discussions, publications, and much hard work, issues that are a matter of life and death for Indigenous women—racism, for example, or the exploitation of the earth's resources—are relegated to a tagged-on conceptual category called "diversity" in the dominant feminist paradigm. In fact, the homogenizing tendency of the women's movement sometimes recreates the same frameworks of discrimination and cultural degradation through which national governments exploit Indigenous Peoples, especially Indigenous women.[11]

Many of the muted voices referred to above articulate a perspective often referred to as difference or equity feminism, an approach that takes as its starting point the existence of biologically-based essential differences between women and men, and therefore seeks equity between the gendered roles of women and men rather than fifty/fifty participation in these roles and responsibilities.[12] The existence of this kind of intra-group conflict is not unique to feminism. Indeed, one of the valuable insights of conflict theory is how, in the construction of identity groups, some characteristics or interests of some group members (or potential group members) are denied. The narrative that gains recognition is a simplified one capable of mobilizing resources and creating affinities.

Within the equality feminist paradigm, the variety of interests and beliefs at both the individual and group level include many contradictions. This leads many to describe equality feminists as a grouping of communities rather than a singular community. This article identifies the mobilized "equality feminist communities" as an identity group that has as a foundational concept the idea of "gender as socially constructed." Although this juxtaposition of the plural "equality feminist communities" with the singular "identity group" appears awkward, it is important to recognize the

many feminist epistemological perspectives present under the umbrella of the equality feminist communities, while also recognizing a significant unity among them.

Feminist epistemologists have documented the many assumptions and biases behind the knowledge claims of epistemic communities via critical analyses both of knowledge produced within mainstream epistemological research and of the productive internal struggles within feminist movements. Feminist epistemologists have also been part of an overall trend within the social sciences to see knowledge as constructed rather than revealed through objective research efforts. In an edited volume titled *Feminist Epistemologies*,[13] feminist epistemologists assert an intimate connection between power and knowledge production. Lynn Hankinson Nelson argues that knowledge production is accomplished by communities who generate knowledge through collaborations, consensus processes, political struggles, negotiations, and other activities.[14] Lorraine Code observes that, far from being objective, "research is legitimized by the community and speaks into a discursive space that is prepared for it . . . [and thus epistemological efforts must be both] critical and self-critical."[15] Helen Longino suggests that "effective criticism of background assumptions requires the presence and expression of alternative points of view. . . . As long as representatives of alternative points of view are not included in the community, shared values will not be identified as shaping observation or reasoning."[16] These perspectives align with the insights of reconciliation theorists, to be discussed below. Feminist epistemologists have argued that knowledge production is undertaken by epistemic communities whose interests and goals are reflected in research agendas and outcomes. Lucy Tatman argues, "One of the epistemological issues that follows from this is that access to such epistemic communities and rhetorical spaces is limited, limited in power-riddled, non-innocent ways."[17] Several decades of sometimes bitter disagreements among feminist communities have forced equality feminist communities to come to terms with the ways that equality feminist thought does not resonate with, or represent, all women and in fact has been experienced as oppressive by some. An issue that equality feminist communities have yet to grapple with is how the equality feminist paradigm is riddled with power in respect to how we name not only women's experience, but also that of men. In the case study below we explore how this might be true, and what it might mean.

THE RESEARCH ON INVOLVED FATHERING

Involved fathering refers in the literature to activities of men related to the hands-on care of children traditionally done by women. Andrea Doucet is a feminist sociologist and author of *Do Men Mother?: Fathering, Care, and Domestic Responsibility*, 2007 winner of the John Porter Tradition of Excellence Book Award from the Canadian Sociological Association. The question in the book's title, says Doucet, often forms a common starting point for research on fathering. Doucet identifies three areas of parenting responsibility usually associated with mothering: emotional, moral, and community, and she examines fathering in light of these responsibilities. She notes that academics examining gender and family life utilize the equality lens in a normative way:

> Most of the studies conducted on gender divisions of domestic labour are informed by the view that gender differences are to be avoided and gender equality is the gold standard. . . . The consensus by researchers is that something along the lines of fifty-fifty parenting or an equal division of labour is the ideal or most successful pattern.[18]

With Janet Siltanen, Doucet also argues, "it is now a well-recognized cross-cultural and historical fact that women take on the lion's share of unpaid work—whether it be housework, child care, . . . informal caring or volunteer work."[19] The equality feminist analysis of this situation generally presents fathers as unwilling or unmotivated to give up the privileges associated with patriarchy in order to fully participate as active fathers. In contrast, there are profeminist bodies of literature that explore involved fathering as an aspect of life to which men aspire.[20] Other models of fathering, put forward by equity or difference feminists,[21] men's rights activists,[22] or others, are marginalized within academic discourses on fathering. These varying approaches represent epistemological communities in conflict. Impetus to resolve this epistemological conflict is provided by a surge of research on fatherhood over the past twenty years showing that increased father involvement is consistently linked to improved outcomes for children, men, and women.[23]

The Development of Equality Feminist Beliefs about Fathering

During the second wave of feminism, discrepancies between the desired feminist ideal of equal parenting and actual experience led equality feminists to the realization that there were two requirements necessary to achieve

equality between a mother and father (and the mothering and fathering roles) within the (heterosexual) family. The first related to deconstructing the central and authoritative place held by the father. The second requirement was recognition of the value of the mother's role.

Both interests were expressed within feminist discourse. Radhika Chopra notes that feminist discourses identified the "almost exclusive link between women . . . and mothering. . . . In particular, [Nancy] Chodorow's (1978) *The Reproduction of Mothering* was seen as a seminal work that sought, as did other feminists texts, to displace the centrality of the father and the Oedipus complex as the source of gender identity and subjectivity."[24] As part of this work, feminists have documented women's experiences as sole nurturer to the family. Jessica Weiss, for example, analyzed data from longitudinal studies with baby boom-era families. She notes that these post-war mothers "believed they had parented on their own. They interpreted their husbands' commitments to career as indicating a lack of interest in family life. Having married with the expectation of parenting through togetherness, they were bitterly conscious of having parented alone."[25]

In their work to displace the centrality ascribed to fathers, equality feminists have focused on the identification of areas where men have not met the needs of their children or female partners. In various places and times, fathers have been labelled as and demonstrated to be absent, abusive, unnecessary, and deficient. Regarding the abusive father, the 2002 *Fact Sheet from the Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women* states that "in 1997, fathers accounted for 97% of sexual assaults and 71% of physical assaults of children by parents."[26] An example of the unnecessary father is seen in Judith Stacey's comment: "[While] the consequences of divorce for children are not trivial, . . . the most careful studies suggest that it is not the loss of a parent, but a hostile emotional environment preceding this loss that causes most of the emotional damage to children."[27] Out of this documentation process came two corresponding paradigmatic beliefs: the single-gendered nature of nurturing on the one hand, and the deficiencies of men in fulfilling an equal role with women on the other. These beliefs were held in the context of understanding gender as constructed. Thus men were not seen as lacking the ability to undertake nurturing roles, but as unwilling and unmotivated to do so.

Profeminist Fathering Communities' Conceptualizations of Fathering

Some profeminist academics and practitioners argue that this conceptualization, rather than representing a revealed reality, is the constructed result of a dominant research approach. They named this approach the "deficit paradigm" of fathering, because it foregrounds the deficits of fathers. These scholars argue that the deficit (or equality feminist) paradigm has supported the exploration of many valid concerns for those working toward equal relationships between men and women, but has also generated an almost exclusive focus on the ways that women have been disappointed in trying to live these relationships.[28]

Alan Hawkins and David Dollahite name their approach, which affirms gender equality but counters many of the beliefs and assumptions of the equality feminist paradigm, the "generative paradigm" of fathering. This approach has emerged from the work of profeminist fathering activists and researchers, many of whom are fathers themselves. Like the equality feminist communities, this group accepts that gender is socially constructed. This article identifies these communities of activists and researchers as "profeminist fathering communities." The term "generative" refers to Erik Erikson's theory of human development. Erikson asserted that the experience of caring for the next generation is necessary for healthy human development. The generative paradigm posits fathers as willing and motivated to become actively engaged in fathering. Hawkins and Dollahite argue that while men bring significant strengths to parenting work, they also face barriers to becoming more involved. And here, in three ways, the equality feminist paradigm's conceptions of fathers fall short:

> [The deficit] perspective is limited in its ability to facilitate personal transformation in fathers because (a) it does not give adequate attention to the processes of paternal growth and maturation (it is nondevelopmental); (b) it misconstrues the motives, feelings, attitudes, and hopes of most fathers (it is inaccurate); (c) it creates significant barriers to personal transformation rather than encouraging change (it is narrow).[29]

How equality feminist communities respond to these challenges will be based substantially on how willing we are to move beyond thinking of our beliefs as "truths."

Recently, it has been argued that the concept of involved fathering should include "provisioning" or "breadwinning." At the fifth annual Father

Involvement Research Alliance Conference in 2008 (the last in a five-year long project funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council), Scott Coltrane and Andrea Doucet brought forward "provisioning" as an aspect of care that has been neglected in the literature. Up to this point, the very terms that defined father involvement served to make the provisioning aspect of parenting invisible. Research exploring the contributions of mothers and fathers to hands-on parenting has consistently found that fathers contribute less in terms of hours and responsibility. Since provisioning has not been included in research on father involvement, the time spent by fathers (and mothers) in paid employment as family breadwinners has not been in evidence. The inclusion of provisioning (or not) is significant because, when included as a parenting function, it evens out the time spent by mothers and fathers in family responsibilities.[30]

The lenses of the equality feminist communities and the profeminist fathering communities represent the work of two groups of researchers whose perspectives reflect the contrasting needs, interests, and beliefs of their identity group, even as they share a common understanding of gender as socially constructed and a goal of gender equality. Two questions emerge when we examine these lenses using conflict theory: first, could the theoretical framings of identity-based conflict and reconciliation theory support the analysis of this conflict and generate new insights previously invisible to, or neglected by, equality feminist researchers in the area of fathering? Second, could these insights illuminate new lines of inquiry for equality feminist communities that lead toward a reconciliation-focused approach to researching fathers? The paper explores these two questions below.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT

This section uses a conflict reconciliation lens to analyze the respective foci of the knowledge production activities of the equality feminist communities and the profeminist fathering communities. A 2x2 matrix provides the analytical structure to look at the beliefs held by the researchers about mothers and fathers. In this matrix, "research on mothers" and "research on fathers" have been positioned across the top, and "deficit model of parenting" and "generative model of parenting" down the side (Figure 1).

To summarize the discussion so far, equality feminist opposition to patriarchal conceptions of the appropriate roles of mothers and fathers led to an interest in displacing the central and authoritative position attributed

to the father in the family and asserting the value of the mother's role. Two identity-based beliefs followed: that fathers are unwilling and unmotivated to take on an equal share of parenting responsibilities (the father as deficient), and that mothering represents the idealized standard for nurturing (the maternal lens as the standard measure of generative parenting). These interests and beliefs have dominated much of the feminist research done on fathering within the social sciences. The two guiding research foci of the equality feminist community are represented in the top right hand quadrant (Quad 2) and the lower left hand quadrant (Quad 3) of the diagram.

Figure 1:



Shifting our attention to identity theory, we can note that when an identity group, such as the equality feminist communities, forms to fight for social justice, the group's focus is on rebutting the hegemonic beliefs that oppress the group. That rebuttal may be experienced by group members as the whole story. (And indeed, patriarchal social arrangements have—although changing significantly—been remarkably resilient.) But Figure 1 makes visible what was previously invisible from the standpoint of the interests and beliefs of this identity group: that the stories of oppression (Quads 2 and 3) do not comprise *all* the stories to be told. Two quadrants (Quads 1 and 4)

are ignored. However, research that explores the neglected quadrants may be identified by group members as outside the beliefs of the group, or worse, as aligned with opposing groups. Group members may consider such research to be outside their known "truths," against the group, or at least against the prioritized interests of the group's mobilized members.

An oppressed group may, through its efforts, gain hegemonic power within a society to define the issues that exist between the groups in conflict. If this happens, the refusal to acknowledge the parts of the story not seen to favour the oppressed identity group (Quads 1 and 4) provides the opening for the "new oppressions that emerge from the struggle itself."[31] Thus, oppressed group members may find that while a focus on their oppression (Quads 2 and 3) is initially needed in order to articulate the problems they face and gain social recognition of these problems, a different tack is needed in order to resolve them. Moving through the conflict to resolution will require a redefinition of the situation that includes the experience of all the parties to the conflict. This transition to a bigger picture analysis is what enables an oppressed group to avoid developing an oppressive force of its own.

The two quadrants generally neglected in the expression of equality feminist interests identified above are quadrant 1, which speaks to the ways that mothers can be deficient in their parenting, and quadrant 4, which speaks to the ways that fathers engage actively with fathering. Following from what would be anticipated by the theory, an examination of research and activism from the men's movements throws light on precisely these quadrants.

The men's liberation movement emerged in the 1970s in response to the second wave feminist movement. Their first response was to engage with the women's movement to end the oppression of women. In so doing, they also recognized and began to articulate the ways that patriarchal society could also oppress men.[32] Michael Messner, who has written extensively on men and masculinities, notes that feminist criticism played a role in the emergence of the profeminist men's movement out of the men's liberation movement: "As feminist women began to criticize men's liberation, these radical men began to move their discourse more clearly in the direction of de-emphasizing the costs of masculinity and emphasizing the ways that all men derive power and privilege within a patriarchal society."[33] By the 1980s the men's liberation movement had split into two main opposing

groups: the profeminist men's movement and the men's rights movement. The former has aligned itself with equality feminist articulations of women's oppression and the concept of gender as socially constructed. It has also been the source of research to show how men want to engage in fathering work that is generative in nature. The latter has taken a more reactive stance to equality feminism, feeling unjustly attacked by feminist analyses of gender issues that focus on the deficiencies of men in fulfilling their fathering role.[34] The men's rights movement has therefore worked to show the places and ways that women also can be deficient in their parenting (Quad 1).[35] Both men's movements have worked to show how fathers are engaged in, and experience barriers to, fathering work (Quad 4). While the profeminist men's movement has focused primarily on father involvement, the men's rights movement has in addition highlighted the breadwinner role as a parenting function. Both groups have found themselves working against considerable cultural bias in trying to bring forward the "positive father" (although this has changed significantly even in the past ten years).[36] In a climate where mothering is considered the standard for nurturing, fathers may be viewed as "incapable or even dangerous if given too much responsibility for carrying out these tasks, for which they are [judged to be] ill equipped."[37]

If we return to our diagram, we now can fill in quadrants 1 and 4 (Figure 2). Quadrant 1 represents the potential for mothers to be deficient in their parenting and has been addressed through the expression of the identity interests of the men's rights movement. Quadrant 4 represents the potential for fathers to be willing to engage in active parenting even while facing barriers. Both the men's rights and the profeminist fathering communities have conducted research and activism (albeit separately) on this concern.

The preceding analysis has focused on possible learnings and opportunities for the equality feminist communities. A similar analysis could be done to illuminate opportunities for the other parties involved. The use of the 2x2 matrix provides a visual tool to expand the analysis of an identity-based conflict from an oppositional framework of "us" versus "them" to a more nuanced examination of the situation. It allows us to see that "they" are needed if "we" are to be fully cognisant of all aspects of the situation that must be addressed for resolution. Again, this is true for all parties to the conflict.

Figure 2:

	Research on Mothers	Research on Fathers
Deficit model of parenting	Quad 1 Mother as deficient (*men's rights*)	Quad 2 Father as deficient (*equality feminist*)
Generative model of parenting	Quad 3 Maternal lens as the standard measure (*equality feminist*)	Quad 4 Fathers as willing & facing barriers (*profeminist and men's rights*)

A RECONCILIATION APPROACH

As demonstrated above, once we go beyond the identity-based beliefs and interests of one party to the conflict to illuminate the concerns of the other parties, a more complete picture emerges. In order for a conflict to be resolved, each party to the conflict must be able to recognize the beliefs and interests of all parties. Hence, it can be said that a reconciliation approach would address all four quadrants of the framework (Figure 3).

The following discussion identifies and applies four themes derived from the reconciliation literature to give further insight into where reconciliation theory supports—and challenges—the prioritized interests and beliefs of the equality feminist communities in this case study. This analysis presents an opportunity for equality feminist communities in our quest for social justice. For forward movement in this direction, each party to the conflict would need to undertake a similar reflexive analysis.

Figure 3:



The Reconciliation Literature

According to prominent scholars in peace and conflict studies, identity-based conflict is ended only through reconciliation among the parties to the conflict.[38] For reconciliation to occur, it is necessary to move beyond the us-them dynamics of identity conflict and express one's relationship with the Other in other terms. Jean Paul Lederach calls on parties to shift their focus from an exclusive concern with the issues toward the restoration of relationship, and to acknowledge their interdependency.[39] Further, the past must be addressed in a process that validates both truth and forgiveness.[40] Michelle LeBaron emphasizes a willingness to change and grow.[41] Jay Rothman maintains that identity conflict "may be creatively transformed when adversaries come to learn, ironically perhaps, that they may fulfill their deepest needs and aspirations only with the cooperation of those who most

vigorously opposed them."[42]

In the work of these scholars, four themes offer us key orientations for a reconciliation approach to an identity-based conflict. The themes relate to our relationship to ourselves (willingness to change and grow), our relationship to the Other (acknowledgement of interdependency), our relationship to the future (transformation of goals), and our relationship to the past (creation of shared stories). We use these themes below to scrutinize the epistemological conflict between the equality feminist communities and the profeminist fathering communities. The analysis explores the peace and conflict theory's potential to address the reconciliation of the conflict constructively. What becomes visible is where there is alignment and where there are gaps between the principles of a reconciliation approach and the identity-based interests and beliefs articulated by the equality feminist communities.

While the analysis uses the reconciliation literature as a source, we should note the parallels between the reconciliation literature and feminist epistemology. Reconciliation theories and feminist epistemologies both demand that identity-based epistemological communities be willing to engage in potentially transformative dialogue with those outside the group. Feminist epistemologist Helen Longino calls this engagement "transformative criticism,"[43] while peace and conflict scholars refer to reconciliation processes. While reconciliation processes offer a direction for the reconciliation of gender-based identity conflict, feminist epistemologies provide the internal-to-feminism reasoning for why these approaches should interest us.

Willingness to Change and Grow

Our analytical framework (Figure 3) demonstrates how identity-based interests and beliefs reinforce competing views between the feminist and profeminist fathering communities. The equality feminist communities, in the effort to displace patriarchal conceptions of parenting, have framed the issues to support their interest in displacing the centrality of the father and asserting the value of mothering (Quads 2 and 3). Because feminist thinking has gained a certain hegemonic power in relation to the discussion of gender issues (particularly parenting), and to distance themselves from fathers' rights activism, the profeminist fathering communities have been careful in their framing of the issues, emphasizing only the capacity of men to undertake generative parenting and the barriers they face in doing so

(Quad 4). For both communities, reconciliation requires a willingness to inquire "beyond the worlds we know."[44] When we begin to work across the boundaries of what we think we know to be true, we create new "uncertainties." Letting go of knowing in favour of being uncertain allows a space for new knowledge to grow—knowledge that can respond to several or all of the prioritized interests and beliefs of the parties in the conflict.

Equality feminism is the product of a specific place and time, and is one of several forces that have significantly changed that place and time. Since the 1960s, feminists have transformed the terms within which gender relations are judged. In the current social context, equality feminists have, in my view, an opportunity to examine our construction of gender issues through a reconciliation lens. What is required for reconciliation is a willingness to move beyond the past articulation of interests and beliefs that addressed only the oppression of women. A feminist reconciliation-focused approach to researching fathering invites us to address all four quadrants of the matrix—including our own deficiencies and the generativity of the Other (Figure 3, Quads 1 and 4). Addressing all four quadrants involves engaging with the Other(s) in order to respond to the interests and beliefs of all stakeholders in the conflict.

Acknowledgement of Interdependency

A starting point for equality feminist knowledge production has been the belief that the benefits men experience in a patriarchal system must be challenged in order for equality to be achieved. It has been theorized that fathers are unwilling to give up the privileges they have in a patriarchal system in order to be "equal parents." In conflict theory terms, this would be described as a win-lose articulation of the conflict.[45] In contrast, Rothman suggests that for reconciliation, "the parties . . . must begin to look at their conflict in common terms, articulating shared concerns and aspirations; all sides must appreciate the advantage of reaching an agreement that the others find fair and equitable; and finally, the parties must feel comfortable with the climate for negotiations that will result in mutual gains."[46]

Feminist researcher Verta Taylor notes, "Ideally feminist inquiry has a policy component that benefits a particular group of women and aims to reduce gender inequality."[47] Within the feminist research approach visible in this quotation, a lack of gender equality is *assumed* to mean inequality toward women. Work that explores inequality toward men (through an

articulation of quadrants 1 and 4, or a critique of quadrants 2 and 3) may be identified as suspect and inherently anti-feminist rather than as illuminating another aspect of the conflict that *must* be explored for reconciliation to occur.

Transformation of Goals

An understanding of their interdependency can lead the parties to the conflict to move from defending their identity-based interests to designing goals that are mutually beneficial. Reconciliation scholars emphasize that the goals which will generate a sustainable peace are those that fulfill and even transcend the identity-based needs and ambitions of all the parties to the conflict. For example, rather than seeing men as unwilling to give up patriarchal power, Caroline New proposes an alternative feminist view that is more aligned with a reconciliation approach. She acknowledges that "it is in men's conservative interests to maintain a gender order that meets some of their human needs—although sometimes in very costly ways."[48] However, she continues, "it is in their *emancipatory* interests to create an order that meets their needs better, without accompanying limitation and injury, and also meets the needs of others, because of the human natural capacity for empathy and identification which is crucial to social life."[49]

The documenting of women's experience has been necessary and invaluable in a research environment where women's experiences have generally been underrepresented or neglected. In the area of parenting, however, this is no longer the case. Women's experience, and the equality feminist articulation of this experience, is the most usual starting point for social science research on fathering. Reconciliation theory would suggest that women, men, and transgender people require goals that align our interests with each other if gender issues are to be addressed constructively.

Creation of Shared Stories

Jay Rothman argues that "conflict arises from a mismatch of words and deeds, which is itself rooted in lack of clarity. It is not that people intentionally deceive themselves or lack integrity when engaged in conflict; rather, their own tacit assumptions usually remain just that—tacit, unarticulated, and unexamined."[50] Vern Redekop concurs that certain ideas held by identity groups "function as truisms, expressed as ideas and stories so often they are not subject to question."[51] According to Caroline New, equality feminists

have created a truism in generating a story of gender relations that relies on win-lose, or zero-sum, thinking. The "notion of interests as given by outcomes is central to the zero-sum conception of oppression. In this view, the advantaged always have interests in keeping their power and privilege, and the disadvantaged always have interests in gaining it. The gender order is thus seen as the ongoing creation of men."[52] The resulting story posits women as victims and men the perpetrators of women's oppression. With this starting point, there has been little room for the creation of shared stories.

In Rothman's ARIA (Antagonism, Resonance, Invention, and Action) framework for reconciliation,[53] parties to the conflict first raise the differences they have, and then they begin to reframe their articulation of the issues from "blame and victimhood to respective responsibility and volition."[54] They undertake to find common ground, and begin to understand the experience of the Other. Rothman notes that the "shift from projecting one's own darker sides onto adversaries to acknowledging such attributes in oneself . . . can lead to profound self-awareness and ownership,"[55] and to shared stories.

THE POTENTIAL FOR RECONCILIATION

Conflict theory would predict resistance to a reconciliation approach among the parties in this entrenched identity-based conflict. This is because reconciliation challenges the precepts of the conflict itself as well as the incentive structure underpinning gendered conflicts. The conflict has emerged out of issues that the parties could not or would not face and resolve. It has also led the conflict parties to define their interests and beliefs in opposition to each other. Reconciliation requires moving beyond this oppositional posture to a framing in which the story of the conflict is jointly defined, and in which the interdependency of the parties is acknowledged. Those within an identity group who do reach toward reconciliation may be perceived to be betraying the cause and risk having their status as knowledge producers within the epistemological community revoked. However, in every conflict there are people on each side working for resolution. Whether these peace workers are perceived by their group as inside or outside the discourse reveals significant information about whether the identity group as a whole is likely to be open to a model that seeks reconciliation.

Andrea Doucet's work provides an example of research that is

well-respected within mainstream feminist articulations of fathering, but also diverges from these articulations. We can examine Doucet's work in terms of the four reconciliation themes identified earlier to seek evidence of the peace worker function within feminist research. In *Do Men Mother?*, Doucet moves beyond the (mobilized) interests of the equality feminist community to document the generative parenting of men—thus demonstrating a willingness to change and grow. While Doucet began her research with an "openness to the political and personal potential of men taking on a greater share of the responsibility for children,"[56] she soon became aware of the epistemological dilemmas in doing so. She notes,

> The epistemology of reception that awaits any positive work on fathering is that some fathers' rights groups, particularly the most militant and anti-feminist ones, may use this information to make their case that fathers are better parents than mothers. Moreover, support for men's involvement in family life can unwittingly turn into a completely different set of arguments; these can include, for example, arguments about essential differences between women and men or how fathers should be involved with their children, no matter what the cost to women.[57]

Consequently, Doucet put considerable effort into ensuring that her research on generative fathers was not accomplished at the expense of devaluing the contribution of mothers. She presents the feminist orientation that guides her research as one which "works toward challenging gendered asymmetries around care and employment, encouraging and embracing active fathering, while always remembering and valuing the long historical tradition of women's work, identities, and power in caregiving."[58] In her study of 118 primary care fathers, she establishes the contributions of both fathers and mothers and the interdependency of each in making these contributions. Doucet acknowledges the ways that mothers' and fathers' embodiment as women and men generates different, and inter-subjective, experiences of parenting, and interrogates the correlation between "difference" and "disadvantage." This framing allows for expressions of gender difference even within an approach that "works toward equality"[59] as an ultimate goal (i.e., she is still ultimately working within the equality feminist framework). Doucet's approach also supports the creation of shared stories. Most studies of engaged fathers have compared fathers' efforts to those of mothers. Doucet argues that "more effective questions to be grappled with are ones

that explore how fathers enact their parental responsibilities and ultimately how they reinvent fathering."[60] Overall, we see a great readiness in Doucet's work to challenge dominant feminist beliefs and interests and to address complexity and paradox within the areas represented by quadrants 3 and 4 in our analytical framework—those of generative parenting by both women and men.

Returning to the analytical framework presented earlier (Figure 4), we can see that Doucet's work reaches across the boundary between the prioritized interests of the equality feminist and profeminist fathering research communities to examine the ways that both mothers and fathers are generative as parents (Quads 3 and 4). Her research does not focus on the "deficient father" of quadrant 2 or the "deficient mother" of quadrant 1. In Figure 4, the focus on quadrants 3 and 4 is identified as a first stage of reconciliation work. Bringing quadrants 3 and 4 together transcends the boundaries of the identity-based conflict examined in this article. However, this shift is not sufficient to exemplify a reconciliation approach to the conflict. As demonstrated above, a reconciliation-focused approach to researching fathering ideally addresses the concerns of all four identity-based beliefs presented on the matrix (Figure 3). This includes being willing to address identity-based beliefs regarding the deficits of both groups. Doucet omits these areas, yet her work represents a significant divergence from mainstream feminist research, and points toward an acceptance of a reconciliation approach in researching fathering from an equality feminist perspective.

The preceding analysis of Doucet's work shows that reconciliation theory is relevant to the fathering discourse, and that Doucet's work points toward a reconciliation approach. Analyzing the work of one feminist scholar to understand the areas of alignment with, and divergence from, a reconciliation approach does not represent a test. However, it does provide a plausibility probe. That Doucet is a prominent researcher within feminist research on involved fathering in North America indicates that the outcome of this analysis is not idiosyncratic; it identifies possible trends in feminist research that could move equality feminist research in a direction that reconciliation theory could support and enhance.

CONCLUSION

This study explores the application of reconciliation theory using only the case of equality feminist theorizing regarding involved fathering. A more

Figure 4:



difficult case study would be one that includes behavioural deficiencies on the part of men and women (Quads 1 and 2). The study is also limited by examining only two identity groups whose members share the same goal of gender equality. This allows us to study the relevance of reconciliation theory to gender issues with less attention on justifying "why" we would want to take this approach. However, it avoids difficult questions regarding how and why groups with differing goals and starting points can approach reconciliation. This study indicates that the equality feminist point of view is a partial view that has been shaped by the mobilized interests of the group (as are the views of the other groups involved in the situation), and argues the desirability of engaging with these others in a more nuanced way. But it does not help us understand how to deal with other reconciliation process issues, such as gaining intra-group agreement, cohesive leadership, and inter-group trust. Further, this research is aligned with third wave feminist approaches which bring women's agency into focus. A more complex analysis is called for that accounts for both the agency of oppressed groups and continuing

expressions of patriarchal social structures. A final area of further social science research is on how involved fathering has dealt with the intersections of ability, sexual orientation, sexual identity, and ethnicity.

That said, the use of an identity theory lens allows us to examine the development of the equality feminist identity group from an unusual and enlightening perspective. Feminist lenses are most often found within academia as tools with which to critique mainstream knowledge production. Also, over time, feminists have engaged with internal criticisms and developed powerful tools for reflexive analysis. But feminist theories are rarely critiqued from an external theoretical perspective.

This study uses identity and reconciliation theories to look *at* feminist lenses, rather than adopt the more familiar view *through* a feminist lens. This approach reveals that equality feminist communities form an identity group that is rooted in a broad but common epistemological understanding and is engaged in an identity-based conflict. The case study presented brings forward an epistemological conflict between two research communities: the equality feminist communities and profeminist fathering communities. The use of identity conflict theory points to neglected areas of knowledge production within equality feminist research approaches. Based on this analysis, we explore the conflict in light of four themes characteristic of a reconciliation-focused approach to conflict. These themes illuminate what shifts in thought might be necessary for equality feminist research to align with a reconciliation approach. The alignment of a reconciliation approach with feminist epistemologies provides a rationale to bring equality feminist communities to the reconciliation table. The study also identifies the potential for the equality feminist communities to adopt a reconciliation-focused approach to researching fathering. This potential can be seen in the acceptance within equality feminist discourses of feminist research such as Doucet's, which is pushing the boundaries in the direction of reconciliation.

Theoretical understandings emerging from the peace and conflict literature provide powerful tools to reveal new insights about research on fathering. Conflict theory may be both relevant and powerful to analyze other gender conflicts in North America, and to address the issues involved in their reconciliation constructively.

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Promoting Community-Based Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms in the Bawku Traditional Area of Ghana

Mamadou A. Akudugu and Edward S. Mahama

Individuals and communities in the Bawku Traditional Area of Northern Ghana use different strategies to manage and resolve the conflicts they encounter in pursuit of their livelihoods. Choices include indigenous, exogenous, and endogenous mechanisms. This paper examines these choices and the determinants for choosing one conflict resolution mechanism over others. The basic data for the analysis was gathered from randomly sampled individuals, key informants, and groups in the area. The results showed that about 79 percent of people in the Bawku Traditional Area prefer endogenous mechanisms, known as Community-Based Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms (COBCOMREMs), and their reasons for this choice are similar. The paper recommends that stakeholders in the management of these conflicts incorporate the elements of COBCOMREMs in their peacebuilding efforts.

INTRODUCTION

In the last three decades, much of West Africa has been engulfed in intra-state conflicts. Several of these conflicts have degenerated into full-scale wars, as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire. Unequal distribution and access to resources, economic activities, and power are major causes of these conflicts. Annie Kairaba and Kathryn Firman-Setters, among others, emphasize the economic and political importance of these conflicts.[1] Conflicts in Africa can be deadly if "political entrepreneurs" capitalize on them to further their cause.[2]

Ghana is often perceived as a peaceful and stable country in a volatile

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region. While the country is stable, it still faces many violent conflicts that threaten its democracy. In response, Ghana has managed to maintain a peacekeeping presence in the affected communities but has not been able to resolve the issues at stake.[3] Northern Ghana is considered the most unstable part of the country. Certainly there are many peaceful communities, and the Upper West Region, one of the three regions of Northern Ghana, has long been relatively peaceful. But there are numerous inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts that lead to the destruction of property and lives. These conflicts are exacerbated by the fact that natural resources are limited and have multiple uses. Different people seek to manage and utilize these resources in different ways and with different approaches in order to attain their goals. Although some of these conflicts are related to disputes over chieftaincy, underlying the chieftaincy issue is control over territory and resources, particularly land and trees important to the economy. Thus, as Jon P. Kirby observes, most of the conflicts in Northern Ghana are related to natural resources, particularly land.[4] Effective strategies to manage and resolve conflicts are very important, and crucial for Ghana to attain the Millennium Development Goals.

To address these conflicts Ghana uses indigenous, exogenous, and endogenous strategies or approaches. Indigenous strategies involve family heads, clan heads, and land priests popularly referred to as *Tendaanas* in Northern Ghana. Exogenous strategies involve the formal police and court system. Endogenous strategies combine indigenous and exogenous strategies. Many communities, especially smaller ones, still use traditional methods, but there is a growing shift toward the use of the courts. Conflict management using the court system is limited to Western methods of adjudication, which are adversarial and normally create win-lose situations. This is particularly so following the breakdown of traditional structures and institutions that specialized in managing and resolving conflicts at the household and community levels. According to Boniface A. Saddique, the ineffectiveness of the exogenous court system, particularly the judiciary, is a key cause of the increasing conflicts in northern Ghana, and alternatives are needed.[5]

This study was motivated by the failure of the exogenous system and the search for positive alternatives. It examines an ongoing conflict between two ethnic groups, the Kusasis and Mamprusis, over which group, through an overlord or paramount chief, should rule the Bawku Traditional Area in northern Ghana. Knowing what factors people consider in seeking

redress for this conflict is critical in developing management and resolution strategies that are culturally and socially acceptable, politically neutral, economically viable, and environmentally sustainable for the feuding factions. Respondents in this study favoured endogenous Community-Based Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms (COBCOMREMS), and this paper examines the factors that drive them to choose COBCOMREMs over the exogenous court system.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC, CLIMATIC, AND POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF THE BAWKU TRADITIONAL AREA

The Bawku Traditional Area is located in the Upper East Region (UER) of Ghana. The UER comprises nine administrative districts and municipalities, three of which are in the Bawku Traditional Area. The municipality and districts of the Bawku Traditional Area are the Bawku Municipality (where the paramount chief resides), the Garu-Tempane District, and the Bawku West District.

Socio-culturally, the Bawku Traditional Area is an ethnically diverse community with several ethnic groups living side-by-side, including the Kusasis (the majority), the Mamprusis, the Busangas, the Bimmobas, the Moshies, and the Hausas. According to Robert Rattray, the Kusasis were the original settlers and therefore consider themselves the indigenes of the area. The Mamprusis, on the other hand, migrated to the area from Gambaga in the Northern Region of Ghana in small groups. The first group of Mamprusi migrants settled in the late nineteenth century in what has become the Bawku town centre and engaged in commerce. They established the town as a military post to protect the trade routes with the north. They were later joined by other Mamprusi migrants and other ethnic groups such as the Moshies and Busangas from Burkina Faso and the Hausas from Northern Nigeria. Most of these migrants were engaged in the trading of goods between the north and the south of the country. A few of these migrants, however, ventured into the countryside to farm. After several decades of habitation and use of the area's natural resources, they started to claim ownership of these natural resources, particularly land.[6]

The Bawku Traditional Area, like most of Northern Ghana, features a uni-modal pattern of rainfall with two distinct seasons: the rainy season from late April to early November, and the dry season from late November to early April. In the dry season the area is susceptible to bushfires and soil

degradation. The area is well drained by the White and Red Volta rivers, their tributaries, and other rivers. The vegetation is mainly of the Sahel Savannah type, consisting of open savannah with fire-swept grassland punctuated by deciduous trees with a few broad-leaved and fire-leached tree species.

The economy of the Bawku Traditional Area is based on three major activities: agriculture, commerce, and small-scale industries. Agriculture is the major economic activity and employs about 70 to 80 percent of the inhabitants. The sector comprises mainly subsistence crop production, livestock, and poultry farming. The main crops include millet, sorghum, maize, rice, groundnuts, watermelon, and onions. The main livestock include cattle, sheep, goats, donkeys, and poultry such as guinea fowl, ducks, and domestic fowl.

Commerce is the second important economic activity in the Bawku Traditional Area, especially in the Bawku Municipality, which is generally considered the commercial centre of the Upper East Region. Its bustling commercial role transcends both municipal and regional boundaries. Local agricultural produce, such as foodstuffs, livestock, and poultry, and manufactured goods are traded during a three-day market cycle. Traders from other parts of Ghana buy livestock and foodstuffs and load them onto trucks for redistribution in major southern commercial centres such as Techiman, Sekondi-Takoradi, Kumasi, Accra, Tema, and Cape Coast. In return, traders from Bawku deal in manufactured goods brought in from those southern marketing centres. Thus the Bawku Traditional Area is important to the economy of the region and the country at large. Its strategic location at Ghana's borders with south-eastern Burkina Faso and northern Togo, and as an outlet to landlocked countries such as Mali and Niger, further reinforces its importance in sub-regional trade.

The third important economic activity includes single-person and family-run businesses and small-scale cottage industries such as shea butter extraction; groundnut oil extraction; *pito* brewing; corn mill operation; sorghum, rice, and maize processing for domestic use; *dawadawa* processing; weaving and dress making; and pottery.

In terms of political organisation and structure, the Bawku Traditional Area has two levels of political authority. The first is the Municipal and District Authority instituted by the state under local government law (PNDC Law 207, 1988) to provide local administration. The second is the Traditional Authority in which sub-chiefs operate under the authority of

the Paramount Chief. While no major role is assigned to the Traditional Authority under the local government system, its position is guaranteed in the Constitution of Ghana based on the support it has from the inhabitants. This is particularly so in the rural areas where the influence of the central government and the Municipal and District Assemblies tends to be minimal. Traditional authorities play critical roles, including allocating land, settling disputes, maintaining law and order, and upholding traditional customs in their communities. The Municipal and District Assemblies constitute a form of local parliament with representatives from the various electoral areas, and they are the Bawku Traditional Area's highest political authority. Two-thirds of members of the Assemblies are elected and one-third are appointed by the central government in consultation with local traditional leaders, with an elected Presiding Member as chair. The central government sometimes delegates part of its appointment powers to traditional authorities. In 2001, for instance, the Paramount Chief of the Bawku Traditional Area, Naaba Azoka Abugrago II, appointed seven members to the Bawku Municipal Assembly.[7]

CHIEFS, NATURAL RESOURCES, POVERTY, AND CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN GHANA

Most of Northern Ghana's conflicts are connected with chieftaincy, poverty, and the control of natural resources. This is further complicated by high poverty levels and/or underdevelopment. According to Paul Collier, conflict and development are related; indeed, by generating and intensifying the poverty levels of affected communities, conflict is development in reverse.[8] Conflicts have been linked to lack of access to quality education, quality health care, and quality food for productive life, all of which negatively influence development.

Since 2000, four areas in Northern Ghana—Yendi, Gusheigu, and Bunkpurugu-Yunyoo in the Northern Region, and Bawku in the Upper East Region—have frequently been in the news regarding conflicts. Many inhabitants continually prepare themselves for violent conflicts by stockpiling weapons.[9] Since the long-standing causes of these conflicts include struggles for traditional political power and control over natural resources such as land, most of the conflicts centre on who should be the overlord of a particular traditional area and thus responsible to manage and control that area's natural resource base.

Most of these conflicts pre-date the country's 1957 independence. Indeed, some of them, such as the conflict over chieftaincy in Dagbon and Gonjaland, predate colonialism, but they were effectively managed and contained using state and traditional institutions, and did not escalate to full-scale civil strife situations. Since 2000, however, these conflicts between feuding factions have assumed alarming proportions, with combatants employing very sophisticated weaponry. They have also been exacerbated by the involvement of party politics. This politicization of conflicts has rendered the traditional, indigenous institutions designated to address leadership crises ineffective and irrelevant, for it imposes upon the feuding factions mechanisms that they do not find culturally and socially acceptable, economically viable, or politically neutral.

To make matters worse, the so-called "well-to-do" in these conflict societies, who have a great deal of influence on the youth, the vulnerable, and the poor, manipulate the exogenous court system to their socio-economic and political advantage. In the Bawku Traditional Area, the fact that the conflict has festered since 2000 is evidence that the exogenous conflict management and resolution mechanisms have largely failed. One major reason is the lack of political will and commitment to enforce court rulings. Other reasons include the involvement of party politics, the relegation of indigenous traditional institutions to the background, and the failure to integrate indigenous systems with formal court systems in the search for solutions.

Traditionally, it was forbidden in the Bawku Traditional Area to spill human blood for any reason or to disobey any of the traditional structures put in place for harmonious living. Offenders were made to perform certain rites to cleanse the land. Disputes that could not be managed by the traditional leadership were often referred to the world of the ancestral spirits for resolution. These structures and mechanisms have given way particularly to the formal court system. Unfortunately, court rulings have been politicized and are disobeyed by those who are seen as losers because they believe they have been treated unfairly. Further, the continuous imposition of curfews and a military presence to contain the conflict have not led to a solution. Given the marginalization of indigenous systems and the failure of the exogenous system, respondents in this study favoured COBCOMREMs, which blend indigenous with exogenous mechanisms. Using negotiation, arbitration, mediation, and spiritualism, these mechanisms create a platform for

win-win outcomes.

CHIEFTANCY, POLITICS, AND CONFLICT IN THE BAWKU TRADITIONAL AREA

Although the Kusasi-Mamprusi conflict has been a prominent issue in Ghana since 2000, and the parties have engaged each other in a bloody ethnic conflict for over five decades (with chieftaincy as the main underlying issue), the conflict dates back to the introduction of the Indirect Rule by the British in the 1930s. According to Christian Lund, traditionally the Kusasis did not have the institution of chieftaincy. Instead, they had a religious figure called the *Tendaana* (land priest); he was the custodian of the land, who performed religious duties on behalf of the community and was looked up to as the community's political and spiritual head. The function of the *Tendaana* was religious rather than secular; he was responsible for ensuring the prosperity of the community by obtaining the goodwill of the earth.[10]

Contention arose when the British established the Native Authority Ordinance, which combined the central colonial government and the local authorities into a single governing system. According to J. G. K. Syme,[11] "the British suddenly arrived in Gambaga and then they came to Kusasi asking for chiefs. They had found chiefs in Gambaga and expected the same in Kusasi."[12] The British then appointed a chief from the politically more organized Mamprusis who had experience in the institution of chieftaincy to take charge of Kusasiland. The British then gave the overlord of the Mamprusi state, the *Nayiri*, the responsibility to select and "enskin" (enthrone) the chief for the Bawku area. This meant that the British delegated *de facto* oversight authority over Bawku to the *Nayiri*, a situation the Kusasis opposed vehemently. This marked the beginning of tensions between the two ethnic groups.

Hostilities between the two groups peaked in the 1950s when the Kusasis enskinned a Kusasi man as the *Bawkunaba*, the chief of Bawku, after the death of the Mamprusi chief. In opposition to this, the *Nayiri* also enskinned a Mamprusi man as the *Bawkunaba*, whom the Kusasis then prevented from returning to their town.[13] This situation compelled Governor Lord Listowel to set up a committee to look into the impasse. The committee found that the Kusasi chief had been customarily elected and enskinned; Lord Listowel therefore concluded that the Kusasi chief was the legitimate chief of Bawku. The Mamprusis did not accept the governor's

interpretation of the committee's findings. For them, the terms "chief of the Kusasi area" and "chief of Bawku" were not identical. They therefore sought an order from a divisional court to reverse the governor's decision, and the court granted the order. The Kusasis then appealed that ruling at the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal agreed with the governor that the two terms were interchangeable and that the governor had clear powers to vary the findings of the committee.[14] The Kusasi *Bawkunaba* remained in office until the overthrow of the Convention People's Party government in 1966. After this the conflict became more politicized, with each faction supporting the political parties that they perceived to be sympathetic to their cause.

The Mamprusis appealed to the new government of the National Liberation Council (NLC) to rectify what they saw as wrong done them by the previous administration. The Chieftaincy Amendment Decree of 1966, NLCD 112, was passed, thereby dethroning the Kusasi *Bawkunaba* and enthroning a Mamprusi man in his place as the chief of Bawku. This situation persisted despite frequent appeals by the Kusasis to subsequent governments to restore their traditional power until the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) came into power in late 1981. The new government passed a law that reversed NLCD 112, thus reinstating a Kusasi as the *Bawkunaba* under the Chieftaincy Act of 1983, also known as PNDC Law 75. This move alienated the Mamprusis but gained wide support among the Kusasis.

With the return of the country to multi-party democracy in 1992, the Mamprusis rallied behind the opposition, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), with the hope that an NPP government would restore the Bawku chieftainship to them. Thus, when the NPP came to power following its success in the 2000 presidential and parliamentary polls, there was wide expectation among the Mamprusis and suspicion among the Kusasis that the NPP would revisit the 1983 Chieftaincy Act. The Mamprusis' expectation, however, was not met, as the NPP chose not to alter PNDC Law 75.

To some observers, then, the Bawku chieftaincy conflict appeared to be settled. But recent events such as calls to rejuvenate and consolidate the Mamprusi leadership, the refusal of the Mamprusis to recognize the Kusasi *Bawkunaba* as the chief of Bawku Traditional Area, and recent violent clashes prove otherwise. Concerning the *Bawkunaba*, the position of most Mamprusis is epitomized in the words of retired Mamprusi Justice B. Yakubu: "I must state that to us Mamprusis, Bawku has no chief and no

one can coerce us into recognizing any bastard as a chief."[15] Such rhetoric reinforces the volatility of the area.

Closely associated with the chieftaincy conflict are disputes about land ownership, for land ownership in the Bawku Traditional Area is tied to the right to rule. The custodian of the land is seen as the custodian of the chieftaincy institution. The Kusasis' claim to the land stems from the fact that they were the first to settle on the land. They argue that the land is the property of the *Tendaana* and since they have always elected the *Tendaanas*, they are the custodians of the land. The Mamprusis, on the other hand, argue that the land belongs to the *Nayiri* and the Kusasi *Tendaanas* were at best caretakers of the land for the *Nayiri*, who always provided protection for Bawku, allowing the so-called "acephalous" (i.e., without a chief) Kusasis to cultivate the land in peace. As a result of this dispute, many contested lands cannot be cultivated. Mamprusis have been driven away from their farmlands in Zabugu and, more recently, in Pusiga in 2008. The control of those farmlands has been vested in the Municipal Assembly to avert any clashes. As farming is one of the major economic and livelihood activities of the area, this conflict is linked to economic opportunities.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

Individuals and communities in the Bawku Traditional Area employ different strategies to manage and resolve the conflicts they encounter in the pursuit of their livelihoods. According to Victor Matiru[16] and Henrietta J. A. N. Mensa-Bonsu and Paul Effah,[17] these strategies include avoidance, coercion, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. Some avoid conflict by not engaging in activities that may spark misunderstandings; some use coercion to stop actions that can lead to conflict, as the government did with curfews and the current ban on motorcycle riding in Bawku in order to prevent targeted killings and drive-by shootings;[18] some negotiate with one another to give and receive concessions, leading to win-win situations; some choose a mutually agreed-upon third party to mediate or arbitrate; and some go to a recognised court to adjudicate the conflict, which produces win-lose outcomes. People choose these strategies based on their preferences, their understanding of the alternative strategies, their perceived likelihood of success, their relationship with the opponent, and the nature of the conflict itself.

As mentioned, Ghana uses indigenous, exogenous, and endogenous

strategies to address natural resource conflicts. Indigenous strategies involve family heads, clan heads, and land priests. These have evolved in various ways within communities, districts, regions, and nation-states for several decades. Nevertheless, they feature socio-cultural and political commonalities, especially in the areas of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. In many places, indigenous systems uphold strategies such as peer pressure, sanctions, and ostracism. Prior to the advent of colonialism, indigenous people embodied the conservation and management of natural resources such as plant species, and the handling of related conflicts, through traditional beliefs by means of systems of taboos. These ensured that natural resources were held sacred and protected from indiscriminate exploitation.[19]

According to Victor Matiru and Stephen Brush,[20] strengths of indigenous systems include the following: (1) they are accessible to all because of their low cost; (2) their scheduling and procedures are flexible; (3) they use local languages understood by the aggrieved parties; (4) they encourage local level participation, and respect local values and customs; and (5) they empower local people to manage and resolve their differences. As for weaknesses, (1) they are inaccessible to certain people on the basis of gender, class, and other attributes; (2) in most cases, they are unable to handle conflicts between communities; (3) they are challenged by the heterogeneity of communities due to urbanization and migration; and (4) they have been supplanted by courts and administrative laws.

The exogenous system is based on legislation and policy statements, including regulatory and judicial administrations, and involves the formal police and court system. It employs adjudication and arbitration as the main strategies for managing and resolving conflicts. The current imposition of curfew, the ban on riding motorcycles, and the high military presence in Bawku illustrate major components of this approach. This system has the following strengths: (1) it involves judicial and technical specialists in decision-making; (2) it results in decisions that are legally binding; (3) it takes into consideration national and international concerns and issues; and (4) it is officially established with well-defined procedures. Weaknesses include the following: (1) it may neglect indigenous knowledge, local institutions, and the long-term needs of the local community in decision-making; (2) it uses procedures that generally promote win-lose situations; (3) it is often inaccessible to the poor, women, and marginalized groups; (4) it is inaccessible to remote communities due to cost, distance, language barriers,

political obstacles, and discrimination; and (5) the judicial and technical specialists involved may lack the expertise, skills, and orientation required for participatory conflict management and resolution.

The endogenous system, or COBCOMREMs, combines indigenous and exogenous strategies. It promotes joint or participatory decision-making mechanisms to manage and resolve conflicts. Developed because the adversarial, win-lose nature of the exogenous system made solutions to conflicts largely unsustainable, COBCOMREMs are built on the time-tested traditional mechanisms that communities employed in settling disputes. The key strategies here are negotiation and mediation to enable litigating parties to reach a consensus that seeks to build long-term mutual benefits for all. COBCOMREMs provide room for effective communication, information sharing, collaboration, and the promotion of positive social change; and above all, they build the capacities of local communities to manage and resolve their own conflicts.

COBCOMREMs have the following strengths: (1) they emphasize building the capacity of local communities and people to control conflict management and resolution; (2) they are flexible and less costly than the exogenous system; and (3) they promote sustainable conflict management and resolution processes, leading to win-win situations. Their weaknesses include the following: (1) it may be difficult to get aggrieved persons to a round-table discussion; (2) it may be difficult to overcome power differentials; and (3) decisions may not be legally binding to all parties.[21]

In the Bawku Traditional Area, conflict management and resolution has evolved in such a way that it is difficult to distinguish COBCOMREMs from indigenous systems. This is because actors in indigenous systems have been trained in COBCOMREMs, which are now practised in many communities. Thus the Bawku Traditional Area features only two approaches to conflict management and resolution—the exogenous system and COBCOMREMs. In an ongoing conflict, litigants in the Bawku Traditional Area tend to choose COBCOMREMs over the exogenous system. The following analysis identifies and evaluates the factors that influence them in their choices.

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVES

This study utilizes an economic theory of conflict for its analysis. Certainly, as Collier notes, violence is complex and no one theory can explain the

basis of violent conflict.[22] Scholars have formulated many theories to explain violent conflicts, including psychological, political, social, and psycho-cultural perspectives.[23] Nevertheless, as economic factors are central to the conflict in the Bawku Traditional Area, an economic analysis can offer useful insights toward the resolution of this conflict. The economic theory of conflict assumes that parties in conflict are driven by the urge to maximize power in order to have access to the economic rewards of victory. As rational economic players, they are guided by the idea of trade-off. People choose between production and appropriation; if the opportunity cost to appropriate is lower than the cost to produce, people will appropriate and violence will ensue.[24] Although conflict and violence are dangerous activities, if their pay-off outweighs the calculated risk, people will choose them.[25] Thus engaging in conflict and violence may be rational economic activities—a form of entrepreneurship.[26] Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, for example, argue that economic factors—the fear of "looting" and the desire to control resources—lead people to resort to violence more directly than do political grievances, whose link to the onset of violence is indirect or secondary.[27]

The economic theory highlights the link between education and economic empowerment on the one hand and conflict on the other. Ted Gurr points out that the presence of a large pool of uneducated young men with limited economic opportunities places a country or community at great risk of experiencing civil strife: "the willingness of young men to join a rebellion might be influenced by their income-earning opportunities. If young men face only poverty, they might be more inclined to join a rebellion than if they have better economic opportunities."[30] According to Gurr's "relative deprivation theory," the lack of economic opportunities serve as a grievance to encourage young men and women to join a rebellion in the hope that changing the existing order will lead to the establishment of better political and socio-economic conditions.[28] The theory highlights "people's perception of discrepancy between their value expectation and value capacities. The value expectation is concerned with the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled and their value capacities are the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they get and keep."[29] Where such a discrepancy exists, people are more likely to be rebellious. Blatant economic inequalities can also make countries and communities vulnerable to civil rebellion or conflict. When people see that their economic woes are a direct result of a few elites sharing most

of the resources, they may be expected to join a rebellion. This is more so in countries where such inequalities coincide with religious, tribal, or ethnic divisions. Inequality increases the discrepancy between people's value expectation and their value capacities, and increases the likelihood of rebellion or violence. Therefore, peace-loving people in the Bawku Traditional Area should be concerned to bridge the economic, social, cultural, and power gaps between the rich and the poor, the young and the old, men and women, and the literate and illiterate.

THE SURVEY

Bawku Municipality, Garu-Tempane, and Bawku West Districts of the Republic of Ghana constitute the Bawku Traditional Area. According to the Ghana Statistical Service, in 2000, the estimated population of the Bawku Municipality was 205,849 with a population density of 169 persons per square kilometre, of Garu-Tempane District was 116,215 with a population density of 99 persons per square kilometre, and of the Bawku West District was 83,034 with a population density of 78 persons per square kilometre.[31] Thus in 2000 the Bawku Traditional Area's population totalled about 405,098 with an average population density of 115 persons per square kilometre. To this day, households, on average, number about seven people. Agriculture and petty trading are the people's predominant livelihood activities.

This paper's study focused on the population of households that are directly affected by the conflict. These include households whose means of income and livelihoods are seriously disrupted as a result of the conflict. About four thousand households in the area fall within this category, and the heads of such households were randomly sampled for analyses. In all, two hundred household heads representing about 5 percent of the target population were selected for the study. In terms of distribution of the sample, fifty of them (25%) came from Bawku West, fifty (25%) from Garu-Tempane, and one hundred (50%) from the Bawku Municipality. Bawku Municipality had the highest number of respondents because it is the centre of the conflict. Key informants came from leadership groups such as chiefs, elders, town and area councils, and Unit Committee chairpersons, secretaries, and assembly members. Instruments used to collect qualitative and quantitative data were mainly interviews, accompanied by semi-structured questionnaires and focus group discussions. Information solicited from the respondents and key informants included their opinions on the selection of conflict management

and resolution mechanisms and the factors that influenced their choices. The factors considered included the speed or promptness of the mechanism; its fairness; the distance to the place of redress; the cost involved; the likelihood of success; the age, gender, literacy level, and status in the community of the respondent; and the relationship between or among litigants.

THE MODELLING FRAMEWORK

Given the economic theory of conflict that underlies this study, an appropriate utility maximization approach to investigate factors that explain how aggrieved persons choose one conflict management and resolution mechanism over another is the probit regression. The probit model, a binary choice model, is employed when the dependent variable (in this case, a litigant's choice of a conflict management and resolution approach) is dichotomous. It specifies a non-linear functional relationship between the probability of deciding to do or not to do something such as choosing a redress mechanism. To choose to do something or not to do it depends on an objective utility function. This underlying utility function could be the struggle for cultural identity, social status, political power, or the economic advancement of individuals and communities; these are some of the reasons why individuals and communities engage in conflicts. If and only if the reason for waging the conflict provides value above a certain threshold to the litigants with respect to the above mentioned factors, then they will choose the redress channel that will help them gain advantage over their opponents, and the reverse also holds true. This is more likely if losing the dispute to a rival group will have a negative effect on the individuals' or communities' social status, cultural identity, political power, and economic advancement. The underlying utility to maximize is thus an individual's or community's ability to protect its cultural identity, social networks, political arrangements, and economic development.[32]

The aggrieved person considers a course of action based on certain factors over which he or she may or may not have complete control. These factors are referred to as explanatory, exogenous, or independent variables and are estimated using the probit model. The probit model has a normal distribution function for the stochastic term, ε.[31]

With special reference to the Bawku Traditional Area, given that the utility derived from a decision not to do or choose something is U_{i0} and a decision to do or choose it is U_{i1}, we see the following:

$U_{i1}(X) = \beta_1 X_i + \varepsilon_{i1}$; is the decision to do or choose (e.g., to seek redress from an endogenous mechanism) and (1)
$U_{i0}(X) = \beta_0 X_i + \varepsilon_{i0}$; is the decision not to do or choose (e.g., not to seek redress from an endogenous mechanism). (2)
Given that the utilities are random, the ith individual litigant will choose to seek redress from the endogenous system if and only if $U_{i1} > U_{i0}$. For the ith litigant, then, the probability of seeking redress from the endogenous system is given by the following:

$$p(1) = p(U_{i1} > U_{i0})$$

$$p(1) = p(\beta_1 X_i + \varepsilon_{i1} > \beta_0 X_i + \varepsilon_{i0}) \quad (3)$$

$$p(1) = p(\varepsilon_1 i0 - \varepsilon_1 i1 < \beta_1 1\, X_1 i - \beta_1 0\, X_1 i\ ) \quad (4)$$

$$p(1) = p(\varepsilon_i - \beta X_i) \quad (5)$$

$$p(1) = \Phi(\beta X_1 i\ ) \quad (6)$$

where Φ is the cumulative distribution function for the error term ε.
For a given regressor vector, it is expected that

$$\underset{\beta' X \to +\infty}{Limprob}(p=1) = 1 \text{ and } \underset{\beta' X \to -\infty}{Limprob}(p=1) = 0 \quad (7)$$

The standardized normal distribution of the probit model is specified as

$$P_i = \frac{1}{2\pi} \int_{\infty}^{Z_i} e^{\frac{-s^2}{2}} ds \quad (8)$$

where s = a random variable that is normally distributed with zero (0) mean and constant variance (σ).
Given the above, therefore,

$$E[Y] = 0[1 - F(\beta' X)] + 1[F(\beta' X)]$$
$$= F(\beta' X) \quad (9)$$

To estimate this model, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is usually used and is specified as

$$InL = [y_i InF(\beta' X_i) + (1 - y_i)In(1 - F(\beta' X_i)] . \quad (10)$$

The marginal effect of the probit model is computed as

$$\frac{\partial \mathbf{p}}{\partial X_i} = \beta_i f(Z_i) \quad (11)$$

where X is variable i, β_i = the coefficient of variable i and $f(Z_i)$ is the density function of the standard normal distribution.

THE EMPIRICAL MODEL

In the case of the Bawku Traditional Area, the empirical specification of the probit model employed for the study is as follows:

$$prob(Endogenous = 1) = f(X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5, X_6, X_7, X_8, X_9, X_{10}). \quad (12)$$

The variables and their mode of measurements are explained in Table 1.

Table 1: Explanatory variables, their measurements and *a priori* expectations

Variable	Mode of Measurement	*A priori* Expectation/ Effect
Position in community (X_1)	1 = Chief/Opinion leader; 0 = Otherwise	Positive
Cost (X_2)	1 = Cost of access is low; 0 = Otherwise	Positive
Fairness (X_3)	1 = System is fair; 0 = Otherwise	Positive
Speed (X_4)	1 = System is fast; 0 = Otherwise	Negative
Gender (X_5)	1 = Woman; 0 = Otherwise	Positive
Likelihood of success (X_6)	1 = Likely to win case; 0 = Otherwise	Negative
Relationship to opponent (X_7)	1 = Not related to opponent; 0 = Otherwise	Negative
Age (X_8)	Years	Positive
Distance to place ofredress (X_9)	1 = Place of redress is far; 0 = Otherwise	Positive
Formal Education (X_{10})	1 = Had formal education; 0 = Otherwise	Positive/ Negative

Source: From literature and field research of authors, 2010

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Ten explanatory variables were modelled and estimated using the probit model by the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method. The summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in the estimation process are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables of the probit model

Dependent Variable	**Unit of Measurement**	**Frequency/ Mean**
Endogenous Mechanism	Binary	0 = 42; 1 = 158
Independent Variables	**Unit of Measurement**	**Requency/ Mean**
Position in community (X_1)	Binary	0 = 146; 1 = 54
Cost (X_2)	Binary	0 = 78; 1 = 122
Fairness (X_3)	Binary	0 = 66; 1 = 134
Speed (X_4)	Binary	0 = 72; 1 = 128
Gender (X_5)	Binary	0 = 62; 1 = 138
Likelihood of success (X_6)	Binary	0 = 114; 1 = 86
Relationship to opponent (X_7)	Binary	0 = 134; 1 = 66
Age (X_8)	Years	(53)
Distance to place of redress (X_9)	Binary	0 = 98; 1 = 102
Literacy (X_{10})	Binary	0 = 64; 1 = 136

Source: Field Survey Data, 2010

The probit regression results gave a McFadden R-squared of about 0.48, which implies that all the variables included in the model are able to explain about 48 percent of the variability in the choice of the endogenous approach to conflict management and resolution in the Bawku Traditional Area in the Upper East Region of Ghana. The Log Likelihood Ratio (LR), which is found to be significant at 1 percent, means that the individual variables included in the probit model jointly influence an aggrieved person's decision to choose one conflict management and resolution mechanism over another.

Table 3: The probit regression results of factors influencing choices of redress

Variable	Co-efficient	Std. Error	Z-statistic	Marginal Effect
Constant	-0.907348	2.496215	-0.363490	-0.7350
Status in community	2.540429	0.552408	4.598828	2.0578
Cost of approach	0.281078	0.398810	0.70479***	0.2278
Fairness of approach	0.860777	0.416965	2.064387**	0.6972
Speed of approach	0.477863	0.434366	1.100140***	-0.3871
Relationship to opponent	-1.552676	0.497142	-3.123203	-1.2577
Likelihood of success	0.408562	0.615730	0.663541	-0.3309
Gender of respondent	0.739143	0.392652	0.882436**	0.5987
Log (age)	1.448157	0.668442	2.166466	1.1730
Listance to approach	-0.256921	0.482124	-0.532893*	-0.2081
Literacy of respondent	-0.454689	0.509308	-0.892757**	-0.3683
Goodness of fit measures				
Mean dependent variable			0.790000	
Log likelihood			-34.39223	
Restricted log likelihood			-65.89557	
Average log likelihood			-0.343922	
McFadden R-squared			0.478080	
LR statistic (10 df)			63.00668***	

*, **, and *** are at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively.
Source: Field Survey Data, 2010

The mean dependent variable of 0.79 implies that about 79 percent of the people interviewed prefer the endogenous mechanism of redressing the ongoing conflict in the Bawku Traditional Area to the exogenous mechanism. Of the ten variables considered in the probit model estimation (Table 3), six were found to have significant influences on individual decisions to choose a conflict management and resolution mechanism. The six significant factors include the cost of the mechanism, its fairness, its speed, its distance from the respondent, the respondent's gender, and the level of formal education attained.

The probit regression results (Table 3) revealed that the cost involved in seeking redress for conflict using a given conflict management and resolution mechanism has a negative influence on an individual litigant's decision to choose such a mechanism and is significant at 1 percent. This means that the lower the cost of accessing the mechanism, the more likely it is to be chosen in seeking redress for conflicts. Also, fairness has a positive effect on the choice of a conflict management and resolution mechanism and is significant at 5 percent. This implies that as long as a mechanism is deemed to be fair in rendering a solution to the conflict, aggrieved persons will choose it. The speed of a conflict management and resolution approach in reaching an amicable solution is also found to be positively related to an individual litigant's decision to choose it and is significant at 1 percent. This implies that the speed of the mechanism in addressing a conflict between litigants is a critical factor aggrieved persons consider in their search for redress. In addition, the gender of aggrieved persons was found to have positive effect on the choice of a given conflict management and resolution mechanism and is significant at 5 percent. This means that gender plays a critical role in the promotion of the endogenous approach to address conflicts: women are more inclined than men to use it. This finding confirms the fact that gender issues are critical in the management and resolution of conflicts.[34]

The distance of the mechanism to the residence of the aggrieved person was found to be negatively related to the choice of a mechanism and significant at 10 percent. This means that the nearer the redress mechanism, the higher the patronage for such a mechanism. Finally, the level of formal education reached by aggrieved persons was found to have a negative relationship with the choice of redress and to be significant at 5 percent. This implies that people who have formal education are more inclined to choose the exogenous mechanism of redress over the endogenous mechanism. This

finding is consistent with a related study of Mamadu Akudugu and Stephen Kendie in Ghana's Bongo District.[35]

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The factors that influence an individual's decision to choose a given conflict management and resolution mechanism are categorized broadly as exogenous and endogenous factors. The exogenous factors are those factors beyond an individual's control, while endogenous factors are within an individual's control. The exogenous factors in the probit regression estimation are speed, fairness, distance, cost, likelihood of success, age, and gender. The endogenous factors include relationship with the opponent, literacy level, and status in the community.

In summary, the study results reveal that five of the six factors that significantly influence the decision of an individual or group to choose a given conflict management and resolution approach fall within the exogenous category. The significant exogenous factors are speed, fairness, cost, gender, and distance to the given conflict management and resolution mechanism. The endogenous factor is the formal educational attainment of aggrieved persons. Thus feuding factions in the Bawku Traditional Area are unable to control most of the factors that significantly influence decisions to choose a conflict management and resolution mechanism. Also, a majority (79%) of the people in the Bawku Traditional Area prefer the traditional or endogenous mechanism in settling the ongoing conflict to the exogenous mechanism, such as peacekeeping by the security forces, the courts, and the police.

Based on these findings, we offer the following recommendations. First, the majority of the people of the Bawku Traditional Area of the Upper East Region of Ghana prefer the endogenous system of managing and resolving the impasse between the Kusasis and Mamprusis that has continued since December 2000. Governmental and non-governmental organisations mandated to broker peace in the area should focus on strengthening the designated indigenous traditional structures of conflict management and resolution.

Second, six of the ten factors modeled in the probit regression were found to significantly influence the decisions of individuals in choosing a conflict management and resolution mechanism. Of the six significant factors, five are exogenous. Therefore we recommend that interventions

aimed at promoting the endogenous system should target improving these significant factors.

Finally, the fact that most of the people prefer the endogenous system of conflict resolution to the exogenous one provides fertile grounds for the promotion of Community-Based Conflict Management and Resolution Mechanisms in the Bawku Traditional Area. We therefore recommend that relevant bodies working to resolve the conflict in the Bawku Traditional Area should target all efforts at building the competencies of indigenous and community-based institutions, and women in particular, in their attempts to find lasting solutions to the impasse.

ENDNOTES

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Slavko Goldstein. *1941: Godina koja se vraca.* [1941: The year that keeps returning], 2nd ed. Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2007. ISBN: 9789536045488 (Pbk). Pp. 479.

With this book, Goldstein joins those who are inclined to write autobiographical memoirs after achieving prominence in their fields. Goldstein is a prominent journalist and publisher in Croatia who is also the coauthor, with his son Ivo Goldstein, of the impressive 2004 volume *Holocaust in Zagreb*. The most significant aspect of the present book is its temporal dimension and autobiographical account. He starts in 1941, follows through World War II, and then continues through to the violent destruction of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The ever-present theme is the shocking genocide of the Jews, Serbs, and Roma in Croatia.

The year 1941 was tragic for all Yugoslavs regardless of their ethnicity or religion. The country was savagely attacked by Hitler's coalition. A puppet regime of Mussolini and Hitler under the name "Independent State of Croatia" (ISC, or NDH in Croatian) was established. This led to the extensive persecution by the Ustashe (Croatian ultra-nationalist fascists) and large-scale genocide in which close to 400,000 Serbs, Jews, and Roma were killed.

The book is written on several intersecting planes. First, and most significant, is the autobiographical dimension. Goldstein describes his childhood years in Karlovac where his father was a respected bookstore owner. His father was imprisoned by the Ustashe and sent to extermination camp Jadovno on the slopes of Mount Velebit. There he was murdered with tens of thousands of Serbs and Jews. Goldstein's mother Lea was imprisoned for several months. He (eleven years old at the time) and his elder brother Danko were evicted from their home. They were taken care of by Goldstein's friends. Danko was later sent to live with grandparents in Tuzla, which was under Italian control. When Lea was released from prison, she and Slavko were permitted to leave for the Italian zone on the Croatian littoral. There

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they joined the Partisan guerrilla resistance. This memoir dimension permeates the entire book. It is abundant with lucid personal observation and knowledge of events and actors in the historical drama of war-time Croatia.

The dimension that necessarily overlaps with autobiography could be described as the reflective plane of this impressive book. It is the author's description and reflection on events and contemporaries known personally to Goldstein, either as victims, Ustasha activists, or resistance fighters. This aspect of the book is of particular interest to those who lived in Karlovac, Zagreb, and Glina at the time the author describes. To this part belong also Goldstein's thoughts on the causes of Yugoslav disintegration through violent civil war in the 1990s. His explanations include the lack of democratic dialogue among major ethnic groups, their "natural differences," and the "authoritarian Bolshevik nature of Tito's rule," but these simply do not reflect reality. Goldstein's reasoning disregards external factors such as the interests of the United States and Germany in the dissolution of the country.

Goldstein's third plane is an attempt to compare the 1941 Ustasha reign of terror and genocidal massacres to killings with destruction during the renewed conflict between Croats and Serbs in the 1990s. From this comes Goldstein's title, *The Year that Keeps Returning*. He highlights the repetition of animosities and violence in the two periods separated by forty-five years of shared life. The bulk of this voluminous book is centred on the year 1941. The author's description of the slaughter of three hundred and fifty male Serbs in the town of Glina on 12-13 May 1941 should be commended for its accuracy.

The most interesting and successful section is Goldstein's comparison of two Croatian villages in the Kordun region—the Serbian Prkos and the Croat Banski Kovacevac—and the destructive losses suffered by their residents in widely different times. His account of the destinies of the two villages, though very perceptive, should nonetheless be critiqued. The almost total destruction of Prkos in 1941, with close to six hundred lives lost, can hardly be compared with some dozen people killed in Banski Kovacevac in the 1990s. Tragically, the same town was the site of another horrible genocide when, on 29-30 July 1941, some three hundred Serb peasants were taken by force from their village and massacred in their own church in the centre of town. It is not clear why Goldstein ignores this horrible crime, but he gives it barely a mention.

Although not based on archival documentation, this work is more than

successful journalism. It is a rich and valuable source of historical data and of personal reflections by an active participant and witness to the historical events in Croatia during World War II and after. For this reason the book is of special interest to Goldstein's contemporaries. The work has received high praise by reviewers in Croatia, as well as by C. Simic in *The New York Review of Books* (July 2009). Moreover, *1941: The Year that Keeps Returning*, is more than a documentation of a specific time and place. It is an emotional and shattering account of horrible destruction befalling numerous Jewish and Serb families in war-torn Croatia.

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Gordon W. Russell. *Aggression in the Sports World: A Social Psychological Perspective.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-19-518959-9 (Hbk). Pp. 273.

> Fights among spectators or between factions typically break out suddenly, often with little warning . . . . Those in the vicinity of the disorder can be seen to assume various roles, from mere observers, to baiting/encouraging the protagonists, to leaving the facility; still others join in the fray. However, there is a fifth category, that is, peacemakers. Particularly in film footage, these individuals can often be seen stepping forward attempting to verbally and/or physically dissuade those engaged in combat (155).

The late Professor Emeritus Gordon W. Russell (1931-2012) of the University of Lethbridge was an international expert in the field of aggression, with specialization in sports aggression. He was a founding member, secretary, and treasurer of the International Society for Research on Aggression. Russell's *Aggression in the Sports World* is a far-ranging exploration of aggression in sport, including topics such as aggression by fans, athletes, and officials; crowd violence; possible sources of aggression; and the impact of media on sports violence. Russell does not stop with an analysis of aggression. He ventures into the important arena of solutions. Fortunately,

Russell's interest is not just with the violent—he also examines those who are, or could be, peacemakers and defusers of crowd violence. His work outlines who are most likely to take this role and what enables them to be effective. Moreover, Russell is not satisfied with a simple survey of the research. The last two chapters of his book examine the roots and patterns that underlie riots and panics, and also provide thoughtful research-based answers to the problems.

The undeniable strength of *Aggression in the Sports World* is Russell's expansive knowledge of and passion for both the fields of aggression research and sport. Russell surveys a vast number of studies, pulling in data specifically on sports, and looking at related studies that shed light on sports violence. He presents and analyzes the experimental data smoothly. Russell is careful to draw from a variety of sports and a plethora of geographic locales. He shows significant sensitivity to issues of gender, numerous times referring to the gendered limitations of certain studies, lamenting "a sparse literature on effects on females" (67). Russell does rather less well (as do the researchers of the studies to which he refers) in naming and acknowledging the influences of cultural differences and dynamics.

The target audience of *Aggression in the Sports World* is "scholars, students and sports savvy fans" (dust jacket). Readers will enjoy the numerous intriguing examples and sports vignettes, and will appreciate Russell's evident sense of humour. In writing about a sports panic incited by professional wrestlers wielding a flame-thrower, for instance, Russell notes the absence of police who at that time "were outside the arena proper, guarding a nearby coffee counter" (181). Russell also aids readers who wish to go more deeply into a topic by providing an annotated list of "Suggested Readings" at the end of each chapter, as well as a copious list of references at the book's end.

There are, however, structural limitations of the book that will render it somewhat inaccessible for some readers. The book lacks both an introduction and a conclusion, making it hard slogging at first to follow the threads of Russell's theses. Furthermore, the chapter explaining research methodologies is oddly placed at the end rather than at the beginning, where it might have been better integrated. While some terms are helpfully defined, others are left to the reader to interpret. "Combatant sports," for instance, are those "which reasonably could be expected to serve as an alternative to war" (Sipes in Russell, 5), but no clarifying examples are given. It is only later in the book that we learn that while boxing is considered a combative sport,

wrestling is not (68).

Shortcomings notwithstanding, Russell has a written an informative and valuable survey of the research and literature related to sports aggression. Unafraid to criticize and note the failings of the studies to which he refers, Russell is also willing to acknowledge the limitations of our present understanding of human motivations and actions. Best of all, he does us all a service by bringing together into one source the recommendations of a multitude of aggression researchers and studies.

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Craig Zelizer and Robert A. Rubinstein, eds. *Building Peace: Practical Reflections from the Field*. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2009. ISBN: 9781565492868 (Pbk). Pp. 352.

Zelizer and Rubinstein articulate their book's genesis: peacebuilding activities and programs have grown "despite the lack of agreed upon ways of documenting the effects and success of these efforts. In order to begin to correct this imbalance the Alliance for Peacebuilding, an organization that serves as a convener, coordinator, and clearinghouse for many of these efforts, asked its members to engage this challenge" (1). Each of the thirteen chapters that follow provides background on the conflict addressed and a description and evaluation of the initiatives that followed.

The editors note, "We intend this book to provide knowledge, inspiration, and tools for policymakers, academics and practitioners" (2). To achieve this comprehensive goal, they focus on diverse programs from an array of societies at different points of development. Programs include mitigating ethnic conflict in Romania and Montenegro; integrating democratic practice in the transitioning state of Slovakia; resolving land disputes in postconflict Guatemala, East Timor, and Sri Lanka; supporting peacebuilding artists in a variety of countries; building democratic traditions in Lesotho; incorporating peacebuilding into health care to benefit Muslims, Serbs, and Croats in the former Yugoslavia; mainstreaming gender in a militarized, male-dominated Angola; building multicultural understanding among ethnic groups in the newly antonomous Crimea; creating radio programs for social

change in Sierra Leone; fostering citizen peacebuilding between Abkhazians and Georgians, whose conflict is still unresolved; and training educators to promote tolerance and inclusion among Macedonians and Albanians.

The book's most surprising chapter focuses on peacebuilding among Jewish settlers in Yaad and Palestinians who were former inhabitants or descendants of Miaar, a hilltop village that disappeared with the founding of Israel. The authors delineate each step in this track-two process. Four separate workshops of several days each gave each community's representatives the opportunity to learn about interactive problem solving, to acquire facilitation and consensus building skills, and to develop empathy. After each participant told his or her family story of the conflict, the facilitators observed that uprooting was the one theme connecting all the narratives, despite different histories, interpretations, and even facts. The authors identify this result of the initiative: this was "the first time that Israeli Jews . . . decided not to build on what used to be an Arab village out of respect for the pain and suffering of the former Arab inhabitants. As far as we know, it was also the first time for members of two such communities to air mutual grievances, share memories and pain, empathize, and resolve to act jointly" (157). This may seem like a modest accomplishment amidst persistent international strife between Jews and Arabs, but the meticulous process is an excellent model of local rather than government peacebuilding that uses facilitated conversation to decrease animosity and increase trust.

Filled with "practical reflections," the chapters sometimes read like final reports to reassure funders that the projects they supported were successful. A vivid exception is "An 85 Percent Settlement Rate and a 91 Percent Compliance: But What Happened to the Rest, and Why?" The alternative conflict resolution programs of the Russian-American Program in Conflictology and its St. Petersburg Conflict Resolution Center have had many successes, but this chapter focuses on cases not resolved or in which the parties did not implement an agreement. It also provides a useful explanation of conflictology: "The Western approach focused on 'fixing' or 'correcting' a situation. In contrast, Russian methods seek to prevent the conflict from occurring at all, yet they support the development of intermediate management or mitigation activities and even remedies, if the situation so requires" (56).

Endorsing no single model or strategy, Zelizer and Rubinstein offer eight key themes:

1. Peacebuilding is a long-term process;

2. Practice needs to be located in local culture and contexts;
3. Outsiders can play a vital role in peacebuilding;
4. Assessment is key;
5. Peacebuilding is not a linear process;
6. Collaboration among peacebuilding actors is critical;
7. Cross-sectoral work is increasingly important;
8. Gender sensitivity is important.

Building Peace is engaging because the narratives are very diverse and written with intimate immediacy. The book will be helpful to students and practitioners by offering such a wide variety in a single volume. These pragmatic case studies offer frequent reminders that peacebuilding relies on fragile interpersonal relationships that require artfulness as much as knowledge and worthy intentions. The book is a vivid reminder that there is no simple calculus of identifying a problem, conceiving and implementing a strategy, and then awaiting a permanent solution.

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